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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, the embodied cognition proposal that action words are directly and 
automatically mapped into the perceiver’s sensorimotor system, and understood via 
motor simulation, has been put under the lenses of neuropsychology, psychophysics, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) investigation. The objective was to establish whether the tie between language 
understanding and motor simulation is necessary for the former to be effective, to the 
extent that a virtual identity can be recognized between action and language systems. 
In Chapter 1, the ability of left-damaged patients to perform actions and comprehend 
their names, was assessed under those stimulus- and task-conditions (i.e., equally early-
acquired verbal and motor tasks involving perceptually and conceptually identical 
stimuli) that are held to increase maximally the degree of overlap between the two 
systems. Even so, I found double dissociations between action and action-language 
performances, and no relationship between deficits in action-word comprehension and 
lesions in motor and premotor regions. These findings clearly show that motor 
substrates (and processes) are not essential for action-word understanding.  
Building on this finding, I proposed that motor simulation in language reflects one 
imagery-based interface mediating strategically (i.e., when needed) the information 
transfer from one system (action) to an independent one (language). To corroborate this 
interpretation, I had to demonstrate that, first, motor activity does not always occur in 
action-language processing and, second, that it is triggered by the same conditions that 
elicit motor imagery. Indeed, imagery recruits motor processes and substrates only 
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when people mentally represent, or stimuli evoke, bodily movements in an egocentric 
(embodied), first-person perspective. 
Using TMS, I found that motor simulation, as reflected in primary motor (M1) activity, 
steps in language processing only when the task required the explicit retrieval of action 
knowledge (versus other aspects) associated with a word (Chapter 3). Importantly, M1 
activity enhanced only after 400 ms, a time interval beyond that for lexical-semantic 
encoding, and within that for imagery. A second TMS study (Chapter 4) shows that M1 
activity increased selectively for actions attributed to the self versus a third 
subject/agent. Not only can the motor system distinguish the self from another, but it 
can also disentangle humans from non-human motion. In chapter 5, I provided evidence 
that action-language affects a subsequent motor behavior when the sentential context 
describes human action versus mechanical motion. These findings resticted from all to 
certain the conditions that make the cross-talk between language and motor system 
possible, compatibly with the circumstances that elicit a motor strategy of imagery. An 
fMRI study (Chapter 6) provides decisive demonstration that simulation in language is 
so truly a strategy that it can be prevented by context-dependent factors, even for tasks 
and stimuli with salient sensorimotor components, and can be readily learnt and 
imposed top-down to the processing of (nonaction) words that do not normally elicit it.  
Motor simulation, in action-word understanding, is defined by the reliance on top-down 
higher-level factors, such as the individuals’ attention to sensorimotor aspects of 
stimuli, the representation of self as distinct from others, the sentential and the cognitive 
(neural) context. That is, the engagement of this modality of processing in language 
requires a cognitive mediation that is not predicted by the direct matching between a 
perceived word and the corresponding motor representation. This research whishes to 
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contribute to our understanding of how information flows from basic (motor) to specific 
(linguistic) domains, within the flexible, creative, distributed architecture, which is the 
human brain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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“No, Ernest, don't talk about action.  
It is a blind thing dependent on external influences, and moved by an impulse of whose 
nature it is unconscious. It is a thing incomplete in its essence, because limited by 
accident, and ignorant of its direction, being always at variance with its aim. Its basis is 
the lack of imagination. It is the last resource of those who know not how to dream.” 
 
Oscar Wilde - The critic as artist - 1891 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the nature of conceptual representations? Are they symbolic or innate? What is 
the role of physical experience in human knowledge of the world? These questions have 
structured the history of ideas for thousands of years, opposing Plato to Aristotle, the 
rationalism of Descartes to the empiricism of Locke and Hume, the nativism of Chomsky 
to the constructivism of Piaget. Recently, cognitive science and neuroscience have 
addressed this issue by trying to establish how knowledge is acquired and represented in 
the human brain. In the latest version of this debate, an embodied approach to human 
cognition has been opposed to a disembodied one.  
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1.1. Embodied cognition 
Although with no unique definition (see Chrisley & Ziemke, 2002; Wilson, 2002), 
the idea of “embodiment”, since the mid-1980s, has been developed in cognitive science 
and artificial intelligence (AI), promoting the view that physical experience with the 
world is a condition sine qua non for any form of intelligence or knowledge (Pfeifer & 
Scheier, 1999). According to this view, meaningful concepts arise from the history of 
humans’ bodily interaction with the environment and from humans’ innate capacity to 
project from sensorimotor and social experience to conceptual structures (Lakoff, 1987; 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 1999). A typical example can be found in the abstract concept 
of “grasping the idea” that may be grounded in the bodily experience of grasping a 
physical object with one’s own hand. This view is not novel, but stems from a tradition of 
Motor Theories of Cognition in psychology, which dates back at least to the eighteenth 
century (Berkeley, 1709; Liberman et al., 1967; Washburn, 1914; Watson, 1913; see 
Scheerer, 1984, for an overview). The first detailed articulation of the new generation of 
embodied theories was by Allport (1985), who proposed that conceptual knowledge is 
organized according to sensory and motor modalities, and that the information 
represented within different modalities was format-specific. In other words, the same 
neural processes that are involved in coding the sensory attributes of an object presented 
to senses, also constitute the basis for the conceptual representation of objects in 
(semantic) memory. Accordingly, the comprehension process is modal, as it corresponds 
to the re-enactment (Prinz, 1997) of previous experience associated with a perceived 
stimulus, including its sensory and motor aspects, and introspective and affective states 
that typically accompanied interaction with that entity (Barsalou, 1999; 2009; Damasio et 
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al., 2004; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Prinz 2002; Zwaan 2004). The specific stance of 
embodied accounts of language is that all words always and necessarily activate the 
internal simulation of the perceptual or motor experience implied by words, because 
conceptual representations are directly mapped onto the neural substrates for action and 
perception, without any cognitive mediation (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Importantly, 
this view predicts that perception and action are functionally linked in the brain, and 
share mechanisms in a frontoparietal sensorimotor system (Braitenberg & Schüz, 1998; 
Fadiga et al., 2000; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). This system, and particularly its 
frontal motor aspect, would the basis and the seat of action understanding. 
 
1.2. Disembodied cognition 
The disembodied approach corresponds to the classic view of cognitive science 
thst concepts are stored in the form of abstract, modality-independent representations or 
symbols, within dedicated cerebral structures, remote from the mechanisms of perception 
and action (Fodor, 1983; Shallice, 1988). Symbols retrieve much of their meaning by 
their association with other symbols, and processing their meaning is amodal, in that it 
does not engage, in the first place, modality-specific systems involved in the perception 
of, or interaction with the physical referent (Fodor, 1975; Kintsch, 1998; Landauer & 
Dumais, 1997; Pylyshyn, 1984).  
The symbolic nature of conceptual representations, however, does not exclude 
that sensorimotor experience can play a role in conceptual organization. In various 
“disembodied” theorizations, in fact, symbolic representations of objects are largely 
shaped and organized by sensory and motor experience. For instance, on one account, 
 16 
conceptual organization is held to be constrained by the modality in which individuals 
interact with objects (i.e., sensory/perceptual or motor/functional), resulting in modality-
specific subsystems that parallel the sensory and motor modalities of input and output 
(the Sensory/Functional Theory; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983; 1987; Warrington & 
Shallice, 1984). On another account, conceptual organization is suggested to reflect 
object domains (e.g., living animate, living inanimate, conspecifics and tools) that result 
from the evolutionarily relevant history of interaction with the environment (Caramazza 
& Shelton 1998; Carey, 2009; Carey & Spelke, 1994). A third class of theories is based 
on the Correlated Structure Principle, whereby semantic memory is organized as to 
represent statistical regularities, namely, the co-occurrence of different types of features 
or properties in the world, which determines different categories of objects (Caramazza et 
al., 1990; Devlin et al., 1998; McClelland & Rogers, 2003; Tyler & Moss, 2001; refer to 
Mahon & Caramazza, 2009, for a more extensive review of theories of concepts). The 
specific stance of disembodied accounts is that conceptual content, while tied in 
important ways to sensory and motor systems, is more abstract than the token-based 
information contained within the sensory and motor (or sensorimotor) systems. 
Thus, the crucial difference between embodied and disembodied theories concerns 
the nature of conceptual representations in the brain, modal or embodied in sensorimotor 
experience on one hand, symbolic and amodal on the other hand.   
Traditionally, the literature on the debate about whether language comprehension 
is fundamentally symbolic or embodied has largely followed the distinction between 
psycholinguistic and computational linguistic approaches. Psychophysics has provided 
instruments for investigating the embodiment of language by showing the effects of word 
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contents on motor behavior, or the effects of motor or perceptual processes on language 
processing (e.g., Boroditsky, 2000; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan et al., 2002; 
Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). On the other hand, the majority of symbolism publications are 
computational, showing how data are related to corpus linguistic findings (Burgess, 1998; 
Howard & Kahanna, 2002; Kintsch, 1998; Landauer, 2002; Landauer & Dumais, 1997; 
Steyvers et al., 2004). This debate and the related empirical investigation have recently 
received new impetus by the discovery of neural underpinnings that may subserve the 
embodiment, and by the availability of a range of techniques (e.g., functional and 
structural neuroimaging and transcranial magnetic stimulation) that allow exploring more 
or less deeply these neural mechanisms. 
 
1.3. Language in the body: a perfect story 
To the earlier theorizations of motor involvement in cognition (i.e., the motor 
theories of cognition; see Scheerer, 1984), the renewed framework of embodied cognition 
has added the description of a mechanism, the mirror matching, and its neural 
underpinnings, the mirror neurons, which have the potential to explain how 
comprehension meets action. According to the mirror matching, action understanding 
results from the automatic mapping of a perceived action onto the perceiver’s motor 
system (“self-other shared representation”), where an internal simulation of that action is 
carried out (Rizzolatti et al., 2001). This process may be accomplished by a population of 
neurons in the sensorimotor circuitry that display the characteristic to respond both when 
individuals observe another’s action and when they perform the same action on 
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themselves. Thus, motor areas may be endowed with a mechanism that matches a 
perceived action on the perceiver’s internal representation of that action.  
Studies on monkey brain have described neurons in the posterior motor area F5 
with such mirror properties between action and vision (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese 
et al., 1996) or between action and audition (i.e., hearing the sound associated with an 
action; Kohler et al., 2002), suggesting that the same mechanism applies to action 
processing, regardless of the modality thorough which the action is perceived or inferred. 
In humans, left-lateralized motor activity has been found not only when an action is 
observed (Fadiga et al., 1995), but also when a word implying an action is presented 
(Hauk et al., 2004), to the extent that the mirror matching has been generalized to action-
language comprehension (see Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010, for a recent overview) 1. On 
this view, the lexical-semantic processing of an action word, just like the processing of 
any action-stimulus, may depend upon the early, automatic and necessary activation of 
the agent-neutral (i.e., the same for self and other’s actions) motor representation 
involved in the execution of the same physical act, via motor simulation (Barsalou, 2009; 
Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; see  
Pulvermüller, 1999, for different but compatible proposal). Notice that this theorization 
rests upon the assumptions that word representations are modality-specific, while 
sensorimotor system for word processing is modality-neutral, in that it treats any action-


Here, we focus on the extent to which the motor system is involved in semantic representations of words 
and in word understanding, although the debate touches other levels of language processing too, including 
phonemic (Liberman, 1967; Wilson et al., 2004), orthographic (Galantucci, 2005) and syntactic processing 
(Glenberg & Kaschack, 2004; Fogassi & Ferrari, 2007), as well as conversation or pragmatics (Scott et al., 
2009).
 19 
related stimulus in a similar manner, regardless of its modality (verbal, auditory, motor or 
perceptual). 
While the existence of mirror neurons in humans is still hotly debated and, given 
the available evidence, very unlikely (Dinstein et al., 2007; 2008; Lingnau et al., 2009; 
see Hickok, 2009; Turella et al., 2009; for critical reviews), a mirror matching-like 
mechanism in humans, whereby actions are understood via motor simulation, could be 
inferred by several lines of evidence. First, the monkey area F5, where mirror neurons 
were first found, is the homologue of the language-related Broca’s region in the human 
brain (see Hagoort, 2005). Both F5 and Broca’s region have similar location within the 
frontal cortex (i.e., in the inferior precentral cortex), and cytoarchitectonic similarities 
(Patrides & Pandya, 1994). Moreover, a positron emission tomography (PET) experiment 
showed that Broca’s area may be also actived during action observation (Rizzolatti et al., 
1996), leading to the conjectural account that this region is the missing ring, in evolution, 
between an archaic manual communication system to human language (Rizzolatti & 
Arbib, 1998).  
Second, “the 90% of apraxics is aphasic” (Ajuriaguerra et al., 1960):  when 
damage affects the left hemisphere, aphasia, the disturbance of linguistic function, is 
often accompanied by apraxia, a disorder affecting the purposeful performance of 
actions. Moreover, systematic studies have reported correlations between the severity of 
aphasia and apraxia (De Renzi, Pieczuro & Vignolo, 1966; Dee et al., 1970; Hecaen, 
1962; Kertesz & Hooper, 1982; Liepman, 1905). Even when motor performance is spared 
in aphasics, verbal impairment is often associated with deficits in nonverbal processing. 
Critically, impaired pantomime recognition is reported as a common correlate of aphasia. 
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For instance, Duffy and colleagues (Duffy & Duffy, 1981; Duffy, Duffy & Pearson, 
1975) reported that, in aphasics, deficits in naming ability, auditory comprehension and 
general linguistic competence were tightly correlated with pantomime recognition and 
expression. In a group of 40 aphasics, Varney (1978) documented that, except for 4 cases, 
all patients exhibited a close relationship between deficits in pantomime recognition and 
reading comprehension. Aphasic patients can also exhibit the disturbance of symbolic 
gesture comprehension (Gainotti & Ibbia, 1972), and this impairment was found to 
correlate with verbal semantic impairment (Gainotti & Lemmo, 1976). Ferro et al. (1980) 
replicated the correlation between impairments on gesture recognition and auditory 
comprehension in 111 aphasics, and proposed that the type of aphasia could have an 
effect on gesture recognition, in that impairment on this ability was more pronounced in 
cases of global, Wernicke’s and transcortical aphasia than in Broca’s, conduction and 
anominc aphasics (but see Daniloff et al., 1982). Gainotti (1980) proposed a link between 
impairments on nonverbal abilities of aphasics (e.g., gesture recognition) and the failure 
of lexical-semantic process, as the poorest performance on nonverbal tests was obtained 
by patients with pronounced lexical-semantic impairments. More recently, in a group of 
29 aphasics, Saygin et al. (2004) identified a sub-group of 23 patients, with correlated 
impairments of action understanding in verbal (i.e., reading) and non-verbal modality 
(i.e., pantomime interpretation). Likewise, tool-use pantomimes of a group of 40 aphasics 
correlated significantly with their performance on linguistic tests (Goldenberg, Hartmann 
& Schlott, 2003). A correlation has been also observed between aphasia and the ability to 
perform naturalistic actions involving technical devices (e.g., making a coffee; Hartmann, 
Goldenberg et al., 2005). The embodied hypothesis of language arguing for a virtual 
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identity of conceptual and sensorimotor representations seems to represent the obvious 
explanation for associated deficits in linguistic and nonlinguistic domains. 
A third line of evidence in favor of the embodied account of language consists in 
empirical demonstration of the phenomenon of motor resonance, i.e. the modulation of 
motor behavior or motor activity during language processing. A number of behavioral 
studies have shown that language content influence motor response. For instance, 
Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) reported that moving the arm toward or away from the 
body was facilitated when preceded by sentences describing a transfer-action in a 
congruent direction, such as “Andy delivered the pizza to you” (see also Zwaan & 
Taylor, 2006). Tucker and Ellis (2004) showed that merely presenting people with the 
name of a manipulable object facilitated a manual (power or precision) grip, consistent 
with that required to actually manipulate the object (see also Bub, Masson & Cree, 2008, 
for consistent results). Gentilucci and Gangitano (1998) showed that reading words such 
as “long” and “short” affected the kinematics of reaching movements (e.g., peak 
acceleration, peak velocity, and peak deceleration of the arm), suggesting that even the 
processing of words with no obvious motor content can interact with the motor system. 
Complementary evidence exists for the influence of perception and action on language 
comprehension: typically, the comprehension of a verbally described action is facilitated 
by a visual prime specifying that action (Klatsky et al., 1989; see also Zwaan et al., 
2002). Taken together these studies suggest that language comprehension can activate 
perceptual and motor representations that interact with concurrent sensorimotor 
processes. 
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Imaging, electrophysiological and transcranial magnetic stimulation studies 
provide physiological support to those behavioral phenomena. Using fMRI, Hauk, 
Johnsrude and Pulvermüller (2004) showed that passive reading verbs denoting hand-, 
leg- and face-actions (e.g., to pick, kick and lick) activated left motor and premotor 
regions for hand-, leg- and face-actions, respectively. Similar somatotopic activations 
were found in the premotor cortex using sentences rather than words (e.g., Aziz-Zadeh et 
al., 2006; Tettamanti et al., 2005). Further evidence for motor activation upon exposure to 
action verbs came from a study using highdensity MEG (Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & 
Ilmoniemi, 2005). Here subjects were engaged in a distracting task while listening to 
words denoting leg- or face-actions. Different patterns of activation were found for leg 
and face words in frontocentral regions, within 200 ms after word onset, a temporal delay 
that well matches that for lexical-semantic access (Pulvermüller et al., 2005). TMS over 
the primary motor cortex (M1) elicits motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in peripheral 
muscles responding to the stimulated area, providing a measure of corticospinal 
excitability. With this technique, Oliveri et al. (2004) found increased left M1 activity 
when participants performed a morphological transformation task involving concrete 
nouns (i.e., producing either the singular or the plural form) and action verbs (producing 
either the third person singular or plural inflected form), relative to abstract nouns and 
verbs. Using sentences, Buccino et al. (2005) reported a somatotopic modulation of the 
left M1 activity, in either the hand or leg area, when participants listened to hand-action 
and leg-action sentences, respectively (see also Glenberg et al., 2008)  
This ensemble of findings (see for a more extensive review, Fisher & Zwaan, 
2008; see also Willems & Hagoort, 2007, for a critical review) supports the stance that 
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language processing recruits the motor systems, where action meanings, just like bodily 
movements, are somatotopically represented (Pulvermüller, 2005). Moreover, motor 
responses appear as automatic as lexical-semantic word processing (Pulvermüller, 2005), 
to the extent that the mere exposure to a single action-word is sufficient to activate the 
motor system. The question is: is the motor system sufficient (and necessary) for 
processing action language?  
 
1.4. Language in the body?  
Despite overwhelming evidence, there is one good reason to accept that 
embodiment is the whole story about language understanding, against a number of 
questions that remain unanswered. The embodied stance that we understand action 
because we can perform and, therefore, simulate that action, is simple to comprehend and 
easy to believe, given that the influence of bodily experience on the most abstract 
thoughts is a daily experience of everyone. “The only question that any one cares to raise 
is how much of it will the known facts permit one to accept” (Pillsbury, 1911, p. 84, 
quoted in Hickok, 2009).  
If the system for motor production plays a constitutive role not only in action 
perception but also in conceptual processing of action, then one should expect that 
damage to this system should always be accompanied by defective language and 
conceptual processing of action words. The study of neurological populations, therefore, 
provides the most stringent test of the causal relationship between sensorimotor and 
language/conceptual processes.  
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Although the embodied account relies (also) on the aforementioned associations 
between apraxia and aphasia, these findings cannot be assumed as a proof of causal 
relationship between sensorimotor and language/conceptual deficits (or processes). The 
reported associations were found in groups of stroke patients, who is the pathological 
population the most frequently studied by cognitive neuropsychologists, given the 
dramatically high incidence of cerebrovascular accidents, worldwide (Hachinsky, 2002). 
However, following a stroke, a cognitive deficit rarely comes in isolation. Particularly in 
right-handed individuals, ideomotor apraxia (IMA) and ideational apraxia (IA) are 
mainly associated with lesions in the language-dominant left hemisphere. The main 
symptom associated with IMA is a reduction in action imitation while the main symptom 
of IA is a deficit in object use (deficit in pantomiming the use of objects has been found 
in association with either imitation deficit or object use deficit). Thus, the association 
between apraxia and aphasia may merely reflect the encroachment of the lesion upon 
contiguous structures, which are differentially dedicated to language and praxis. 
Alternatively, the association can result from a failure of a third component that is 
involved both in verbal and nonverbal abilities, as suggested by a number of studies 
(Goldenberg, Hartmann, & Schlott, 2003; Lehmkuhl & Poeck, 1981; Rumiati et al., 
2001). For this reason, any conclusion driven from associated linguistic and nonlinguistic 
impairments cannot imply necessarily a functional dependence between systems (Saffran, 
1982; Schwartz, 1984). The ambiguity of relying on symptom association is further 
suggested by reports of uncorrelated performances in groups of aphasics, for instance, 
between production of transitive and intransitive pantomime versus their comprehension 
(Goodglass & Kaplan, 1963; Wang & Goodglass, 1992), verbal comprehension versus 
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pantomime recognition (Bell, 1994), and comprehension of sentences describing actions 
versus comprehension of the same actions when visually presented (Saygin et al., 2004).  
On the whole, evidence of correlated or uncorrelated performance based on group 
analysis can reflect an overall trend, while masking individual cases with dissociations 
that go in the opposite direction relative to this tendency (see Caramazza, 1986; Shallice, 
1988). Indeed, when the performance of single patients was considered, double 
dissociations were reported, which are held to constitute the most solid basis to infer the 
organization of cognitive abilities in patients, and processes in models (Shallice, 1988). 
For instance, Liepmann (1905) described 7 non-aphasic patients with apraxia, 6 of whom 
had right-sided hemiplegia. Kertesz, Ferro and Shewan (1984) found that of 177 left-
stroke patients, 6 had severe aphasia but normal praxis abilities. De Renzi et al. (1980) 
studied 100 left-damaged patients and found a positive, significant correlation between 
imitation scores and a measure of verbal competence (measured with the Token test). 
However, the study of individual cases showed that 12 of the 60 aphasics in the group 
were not impaired in the imitation task, while of the 40 non-aphasic patients, 2 showed a 
selective deficit in performing the imitation task. Papagno, Della Sala and Basso (1993) 
reported that 10 out of 699 patients exhibited a deficit in imitating actions without 
aphasia, and 149 of them were aphasic but not apraxic. Recently, Mengotti et al. (2009) 
described, in a group of 61 left-damaged patients, 6 with a selective impairment in 
language and 5 with a selective deficit in imitation. This functional independence 
between language and praxis related to their anatomical segregation. In fact, using the 
Voxel-based Lesion Symptom Mapping (VLSM), the authors found that imitation deficit 
was associated with lesion in the angular gyrus and bordering white matter, while aphasia 
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was associated with lesion in superior temporal and insular cortex (Mengotti et al., 2009). 
Consistently, in a group of 37 unilateral stroke-patients double dissociations at the 
behavioral level (Negri et al., 2007), and anatomical dissociations (Mahon et al., 2007) 
were found, when the ability to imitate and use objects was compared with the ability to 
name and recognize (in name-to-picture matching task) pantomimes of object-use and 
objects. Dissociation between apraxia and aphasia well matches reported double 
dissociation between deficits in motor production versus deficits in recognition of visual 
actions and objects, or in their conceptual knowledge (e.g., Cubelli, Marchetti, Boscolo, 
& Della Salla, 2000; Mozaz, Rothi, Anderson, Crucian, & Heilman, 2002; Ochipa, Rothi, 
& Heilman, 1989; Rapcsak, Ochipa, Anderson, & Poizner, 1995; Rosci et al., 2003; Rothi 
et al., 1986, Rumiati, Zanini, Vorano, & Shallice, 2001; see Mahon & Caramazza, 2005).  
As noted by Gainotti and Lemmo (1976), nonverbal impairment is highly variable 
among aphasic subjects, so that, in the spectrum of possible relationships between verbal 
and nonverbal impairments, there are aphasic patients who can still produce high rates of 
effective nonverbal (motor) behavior and retain nonverbal competence. Double 
dissociations cast serious doubt on the hypothesis that motor system, via simulation, 
sustains a general and necessary mechanism for processing language with motor content.  
At very least, neuropsychological dissociations make the conclusion that action 
and language representational systems are virtually identical unlikely. Neither 
opportunely justified is the conclusion that, in normal individuals, language-induced 
motor activity (or simulation) truly served lexical-semantic encoding of action-related 
language. In fact, based on the imaging studies reporting motor activations during passive 
exposure to action language (e.g., Hauk et al., 2004; Tettamanti et al., 2005), it is not 
 27 
clear which type of processing participants were engaged in, because an online measure 
of participants’ performance was not recorded (or provided). What is more, no TMS 
study proved that when M1 activity was disrupted by the TMS-induced neural noise, the 
processing of action language was altered or abolished (a possibility that appears 
unlikely, given the neuropsychological results!). In fact, the above TMS studies (e.g., 
Buccino et al., 2005; Oliveri et al., 2004) failed to provide a measure of participants’ 
performance on action language during TMS delivery. Finally, the effects of congruence 
between language and motor behaviour can only suggest that language and motor 
systems interact at some unspecified level (Kornblum et al. 1990); however, in this sort of 
experiments, participants are often cued explicitly to activate sensorimotor modalities by 
tasks that involve skills such as visuo-spatial analysis of pictorial information and 
movement to button press, or require deep semantic analysis (e.g., semantic judgments, 
sensibility ratings, memory load) focusing participants’ attention on the sensorimotor 
content of language. This consideration suggests that, under certain circumstances, 
language understanding may be supported by sensorimotor processes, without implying 
that language is solely embodied.  
 
1.5. The working hypothesis  
A theory is warranted to integrate the neuropsychological evidence of distinct 
representational systems and processes for action and language, with the phenomenon of 
language-induced motor resonance. This objective poses the primary question to establish 
whether motor simulation in language is really a component of the lexical-semantic 
processing of action words.  
 28 
The initial discovery of mirror neurons in premotor - but not in primary motor - 
regions of monkey brain led some scholars to claim that ‘‘mirror’’ responses to action 
observation reflected a higher-level function, beyond the mere implementation of a motor 
command, resulting in covert motor activity (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti et 
al., 2001). Despite so, Tkach et al. (2007) have recently described mirror neurons M1 of 
macaques, leaving open a possibility that “mirror” activity indeed reflects covert 
generation of a motor command in response to action-stimuli, via learned associations.  
This argument may extend to the role of motor system in language. The embodied 
view interprets language-induced motor simulation in terms of lexical-semantic 
processing for language processing. Again, this conclusion seems to overlook the 
possibility that the motor system in language supports motor functions. Motor imagery, 
the ability of humans to generate, manipulate and transform mental images of actions, is a 
cognitive state that can be experienced by everyone in everyday life, and can be 
strategically engaged to assist virtually any cognitive task, by recalling perceptual 
information from memory when a stimulus is not physically present (Kosslyn, Behrmann 
& Jeannerod, 1995). This process, though complex it might be, largely relies on the 
mechanisms for overt action execution, including motor brain network, keneasthetic 
sensations and autonomic activation (Decety, Jeannerod, Durozard & Baverel; 1993; 
Jeannerod, 2001), to the extent that it is defined a “true motor behavior”.  
Thus, the proposal of an intense exchange between motor system and higher-level 
cognition (language as well as learning, memory, abstract or concrete reasoning) is 
neither novel, nor surprising. Embodied cognition goes beyond this, claiming that the tie 
between language processing and motor system is necessary for the former to be 
 29 
effective. However, no evidence can so far rule out the possibility that motor activity in 
language reflect imagery, providing a strategic interface between two independent 
systems to achieve or facilitate comprehension.  
The evaluation of the two alternatives (necessary or strategic simulation) asks to 
establish, in the first place, whether or not it always occurs in language. However, 
proving that action language processing is not always accompanied by motor activity is 
not sufficient to support the interpretation based on motor imagery. One should also 
demonstrate that the conditions that trigger motor activity in language are the same that 
trigger motor imagery. Imagery is not a single, undifferentiated ability, but can rely on 
different sets of processes, or strategies, which can be independently employed (Kosslyn 
et al. 2001) or disrupted (Tomasino & Rumiati, 2004). Imagery is “motor” and is 
therefore accompanied by motor activity when people mentally transform, or the stimuli 
evoke, movements of human body parts or their interactions with objects (Ehrsson et al., 
2003; Kosslyn et al., 1998; Tomasino et al., 2010). This occurs when motion is mentally 
represented in an egocentric reference frame, or first-person perspective, so that a virtual 
identity has been established between kineasthic motor imagery and first-person imagery 
(Jackson et al., 2006; Solodkin et al., 2004).  
On the one hand, the embodied account of language implies that: first, motor 
activation is as early as the activation of the lexical-semantic network for word 
processing; second, motor activation occurs automatically, in response to any action 
word, regardless of the task or the context in which the word occurs, and regardless of 
whether words refer to oneself or another’s action. On the other hand, the “strategic 
imagery“ account poses a number of constraints to the recruitment of  motor activity in 
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language. First, it enhances only when required by the task-context cueing concrete, 
motor representations of words; second it is most likely to take place when the stimulus 
content activates the representation of human body-part motion or human actions; third, 
motor activation is greater when the stimuli activate an egocentric, first-person 
perspective (versus a third-person perspective) representation of motion. 
The following studies have been carried out with the objective to address directly 
each of these predictions. This research may contribute to lay the foundation of a theory 
that will be able to explain the mental operations that make the cross-talk between 
language and motor processes possible, to the extent that embodied representations go 
along with –or even supersede - more abstract representations of meanings.  
This work also represents an attempt to break out of the current impasse reached 
by the debate between advocates of either embodied or disembodied hypothesis, which 
runs the risk to arrest research on other (more crucial) questions concerning, for instance, 
what the sensorimotor experience actually adds to human cognition, and what is missed 
in conceptual representations, when such experience is lacking. Finally, this work was 
also motivated by one practical and ethical reason: the generalization of embodied 
theories to a surprisingly wide range of abilities and disorders (e.g., language, empathy, 
altruism, emotion, theory of mind, imitation, autism spectrum disorder, tabagism and 
alcoholism) is leading to the proliferation of clinical work using motor simulation, action 
observation and/or action imitation therapeutically, for instance, after stroke to stimulate 
recovery of language abilities. Given the state of the art, one may think that treating an 
aphasic with action observation is not bad per se; but is there enough reason to believe 
that it is right?  
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Chapter 2.  
Tool-use actions, action verbs and tool 
nouns: Evidence from neuropsychology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Action and language are traditionally considered paradigmatic examples of independent 
brain systems (Fodor, 1983; Shallice, 1988). Accordingly, a wealth of 
neuropsychological studies has documented dissociations between linguistic and 
nonlinguistic deficits in single patients, and uncorrelated performance on linguistic and 
nonlinguistic in groups of left-damaged patients (see Rumiati, Papeo, & Corradi-
Dell’Acqua, 2010 for a review; refer also to Chapter 1). However, the association of 
aphasia and apraxia is the most common scenario in neuropsychological population, and 
linguistic deficits often co-occur with deficits in nonverbal action domains such as 
signs, gestures and pantomimes (Duffy & Duffy, 1981; Pickett, 1974; Seron, van der 
Kaa, Remitz, & van der Linden, 1979; Varney, 1982) and object recognition (De Renzi, 
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Pieczuro, & Vignolo, 1968). Likewise, individuals with a specific disturbance affecting 
motor functions, such as the Motor Neurone Disease, may also show communication 
problems, particularly with verbs (Bak, O'Donovan, Xuereb, Boniface, & Hodges, 2001; 
Bak, Yancopoulou, Nestor, Xuereb, Spillantini, & Pulvermüller, 2006), although the 
major implication of frontal lobes, as shown by radiological exhibits of these patients, 
casts doubt on the motor origin of their cognitive impairments (see Neary et al., 1990; 
Talbot et al., 1995; see also Hickok, 2010, for a critical review). 
While past conceptualizations have interpreted associations in terms of damage 
to a single underlying factor, common to both functions (“asymbolia” hypothesis; 
Finkelnburg, 1870), the involvement of motor system in apparently unrelated processes, 
such as word comprehension, has been differently framed within the embodied 
hypothesis of language. In its strongest – and latest - version, embodied hypothesis 
holds action meanings are encoded, with no cognitive mediation, in the motor system, 
with a prominent involvement of inferior frontal, precentral motor regions (see 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). 
However, while accounting for symptom associations, the embodied hypothesis 
cannot explain why patients are observed as suffering from aphasia or apraxia 
selectively. Saygin, Wilson, Dronkers, and Bates (2004) attempted to overcome the 
discrepancy between the associative and dissociative view, testing the ability of 29 
aphasics to understand transitive pantomimes (actions involving objects) depicted in 
line drawings or described by sentences. These authors found that the performances on 
the two tasks did not correlate at group level, but did in a subgroup of patients. They 
proposed that these conflicting results might reflect different degrees of representational 
overlap in linguistic and nonlinguistic domains, depending on how similar verbal and 
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nonverbal tasks are in terms of perceptual and conceptual properties and developmental 
stages of acquisition. In particular, the authors argued that the overall dissociation 
between verbal and nonverbal performances could be attributed to reading being 
acquired much later in life than nonverbal action comprehension (but see Hickok, 2009; 
2010, for a critical discussion of these findings). Therefore, “if the systems are acquired 
and related skills are honed at such different stages in development, the resulting brain 
networks subserving processing in the two domains will also be rather different, and 
patients with brain injury will not show tightly correlated deficits” (ibidem, p. 1082). It 
follows that, when the linguistic and nonlinguistic task involve identical stimuli and are 
served by networks acquired at similar (early) stages in development, tightly correlated 
deficits should be observed in brain-damaged patients’ performance.  
The aim of the study reported in this chapter was threefold. First, I investigated 
whether a causal relationship exists between processing action-related words and the 
ability to perform actions, when tasks and stimuli are matched for perceptual, 
conceptual and developmental characteristics. Second, I examined the patients’ lesions 
in order to describe the neural correlates of action-word comprehension. One insight to 
this question can be primarily provided by patients’ performances on motor and 
linguistic task. Dissociations between tasks would strongly suggest that the distributed 
networks that maintain action performance (Rumiati et al., 2010) and action-word 
comprehension (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007; Price, 1998) are independent (Shallice, 
1988). The idea of a distributed architecture for complex functions implies that 
networks can sometimes interact (i.e., the same anatomical region can be involved in 
both functions), as depending on a given task context (see Price & Friston, 2002). In 
this light, it is not surprising that, for instance, areas involved in tool use can sometimes 
 34 
be recruited when naming tools (see Johnson-Frey, 2004). The embodied hypothesis 
goes beyond this, suggesting that the motor system is always a necessary correlate of 
action-word comprehension. Thus, an evaluation – and eventually the acceptance - of 
this hypothesis requires to demonstrate not only that all patients with action-word 
comprehension deficits cannot perform actions, but also that their impairment is 
associated with damage centered in those regions of the motor system (inferior frontal, 
precentral and central gyri) that are held to encode action meanings. The combination of 
evidence from patients’ behavior and lesion analysis can shed light on this issue.  
Third, I examined the alleged differences in processing action verbs and tool 
nouns. In fact, neuropsychological studies showed that these two word classes can be 
selectively affected by brain injury (Berndt, Mitchum, Haendiges, & Sandson, 1997; 
Caramazza & Hillis, 1991; Damasio & Tranel, 1993; Daniele, Giustolisi, Silveri, 
Colosimo, & Gainotti, 1994; Luzzatti et al., 2002; Miceli, Silveri, Nocentini, & 
Caramazza, 1988; Shapiro, Shelton, & Caramazza, 2000; Warrington & McCharty, 
1987). Moreover, imaging studies have indicated that while noun processing is centred 
in left temporal regions, verb processing is associated with the activity of left 
frontoparietal regions (Corina et al., 2005; Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & 
Ungerleider, 1995; Tranel, Adolphs, Damasio, & Damasio, 2001; but see Perani et al., 
1999; Tyler, Russell, Fadili, & Moss, 2001; Warburton et al., 1996), although it is not 
clear whether this verb-noun distinction reflects a grammatically-based principle of 
lexicon organization (Caramazza, 1997; Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999), or emerges 
from semantics. This latter hypothesis follows from the observation that nouns have 
more semantic features in common with other nouns as they typically denote objects, 
while verbs share more features with other verbs as they typically denote actions (Bates 
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& MacWhinney, 1982; Langacker, 1987). Contrasting with the view that nouns and 
verbs enjoy different lexical-semantic status, embodied theories of cognition predict that 
information related to actions or objects we use, is represented and encoded in the motor 
system responsible for action production (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005).  
To these ends, the current study examined the ability of 12 left-damaged patients 
and 17 healthy participants to imitate and name actions, to use and name tools, and to 
recognize words (verbs and nouns), using the same stimuli in verbal and nonverbal 
tasks. As the main objective of this study was to assess the embodied prediction of 
shared substrates and processing for motor and action-word representations, naming and 
word recognition were both employed to test action-language comprehension. Indeed, 
naming impairment, on its own, is not sufficient to conclude that a word representation 
is disrupted, as it can also reflect a failure of lexical-phonological retrieval that can take 
place even when the semantic representation of a word is spared (see Caramazza, 1997). 
Notice also that naming, which has been used in most of the abovementioned studies, 
involves a strong motor (articulatory) component that brings a confounding factor in the 
interpretation of association between motor and language disease (see Hickok, 2010).  
Importantly, the abilities recruited in performing our motor and linguistic tasks 
are supposedly acquired at comparable developmental stages. I had no instrument to 
establish when exactly our participants acquired the ability to perform a given tool-
directed motor program, or to comprehend (or produce) its associated label. However, 
our claim is well grounded in a wealth of developmental studies showing that motor 
control required to perform deictic gestures, gestural routines and tool use, develops 
synchronously with word acquisition, and particularly with word comprehension (Bates 
& Dick, 2002; Lenneberg, 1967; Siegel, 1981). To avoid the risk of group analysis 
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ignoring cases that do not follow the group-level trend but can provide a basis for 
inferring functions (Caramazza, 1986; Shallice, 1988), the patients’ performance was 
analyzed at both group and single-case level. Multiple single-case analysis was 
conducted to look for potential dissociations between verbal and motor abilities, as well 
as between action-verb and tool-noun processing. 
  
2.2. Material and Methods 
2.2.1. Participants 
A group of 12 consecutive patients (mean age 70±8 years, mean education 10±4 
years) took part in the study. They were recruited in the rehabilitation and neurological 
unit of the Ospedali Riuniti in Trieste. To be included in the study, patients had to meet 
the following criteria: to have a single focal unilateral lesion in the left-hemisphere; to 
have al least 5 years of education; to be right-handed (Oldfield, 1971) and native Italian 
speakers. They had all normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no hearing difficulties and 
neurological or psychiatric history. The inclusion criteria did not contemplate patients’ 
symptoms or lesion site in the left-hemisphere. Nine out of 12 patients were still in the 
acute epoch of recovery (i.e., within 3 months post lesion-onset), when tested. 
Demographic variables are summarized in Table 1. Seventeen healthy right-handed 
Italian speaking adults (mean age 69±8 years, mean education 12±4 years) served as 
controls for experimental tests after taking the Mini Mental State Examination (Folstein, 
Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) to ensure that they were not suffering from any form of 
cognitive decline. All participants confirmed their voluntary participation signing the 
informed consent. The study was approved by SISSA Ethics Committee. 
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2.2.2. Neuropsychological assessment 
 Patients were given the Aachen Aphasia Test (AAT, Italian version; Luzzatti et 
al., 1996) to assess type and severity of aphasia, and standardized tests to evaluate 
praxis, visuo-spatial abilities (and in particular, to ensure they had no visual agnosia), 
executive functions and memory. Patients and controls performed additional verbal 
tasks to assess lexical access (Luzzatti, Willmes, & De Bleser, 1996), reading (Toraldo, 
Cattani, Zonca, Saletta, & Luzzatti, 2006) and potential noun-verb dissociation (object 
and action picture naming, Crepaldi et al., 2006). Details about the neuropsychological 
screening and the scores obtained by each patient are reported in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Demographic variables and patients’scores on the neuropsychological evaluation.  
 
Part 1. 
 
 
Case 
 
Sex 
 
Age 
Education 
(years) 
Testing post-
onset 
(months) 
EHI LTM 
words 
LTM 
faces 
Span 
forward 
Span 
backward 
Corsi TMT A TMT B Weigl Raven’s 
CPM 
BB M 72 18 3 100 n.a. 10 - - 4 - - t.i. t.i. 
BS M 60 8 1.5 100 43 21 4 4 4 36 144 10 32 
CF M 80 8 1.5 100 32 23 6 3 5 92 t.i. 7 24 
CG M 77 17 1 100 n.a. - - n.a. n.a. 194 - 3 20 
DC F 62 10 1 100 39 - 5 5 4 47 106 13 29 
DBM F 58 13 11 100 35 25 - - 4 48 76 13 31 
IN F 71 8 2 100 34 24 - - 4 117 t.i. 5 18 
MB M 70 8 2 62 31 20 3 2 5 45 285 4 - 
NP F 75 5 1 100 35 21 5 2 4 125 n.a. 3 11 
SA F 83 8 1 100 36 19 4 2 4 89 t.i. 6 13 
SN F 64 8 7 100 28 21 n.a. n.a. 6 94 n.a. 9 28 
UL M 71 6 4 83 29 9 4 n.a 3 n.a. n.a. 5 19 
Maximum 
score 
     
100 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
15 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 
Part 2. 
 
Case AAT 
token 
AAT 
repet 
AAT 
written  
AAT 
naming 
AAT 
compreh 
Lexical 
decision 
Reading Picture 
naming 
VOSP 
screen 
VOSP 
o.d. 
IMA IA Type of aphasia 
BB 46 66 10 23 49 t.i. n.a. N>V t.i. 9 60 10 severe global 
BS 15 127 85 94 110 144 109 N>V 20 20 64 14 mild amnesic 
CF 14 139 82 109 109 134 114 N>V 20 18 70 14 severe unfluent 
CG 50 n.a. n.a. n.a. 22 122 n.a. n.a. 19 12 31 7 severe Wernicke’s 
DC 2 149 90 117 117 144 116 N>V 19 18 58 14 - 
DBM 23 111 77 95 111 138 110 V>N 20 16 66* 14 mild anomic 
IN 28 65 27 60 93 128 23 V=N 20 16 43 11 mild Broca’s 
MB 17 110 73 100 86 142 108 N>V 20 12 66 14 mild Broca’s 
NP 20 139 37 93 90 126 108 N>V 18 13 52 10 - 
SA 5 143 62 105 100 141 115 N>V 20 16 46 9 mild amnesic 
SN 28 137 53 69 93 125 100 n.a. 20 13 - - severe Broca’s 
UL 29 132 31 93 84 101 65 N>V 20 17 48 14 mild Broca’s 
UL 29 132 31 93 84 101 65 N>V 20 17 48 14 mild Broca’s 
Maximum 
score 
 
50**  
 
120 
 
90 
 
120 
 
120 
 
144 
 
116 
 
- 
 
20 
 
17 
 
72 
 
14 
 
 
 
Standardized tests used in the neuropsychological assessment: EHI = Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield; 1971); LTM words = long-term memory, word 
recognition (Warrington, 1984); LTM faces = long-term memory, face recognition (Warrington, 1996); Span forward = digit span forward for verbal short-term 
memory; Span backward = digit span backward for short-term memory and working memory; Corsi = Corsi test for spatial short-term memory (Spinnler & Tognoni, 
1987); TMT A = Trail making tests for attention; TMT B = Trail making test for executive functions (Giovagnoli et al., 1996); Weigl = Weigl’s tests for executive 
functions (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987 ); Raven’s CPM = Raven Coloured Progressive Matrices for general intelligence (Carlesimo, Caltagirone and Gainotti, 1996); 
AAT = Aachener Aphasie Test, Italian norms (Luzzatti et al., 1996); AAT token = subtest for comprehension; AAT repetition = subtest for repetition; AAT written 
language = subtests for reading and writing; AAT name = subtest for production; AAT comprehen = subtests for auditory and visual comprehension; Lexical decision 
(Luzzatti et al., 2002); Reading (Toraldo et al., 2006); Picture naming = object and action picture-naming (Crepaldi et al., 2006); VOSP screen = Visual object and 
space perception, screening task; VOSP o.d. = VOSP object decision task (Warrington & James, 1991); IMA = Test for ideomotor apraxia (Tessari & Rumiati, 2004), 
* = test by De Renzi, Motti & Nichelli (1980); IA = Ideational Apraxia (De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1988). Patients are sorted alphabetically by their initials. F=female. 
M=male. t.i. = test interrupted because the patient was not able to perform the task. n.a. = test not administered. Pathological scores are reported in bold. Maximum 
scores are reported where applicable (** Maximum error). 
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2.2.3. Experimental design and materials 
 A 3x2x2 experimental design was used: 3 tasks (Motor production, Naming and 
Comprehension), 2 stimulus-types (Action and Tools) manipulated within-subjects, and 
2 groups (Patients and Controls) (see Table 2).   
Stimuli were selected with series of preliminary, norming studies. First, I choose 
87 tool-use pantomimes, presented in the form of colour video clips of 3 sec each, in 
which a male actor carried out pantomimes of tool use with his right hand (the tool itself 
was not shown), and  87 colour photographs of the corresponding tools, portrayed in 
their prototypical view. A panel of 45 healthy adults (age 21-86 years, education 5-18 
years) was then asked to name the actions shown in the clips and the tools shown in the 
photographs, using verbs and nouns, respectively. Notice that the panel covered also the 
age and educational level typical of patient population. Items that were named with the 
same label by at least 85% of participants1, were subjected to a second norming phase, 
in which a group of 30 healthy adults (age 21-41 years) was asked to name each of 
them, as fast as possible. Only action-tool pairs in which both items were named in less 
than 3 sec were selected. Finally, 19 healthy adults (age 21-31 years) rated the age of 
acquisition (AoA) of verbs and nouns corresponding to actions and tools thus selected, 
using a 7-point Likert-type scale with 1 corresponding to acquisition within the third 
year of life, 2 between the fourth and the fifth years, and so on up to 7 (after 13 years). 
Action-verbs and tool-nouns were thus matched for AoA (t(14) = -0.31, p = 0.7), which 
is closely related with word frequency, but predict better naming performance in adults 
(Perez, 2007), as well as for word length (t(14) = -0.63, p = 0.5). Thus, this multi-phase 
 
1
 A second response to any of each items, provided by at least 5% of the panel was considered as an 
alternative correct response in the experimental phase. 
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norming study reduced the initial set of 87 actions and 87 tools, to 15 items for each 
category, which achieved the 85% of agreement on their label and were named in less 
than 3 sec. The set of stimuli is listed in Appendix A.  
The selected 15 video-clips of pantomimes and 15 corresponding real tools were 
used in the imitation and tool-use task, respectively. The same actions and tools were 
presented in a naming task. Video-clips were preferred to static line drawings because 
the latter require inferences to be made about action movements, a process that is not 
required in tool naming (see Corina et al., 2005). For the verb comprehension task, 15 
photographs were derived from the video-clips, depicting the frame that best described 
the action. Each target photograph was presented with two distractor photographs 
depicting, respectively, an action semantically related and one visually similar to the 
target. The second distractor could be either a real or a nonexistent action, obtained by 
modifying a kinematic aspect of the target action such as the hand/arm orientation (e.g., 
target action: eating with a spoon; semantic distractor: filling a dish; visual distractor: 
hand in the configuration required for eating with a spoon but near the actor’s forehead). 
In the noun comprehension task, the 15 photographs of the above 15 tools were taken. 
Each target photograph was presented together with a semantically related and a 
visually related object (e.g. target: spoon; semantic distractor: ladle; visual distractor: a 
round mirror with handle). The semantic distance between targets and distractors was 
assessed on a 7-point Likert-type scale by 10 healthy adults.  
Photographs, instead of video-clips, were used in the comprehension task in 
order to present all three actions simultaneously and, thus, avoid the influence of 
confounding factors, such as great memory load or great demand to working memory, 
on participants’ performance. In each trial of the two comprehension tasks, the verb or 
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the noun corresponding to the target was spoken aloud by the experiment 
simultaneously with the appearance of the three photographs on the screen (see below). 
 
 
Table 2. Experimental design: two types of action-related stimuli (pantomimes and 
tools) were processed across motor and linguistic tasks by all participants (patients and 
controls). 
  
 Trigger 
 Pantomimes of tool-use (N=15) Tools (N=15) 
Motor performance to visual 
stimuli 
Imitation Use 
Naming to visual stimuli Action-verb retrieval Tool-noun retrieval 
Name-to-picture matching  Action-verb comprehension Tool-noun comprehension 
 
2.2.4. Procedures 
 All patients and controls completed the three types of tasks with actions and 
tools, for a total of six experimental conditions. Five controls performed the praxis tasks 
with the non dominant-left hand in order to match them with the patients who showed 
right-sided hemiparesis following left-hemisphere injury. As all tasks involved the same 
stimuli, their order was counterbalanced across participants to control for carryover 
effects. Comprehension tasks were always presented at the end of the experimental 
session. Items in each condition were presented to all participants, in a fixed order. The 
six conditions are described below. 
 
Pantomime imitation. Video-clips of tool-use pantomimes were presented on a 
computer screen placed in front of the participant. S/he was asked explicitly to imagine 
holding and using the tools. Each item was presented once and, if the participant failed 
to imitate, it was shown again for a maximum of two times. Performances were 
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videotaped and analyzed offline by one of the authors (LP), and two neuropsychologists 
unaware of the experimental hypotheses, as follows. Each rater judged each trial as 
“correct” or “incorrect”. If at least 2 of the 3 raters judged the performance as “correct”, 
two points were assigned to that trial. If at least 2 of the 3 raters judged the performance 
as “incorrect”, one rater, who is an experienced neuropsychologist, trained in the error 
analysis of praxis tests, classified the error according to criteria established in previous 
studies (e.g., Negri et al., 2007; Tessari et al., 2007). The categories of errors included: 
spatial-hand or spatial-arm error, semantic error (“body-part use as a tool”, or 
substitution with a semantically-related action), visual error (substitution with a 
visually-related action), omission, and unrecognizable action. In particular, “1” was 
assigned when the participant made spatial errors (i.e., misorientation of hand/arm), but 
the action was still clearly recognizable; “0”was given in all the other cases of error. 
This procedure led to one score assigned to each trial (0, 1 or 2), the total score of a 
patient corresponding to the sum of scores assigned to each trial (maximum = 30/30). 
Tool-use. Each tool was placed on a table in front of the participant, who was 
asked to demonstrate how s/he would use it. The participant’s performance was 
videotaped and subsequently scored by the same three raters as above. One point was 
assigned when at least 2 of the 3 raters judged the performance in a trial as correct, “0” 
was assigned, if at least 2 of the 3 raters judged the performance as incorrect. Then, an 
experienced neuropsychologist (the same as above) classified the error as misuse, 
mislocation, clumsiness, perplexity, or spatial error, according to previously established 
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criteria (see Negri et al., 2007). The total score of a patient in this task corresponded to 
the sum of the scores assigned to each trial, the maximum being 15/152. 
Action and tool naming tasks. In the first task, participants were requested to 
name, by producing a verb, 15 pantomimes presented in the form of video-clips, one at 
a time, on a computer screen. All but five pairs of  verb- noun had phonologically 
unrelated roots (i.e., penna-scrivere, pen-to write vs. timbro-timbrare, stamp-to stamp),. 
To avoid confusion in assessing the performance in those five cases, patients were 
always encouraged to produce the infinitive form of the verb, for which a specific 
suffixation is needed (timbr-are). The response was scored 1 if the participant produced 
the correct verb or its acceptable alternative, and 0 if the response was incorrect. Self-
repairs, dialect forms of the target-verb and phonological errors in which the target word 
was clearly recognizable were scored as correct. Semantic paraphasias, circumlocutions 
and latencies longer than 5 sec were scored as errors. In the case of multiple responses 
for a single item, the first was considered. The maximum score was 15/15. In the second 
task, participants were requested to name the 15 tools from photographs presented, one 
at a time, on a computer screen. The same scoring criteria were applied as for action 
naming. 
Verb and noun comprehension tasks. Two separate word-picture matching tasks, 
one involving the 15 verbs and one the 15 nouns were used to assess participants’ word 
comprehension. A verb (or noun) was spoken aloud by the experimenter in each trial, 
while three color photographs (the target and two distractors) appeared on the computer 
 
2
 Inter-rater reliability was computed using the concordance correlation coefficient (Lin, 2000) for 
assessment of concordance in continuous data, as we used scores obtained by patients in each of the two 
tasks (imitation and tool-use). Correlation coefficient was 0.97 between rater 1 and rater 2, 0.97 between 
rater 2 and rater 3, and 0.98 between rater 1 and rater 3.  
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screen, with their relative position (left, center, right of the screen) being pseudo-
randomly counterbalanced. In each matching task, participants had to indicate the 
photograph depicting the spoken item. One point was assigned for correct responses and 
0 when the participant pointed at either distractor. The maximum score was 15/15 for 
each task. 
 
2.3. Statistical analyses 
2.3.1. Behavioral analysis 
Group level. The data entered in this analysis corresponded to the individual 
percentage of correct responses in each experimental condition. As patients’ and 
controls’ data in the six experimental conditions were not normally distributed (Shapiro-
Wilk’s W-test, ps >.05), the non-parametric Wilcoxon test and Mann-Whitney-U-test 
were used to compare performances within and across groups (patients and controls), 
respectively. To measure the strength of association between performances at group 
level, Spearman’s correlations were computed between imitation, naming and 
comprehension of pantomimes, and between use, naming and comprehension of tools. 
Separate Spearman’s correlations were computed between action and tool naming and 
between action-verb and tool-noun comprehension.   
Single-cases. The Revised Standardized Difference Test (RSDT, Crawford & 
Garthwaite, 2006) was used to detect dissociations, using the software released with the 
article by Crawford and Garthwaite (2005). The following comparisons between 
patients’ scores on different tasks involving the same stimuli: 1) action imitation versus 
action naming; 2) action imitation versus action-verb comprehension; 3) tool-use versus 
tool naming; 4) tool-use versus tool-noun comprehension. The software provides a t 
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score for each individual performance in the pair, which estimates the abnormality of 
the individual’s score (defined as the percentage of the population that would obtain a 
lower score), and 95% confidence limits on this percentage. In addition, based on the 
significance values of the t scores and taking into account the correlation within controls 
across the two tasks, the RSDT determines whether potential difference between the 
two scores reflects classical dissociation (compared to controls, the patient is impaired 
on task A but not on task B) or strong dissociation (the patient is impaired on both tasks 
relative to controls, but task A is more impaired than task B), according to Shallice’ 
criteria (1988) revised in Crawford et al. (2003). Both types of dissociation provide 
evidence that two functions are independent and rely on separate neural substrates. The 
same inferential method was applied to test possible dissociations between action versus 
tool naming, and between action-verb versus tool-noun comprehension.  
 
2.3.2. Lesion analysis 
A neuroradiologist, uninformed of the experimental hypotheses, mapped the 
lesioned areas on the computerized tomography (CT) or magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) scans for all patients but three (MB, SA and CF), onto a normalized MNI 
template (www.bic.mni.mcgill.ca/cgi/icbm_view) using MRIcro 
(http://www.mricro.com; Rorden & Brett, 2000). Lesion location in each patient was 
identified using the Automated Anatomical Labelling map (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 
2002) provided by the software, and referring to the Duvernoy atlas (1991) (see Table 
3). The following lesion analysis was performed with the same software, based on the 
logic of subtraction proposed by Rorden and Karnath (2004). This method is 
particularly suited for visualizing evident anatomical changes like those that typically 
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follow strokes, even in relatively small sample size. Given the limited sample size, the 
following analyses were run with the objective to provide a description of regions that 
were damaged in all patients with impairment in a given task (task-specific regions), 
and regions that were possibly implicated in both verbal and nonverbal functions 
(shared regions).  
Firstly, I overlaid all patients’ lesions to ensure that those regions that are held to 
be crucially involved in our experimental tasks were actually affected in our sample. To 
show what region was specifically associated with deficit in each of the 6 tasks, lesions 
of all patients impaired in a given task (according to the Crawford’s t scores) were 
overlaid, revealing the lesion site common to all patients in the group (i.e., lesion 
intersection). From the resulting lesion density plots, I subtracted the lesion sites of 
patients who were not impaired in the same task. This subtraction analysis, whereby 
lesions of patients with injuries in the same hemisphere and comparable 
neurological/neuropsychological characteristics but without the impairment of interest, 
are subtracted from lesions of patients with the impairment of interest, is based on the 
assumption that regions unrelated to the disorder of interest reflect vulnerability to 
injury (e.g. due to their vasculature or susceptibility to sheer and impact) and, therefore, 
tend to be equally damaged in patients with different symptoms  (Rorden & Karnath, 
2004). As subtractions were performed between groups of different sizes, relative 
percentages rather than absolute values were used. The automatic three-dimensional 
renderings of the subtraction analysis showed regions that were most frequently 
damaged in one group of patients, and typically spared in patients without that deficit.  
Then, in order to investigate what region was possibly involved in both action 
performance and comprehension, lesions of group with praxis deficit were compared 
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against lesions of group with comprehension deficit. This comparison assessed directly 
the embodied hypothesis that action-word comprehension relies on the same substrates 
for motor production. Two separate comparisons were performed, one contrasting group 
with imitative deficit against group with action-verb comprehension deficit, and the 
other contrasting group with tool-use deficit against group with tool-noun 
comprehension deficit. In each comparison, regions associated with both deficits 
resulted from the overlay of all patients with either deficit (lesion intersection), from 
which lesions of patients with no deficit in either task were subtracted. In this manner, I 
could clean off damaged regions with no specific effects on either task, while preserving 
those regions associated with both tasks. Lesion sites resulting from each of the 
described comparisons were identified using the Automated Anatomical Labelling map 
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) and verifying its output referring to the Duvernoy atlas 
(1991). 
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Table 3. Description of lesion for all patients. Numbers indicate Brodmann Areas. 
 
 Cerebral regions affected by the lesion BA involved in the lesion 
BB precentral gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, insula, basal ganglia 
(putamen and caudate), superior temporal gyri and temporal 
pole. 
4, 6, 22, 38, 42, 43 ,44, 47 
BS middle and superior temporal gyri, middle occipital gyri. 19, 20, 21, 22, 41, 42 
CF* small portions of precentral and postecentral gyri, rolandic 
operculum, subcortical white matter. 
 
CG middle and inferior frontal gyri, rolandic operculum, insula, 
supramarginal and angular gyri, superior, middle and 
transverse temporal gyri, middle occipital gyrus.  
2, 3, 19, 21, 22, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42 
DC small portion of inferior frontal gyrus, precentral and 
postcentral gyri. 
2, 3, 4, 6, 43, 44 
DBM middle and superior temporal gyri. 20, 21, 22, 37, 41, 42 
IN rolandic operculum, insula, postcentral gyrus, inferior 
parietal lobule, supramarginal and angular gyri, superior, 
middle and transverse temporal gyri, superior and middle 
occipital gyri. 
1, 2, 3, 7, 19, 21, 22, 37, 39, 40, 
41, 42, 43 
MB* basal ganglia  
NP insula, basal ganglia (caudate, putamen, pallidum)  
SA* periventricular hypodensity  
SN inferior frontal gyrus, rolandic operculum, insula, 
postcentral gyrus, temporal and transverse temporal gyri, 
temporal pole, basal ganglia (caudate, putamen, pallidum). 
6, 20, 21, 22, 38, 42, 43 
UL insula, basal ganglia (caudate, putamen, pallidum), thalamus  
 
The location of the lesions was identified using the Automated Anatomical Labelling map (Tzourio-
Mazoyer et al., 2002), and with reference to the atlas of Duvernoy (1991). * patients with no MRI or CT 
scan available: for these patients, the lesion site was defined with reference to the medical exhibit. 
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2.4. Results    
2.4.1.Group-level performance  
Figure 1 shows the results of both groups in all the experimental tasks.  
 
Controls. Controls were better at naming tools than actions, and at 
comprehending tool nouns than action verbs (both Wilcoxon: p = .02). Their 
performance on naming and praxis tasks did not differ (ps > .05). Action-verb 
comprehension was better than imitation (Wilcoxon: p = .03) and tool-noun 
comprehension tended to be better than tool-use (Wilcoxon: p = .06). Overall, controls 
performed better on nouns than verbs, and on verb and noun comprehension relative to 
praxis tasks involving the corresponding actions and tools.  
The difference between performance on nouns and verbs is consistent with 
evidence for a stable and significant noun advantage, which holds for normal children, 
older people and aphasic patients (DeBleser & Kauschke, 2003; but see below). The 
performance difference between comprehension and praxis may merely indicate that the 
former task was less difficult than the latter. 
 
Patients. Mann-Whitney-U-Tests showed that, as a group and compared to 
controls, patients were impaired in imitation (p = .01), tool-use (p = .02), and in action 
(p =.0001) and tool naming (p = .0001). They did not differ from controls in action-verb 
and tool-noun comprehension (p > .1). Comparing patients’ performance across the 
three tasks involving action-stimuli (imitation, action naming and comprehension) with 
Wilcoxon tests, they resulted similarly impaired at imitating and naming actions (p = 
.15). Comprehension was better than naming (p = .003) and imitation, although the 
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latter difference did not reach significance (p = .08). Considering the performance with 
tool-stimuli, naming resulted more impaired than tool-use (p = .03) and tool-noun 
comprehension (p = .003), while performance on these two tasks did not differ (p = .2). 
Therefore, patients showed a prominent impairment in naming with no difference 
between action- and tool-stimuli (p = .34), and in praxis, imitation being more 
compromised than tool-use (p = .03). This is as expected because apraxic and aphasic 
symptoms are most common following left-side injury. Comprehension of verbs and 
nouns was relatively preserved, at group-level, with no difference between action verbs 
and tool nouns (p = .15). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Performance (percentage of correct responses) of both groups (patients and controls) in the 
three types of tasks (motor production, naming and word comprehension) triggered by action-stimuli and 
tool-stimuli. Relative to controls, patients were significantly impaired on naming (no difference between 
action and tool naming) and motor production tasks (tool-use better than imitation). Vertical bars denote 
the standard error of the mean. 
  
 52 
While overall performance on action naming correlated with both imitation 
(N=12, Spearman R=.59, p=.04) and action-verb comprehension (N=12, Spearman 
R=.67, p = .01), performance on imitation and action-verb comprehension did not 
(N=12, Spearman R=.42, p = .17) (Table 4). The same analysis performed on tasks 
involving tool-stimuli revealed only a significant correlation between naming and noun 
comprehension (N=12, Spearman R=.72, p = .008) (see Table 4). Significant 
correlations were found between action and tool naming (N=12, Spearman R=.83, p = 
.0008), but not between action-verb and tool-noun comprehension (N=12, Spearman 
R=.42, p = .17).  
 
 
Table 4. Results of Spearman’s correlation analyses computed on the raw scores of 
tasks involving pantomimes of tool-use and tools. 
 Tasks with pantomimes of tool-use  Tasks with tools 
 Naming Comprehension  Naming Comprehension 
 Spear. R N Spear. R N  Spear. R N Spear. R N 
Imitation .59* 12 .42 12 Tool-use .40 12 .19 12 
Naming   .67** 12 Naming   .72** 12 
 
*Correlation is significant at the .05 level. **Correlation is significant at the .001 level. 
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2.4.2. Single-case performance 
 Table 5 provides a summary of patients’ performance across all experimental 
tasks.  
 
Performance on action stimuli 
Imitation versus action naming (Figure 2). Six patients showed a poorer 
performance on action naming relative to imitation: three (CG, MB, UL) showed a 
classical dissociation as, compared with controls, they performed pathologically on 
naming but normally on imitation; the remaining three (BB, IN, SN) exhibited a strong 
dissociation, with both performances being worse than controls but naming being more 
impaired than imitation. One patient (NP) showed the reversed (classical) dissociation, 
in that she was impaired on imitation but not on naming. Of the remaining five patients, 
one (SA) was more impaired on imitation than naming, but this difference did not 
approach significance, while the other four patients performed within the normal range 
on both action naming and imitation. 
Imitation versus action-verb comprehension (Figure 2). Three patients exhibited 
a significantly worse performance on imitation than comprehension. In particular, two 
of them (IN, NP) showed a classical dissociation, as their comprehension was within 
normal range, and one patient (SA) showed a strong dissociation, as her comprehension 
was also impaired, but significantly less than imitation. On the contrary, two patients 
resulted more impaired in action-verb comprehension, relative to imitation, one of them 
(CG) exhibiting a classical dissociation (i.e., normal ability to imitate), and the other 
one (BB) exhibiting a strong dissociation. Of the remaining seven patients, six 
performed normally on both imitation and comprehension tasks; one (SN) was impaired 
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in imitation but the performance difference between the two tasks did not reach 
significance. 
Thus, when comprehension was tested through word-picture matching task, 
which did not entail phonological-retrieval and speech production ability, a greater 
imitative deficit, relative to word comprehension, became evident in three patients, 
while the comprehension deficit suggested by naming performance was confirmed in 
two patients.  
  
Performance on tool-stimuli 
Tool-use versus tool naming (Figure 3). Seven patients showed a single 
dissociation between the ability to use and the ability to name tools. Specifically, five 
patients (CG, DBM, BS, CF, SN) showed a classical dissociation with impaired naming 
but normal tool use, while two patients (BB and IN) showed a strong dissociation, 
performing poorly on both tasks, with naming being worse than tool use. In contrast, 
although patient NP was more impaired in tool use than naming, the performance 
difference did not approach significance. Of the remaining four patients, three showed 
no significant difference across tasks (although compared to controls their performance 
on naming was impaired, it did not differ significantly from tool use, which was within 
the normal range), and one (DC) performed normally on both tasks.  
Tool-use versus tool-noun comprehension (Figure 3). While I failed to find a 
double dissociation between tool use and naming, as all patients resulted more impaired 
in naming, the word-picture matching task was revealing of patients’ performances, 
which were poorer on tool use relative to comprehension. In particular, NP and IN 
showed a classical dissociation, with impaired tool-use and normal tool-noun 
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comprehension. The reversed dissociation was shown by two patients, of whom CG was 
impaired in tool-noun comprehension with a normal ability to use tools (classical 
dissociation), and BB was impaired in both tasks, with comprehension being worse than 
tool use (strong dissociation). The performance of the remaining eight patients on both 
tasks was comparable with that of controls.  
The word-picture matching task revealed that, of the seven patients who were 
impaired in tool naming (as compared to use), only in two patients comprehension was 
actually worse than use. Two other patients showed the opposite pattern of performance, 
resulting in a double dissociation between tool use and tool-noun comprehension.  
 
 Language performance 
Action naming versus tool naming (Figure 4). Six patients were more impaired 
on tool naming relative to action naming: three of them (BS, DBM, NP) revealed a 
classical dissociation (normal performance on action naming), and the remaining three 
(BB, CG, IN) exhibited a strong dissociation3. No patient showed the opposite 
dissociation. Of the remaining six patients, BB, SA, SN and UL were equally and 
severely impaired in both tasks; CF and MB were more impaired in tool naming, 
relative to controls, but this performance did not differ significantly from that on action 
naming; finally, DC performed within the normal range on both tasks.  
Action-verb comprehension versus tool-noun comprehension (Figure 4). Double 
dissociation was found when word comprehension was tested with the word-picture 
matching task. Indeed, while patients BB and CG exhibited a strong dissociation, with 
 
3
 It should be noticed that patients BB and CG’s performances on both action and tool naming were very 
extreme (near floor). In this cases, even though the RSDT showed a significant difference between the 
two tasks (i.e. dissociation), the results should be treated with caution (see Laws et al., 2004). 
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noun comprehension worse than verb comprehension, SA was impaired at 
comprehending action verbs, with normal tool-noun comprehension. All remaining 
patients performed normally with both word-classes.  
Thus, only in patients BB and CG, impairment in tool naming and in the 
comprehension task could be due to brain damage affecting tool-noun representations 
more than action-verb representations; one patient (SA), who was dramatically impaired 
in naming both types of stimuli, showed a major damage to noun, relative to verb 
representations, in the comprehension task. 
 
Age of acquisition (AoA) effect on actions and tool naming. I tested whether 
AoA of words affected noun and verb retrieval differentially. The AoA of a word is 
thought to determine the way in which the information is stored and accessed in the 
brain; therefore, it has been suggested that this variable affects differently, word classes 
for which segregated substrates are predicted (Ghyselinck, Lewis, & Brysbaert, 2004). 
The effect of AoA results in a better performance on early-acquired than later-acquired 
words, this being more reliable in naming, than in comprehension performance 
(Morrison, Ellis, & Quinlan, 1992). Naming ability also reveals that words learned at 
late childhood are typically more vulnerable to loss in elderly subjects and patients with 
neurological conditions (Morrison, Hirsh, & Duggan, 2003). I tested whether the AoA 
had a different impact on nouns and verbs using Pearson’s correlations between the 
mean AoA of nouns and verbs, as assessed in the rating study (see “Materials” section), 
and the mean percentage of patients’ correct responses in naming for the same items. 
Overall, AoA correlated with the patients’ ability to name items (N=30, r=-.43, p = .01): 
earlier-acquired words were named more accurately - or were more resistant to the 
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deficit - than words acquired at a later age. However, when correlations were carried out 
separately for nouns and verbs, performance on action naming did not correlate with 
AoA (N=15, r=-.35, p = .2), whereas there was a significant correlation between AoA 
and tool naming (N=15, r=-.5719, p = .02).  
 
Table 5. Individual performance of all patients across all experimental tasks. 
 Action-stimuli Tool-stimuli 
 Imitation Naming Comprehension Tool-use Naming Comprehension 
Case % corr t score % corr t score % corr t score % corr t score % corr t score % corr t score 
BB 56.67 -3.63 0 -11.77 46.67 -7.24 73.33 -4.17 0 -24.31 60 -10.72 
BS 86.67 -0.42 93.33 -0.09 100 0.76 100 0.72 86.67 -2.82 100 0.32 
CF 90 -0.06 86.67 -0.93 93.33 -0.23 100 0.72 86.67 -2.82 100 0.32 
CG 80 -1.13 0 -11.77 66.67 -4.24 100 0.72 0 -24.31 46.67 -14.40 
DBM 90 -0.06 86.67 -0.93 100 0.76 93.33 -0.50 46.67 -12.73 93.33 -1.51 
DC 96.67 -0.65 93.33 -0.09 86.67 -1.21 93.33 -0.50 100 0.48 100 0.33 
IN 40 -5.42 26.67 -8.43 93.33 -0.23 40 -10.28 33.33 -16.04 100 0.33 
MB 100 1.00 73.33 -2.59 100 0.76 86.67 -1.72 86.67 -2.82 100 0.33 
NP 60 -3.28 86.67 -0.93 100 0.76 66.67 -5.39 80 -4.47 100 0.33 
SA 40 -5.42 60 -4.25 80 -2.24 86.67 -1.72 80 -4.47 100 0.33 
SN 73.33 -1.85 46.67 -5.93 86.67 -1.21 86.67 -1.72 73.33 -6.12 100 0.33 
UL 76.67 -1.50 60 -4.25 86.67 -1.21 86.67 -1.72 80 -4.47 100 0.33 
 
Note: Patients are sorted alphabetically by their initials. Numbers in bold denote t-scores (Crawford & 
Garthwaite, 2002) significantly below the controls’ mean. 
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Figure 2. Upper part: patients’ performance on action imitation versus action naming. Lower part: 
patients’ performance on action imitation versus action-verb comprehension. Patients are shown in 
alphabetic order. Besides patients’ initials: *indicates classical dissociation, **indicates strong 
dissociation (Crawford & Garthwaite’s RTSD, p < .05). On the top of the columns: *indicates dissociation 
with better performance on imitation than on word-stimuli; ~ indicates dissociation with better 
performance on word-stimuli than on imitation. 
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Figure 3. Upper part: patients’ performance on tool use versus tool naming. Lower part: patients’ 
performance on tool use versus tool-noun comprehension. Patients are shown in alphabetic order. Besides 
patients’ initials: *indicates classical dissociation, **indicates strong dissociation (Crawford & 
Garthwaite’s RTSD, p < .05). On the top of the columns: *indicates dissociation with better performance 
on tool use than on word-stimuli; ~ indicates dissociation with better performance on word-stimuli than 
on tool use.  
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Figure 4. Upper part: patients’ performance on action versus tool naming. Lower part: patients’ 
performance on action-verb versus tool-noun comprehension. Patients are shown in alphabetic order. 
Besides patients’ initials: *indicates classical dissociation, **indicates strong dissociation (Crawford & 
Garthwaite’s RTSD, p < .05). On the top of the columns: *indicates dissociation with better performance 
on action-verbs than on tool-nouns; ~ indicates dissociation with better performance on tool-nouns than 
on action-verbs.  
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2.4.3. Lesion results 
The lesion overlay of the 9 patients, for whom the CT or MRI scan was 
available, covered the classic perisylvian language-processing regions and the 
frontoparietal network sustaining sensorimotor functions (see Figure 5A; refer also to 
Table 3, where regions damaged in each patient are listed). In the following 
comparisons, patient NP, who had a prominent impaired in imitation and tool-use, was 
not included, as she had only subcortical lesion (Figure 5B). Although her performance 
was highly informative with respect to our hypothesis, including this patient in the 
groups with similar impairments would have “masked” the cortical regions that were 
affected in the remaining individuals. Indeed, the intersection plot only shows regions 
that are commonly affected in all patients in a group. 
 
 
Figure 5. A) The lesion overlay including all 9 left-damaged patients for whom CT or MRI scan was 
available. B) NP’s CT scan showing the lesion affecting the left hemisphere insula, basal ganglia, 
thalamus and surrounding white matter. Coordinates of the transverse sections are given. As customary, 
the neuroimage is reversed, the right hemisphere is on the left side of the picture. 
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Damaged regions in processing action-stimuli (Figure 6). Lesion overlay of all 
patients with imitative deficit (BB, IN, SN), after subtraction of damaged areas in the 
remaining patients with no imitative deficit, showed that imitation was specifically 
associated with insular cortex and postcentral gyrus extending to the opercular region 
(OP) of the parietal lobe. The lesion site associated with deficit in action-verb 
comprehension (impaired: BB, CG), after subtracting lesions of non-impaired patients, 
resulted centred in the insular cortex, pars opercularis and, marginally, pars triangularis 
of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), superior temporal pole (TP) and a small portion of 
superior temporal gyrus (STG). The intersection analysis involving patients with action-
naming deficit (BB, CG, IN, SN, UL), after subtracting lesions of non-impaired 
patients, revealed no mutually shared coordinates. This result suggests that, as it could 
be expected, the naming deficit of our patients resulted from damage to different 
processes (from motor to semantic), and therefore to different brain regions. The 
contrast between lesion sites associated with deficits in imitation and action-verb 
comprehension confirmed the above task-specific regions. In addition, it showed that 
regions associated to both deficits overlapped in the insula and the posterior part of PO.   
Damaged regions in processing tool-stimuli (Figure 7). The lesion overlay of 
patients with tool-use impairment (BB, IN), after subtraction of the remaining non-
impaired patients, was centred in postcentral gyrus extending to the supramarginal 
gyrus (SMG). Lesion site specifically associated with tool-noun comprehension deficit 
of patients BB and CG (after subtraction of non-impaired patients) involved the insular 
cortex, pars opercularis of IFG, extending to the adjacent part triangularis, and superior 
TP, extending marginally to STG. Again, the same analysis applied to patients with 
action-naming deficit (BB, BS, CG, DBM, SN) revealed no mutually shared 
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coordinates. The contrast between lesion sites associated with deficits in tool use and in 
tool-noun comprehension confirmed the above task-specific regions, and showed that 
regions associated to both deficits overlapped in the insular cortex and OP.  
 
 
Figure 6. (A) Lesion overlay of three patients with imitation more impaired than action-word 
comprehension (B) Lesion overlay of two patients with action-word comprehension more impaired than 
imitation. The number of overlapping lesions is illustrated by a colour coding increasing frequencies from 
violet (n=1) to red (indicating the maximum number of subjects in each group) colour. (C) Damaged 
regions specifically associated with imitative deficit, after subtraction from non-impaired patients, are 
shown in yellow color. Damaged regions associated with deficit in action-verb comprehension, after 
subtraction from non-impaired patients, are shown in light-blue color. D) Intersection of damaged regions 
implicated in imitation and action-verb comprehension. Only those regions in which the percentage of 
overlapping lesions for a specific group of subjects (after subtraction from the other groups) was 100% 
are shown. Coordinates of the transverse sections of the brain are given.  
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Figure 7. (A) Lesion overlay of three patients with tool use more impaired than tool-noun comprehension 
(B) Lesion overlay of two patients with tool-noun comprehension more impaired than tool use. The 
number of overlapping lesions is illustrated by different colours coding increasing frequencies from violet 
(n=1) to red (n=2) colour. (C) Damaged regions specifically associated with deficit in tool use, after 
subtraction from non-impaired patients, are shown in yellow color. Damaged regions associated with 
deficit in tool-noun comprehension, after subtraction from non-impaired patients, are shown in light-blue 
color. D) Intersection of damaged regions implicated in tool use and tool-noun comprehension. Only 
those regions in which the percentage of overlapping lesions for a specific group of subjects (after 
subtraction from the other groups) was 100% are shown. Coordinates of the transverse sections are given.  
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2.5. Discussion 
In this chapter I tested the hypothesis that the action production system is 
causally involved in the comprehension of words related to action. One explanation of 
the conflicting neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence about the relationship 
between action and language systems suggests that the extent to which the two systems 
overlap is a function of i) the perceptual and conceptual similarity between verbal and 
nonverbal stimuli employed in linguistic and nonlinguistic tasks, and ii) the temporal 
similarity of the development of skills underlying those tasks (Bates & Dick, 2002; 
Saygin et al., 2004).  
Here, I showed that, although linguistic and nonlinguistic (motor) deficits in left-
damaged patients may correlate, single-patients’ performances on motor and word 
comprehension abilities double dissociated, even when identical action-related stimuli 
were used in tasks with comparable developmental stage. I will start by discussing 
patients’ performance on linguistic and non-linguistic tasks involving actions and tools, 
and I will then consider their linguistic performance on action verbs versus tool-nouns. 
 
2.5.1. Linguistic and non-linguistic abilities  
The analysis of the patients’ performance at group and at single-case level on 
action imitation and linguistic tasks with verbs (naming and comprehension) produced 
different results. Although at group-level a positive significant correlation between 
action naming and imitation seems to support the argument that action-word 
representations are related to representations for motor performance (Gallese & Lakoff, 
2005), the single-case analysis revealed the limits of a logic based on correlations. A 
number of patients were, in effect, impaired on naming actions but relatively 
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unimpaired when imitating them, while one patient showed the opposite pattern, 
suggesting that word representations can be disrupted despite preserved imitation, and 
vice versa.  
On the other hand, action imitation and comprehension did not correlate at 
group-level but if I increased the sample size or  the number of observations, this 
correlation could become significant, as reported in previous studies (see Buxbaum, 
Kyle, & Menon, 2005; Negri et al., 2007). However, when performance of individual 
patients was considered, comprehension and imitation double dissociated suggesting 
that the ability to comprehend action-verbs can be disrupted in the absence of deficit in 
producing the corresponding motor program, and vice versa. While it cannot be 
established unequivocally why two functions do - or do not - correlate (as any third 
factor or, merely, the lack of statistical power, can explain it), the observed double 
dissociation provides a solid basis for inferring that they are served by distinct 
substrates. Individual patients’ performances challenge the embodied view of language: 
the basic ability to translate a visual input into a motor output required for imitation, 
does not seem necessary for the comprehension of verbs that denote the same motor act.   
When I analyzed the relationship between the ability to use tools and the lexical-
semantic processing of tool-nouns, at group level, I found that tool use did not correlate 
with either tool naming or tool-noun comprehension. As observed above, the lack of 
correlation may reflect, in the first place, the limited power of our analysis, due to a 
small-sized sample of participants or stimuli. However, previous studies involving 
larger samples suggest that, although tool use and tool recognition can correlate (e.g. 
Negri et al., 2007), this is not universal (see Tessari et al., 2007). The lack of 
correlation, in our study, is rather in keeping with double dissociation between the use 
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of tools and the ability to comprehend their nouns, observed at individual level. Overall, 
our findings agree with studies that described selective deficits affecting one of these 
abilities at a time (De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1988; Negri et al., 2007; Rosci et al., 2003; 
Rumiati et al., 2001). Hence, the ability to use tools does not seem necessary for 
successfully comprehending their nouns.  
The lack of double dissociation between verbal and motor tasks, when 
comprehension was tested with a naming task, does not weaken this conclusion. In fact, 
naming deficit does not necessarily reflect damage to word (semantic) representations. 
Based on the overall performance of patients on verbal tasks, we can safely conclude 
that the naming deficit was genuinely determined by a semantic breakdown only in two 
patients. In contrast, the naming disability of the remaining five patients could be due to 
a failure occurring at other stages of the processing, such as the lexical-phonological 
retrieval of a specific entry that did not abolish semantic activation required for 
performing the word-picture matching task (see Berndt et al., 1997). Notice that this 
independence of naming from word recognition, which is also predicted by influential 
models of language (Morton & Patterson, 1980; Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989), does 
not mean that a close relationship does not exist between them. Indeed, both functions, 
tap the same representations, as confirmed by the tight correlation I found in the group-
level analysis, between action naming and action-verb comprehension, and between tool 
naming and tool-noun comprehension. 
 
2.5.2. Tool-nouns and action-verbs 
 Although performances on action-verbs and tool-nouns correlated at group-
level, they dissociated at the level of individual patients. When action-word 
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representations were assessed with naming task, five patients named actions 
significantly better than tools, while none of the patients showed the opposite pattern of 
performance. However, double dissociation between action-verb and tool-noun 
representations emerged when they were assessed with the word-picture matching task, 
which is more reliable than naming in assessing comprehension. In the light of the 
double dissociation between action-verbs and tool-nouns, I conclude that the semantic 
(motor) content of words is not sufficient – or does not constitute the only principle - for 
determining their organizationin the brain. In line with previous neuropsychological and 
imaging studies (see Shapiro & Caramazza, 2003), the dissociation between verbs and 
nouns reported here maintains that word representations are (also) organized by word-
form class, even when they share relevant semantic features. 
Notice that, in the comprehension task, seeing static photographs, instead of 
video-clips, might have made the recognition of the ongoing action more difficult than 
the recognition of a tool. Luckily, having observed a double dissociation makes this 
event unlikely (e.g., Shallice, 1988). Moreover, the within-patient difference between 
accuracy rates in the two comprehension tasks was rather equivalent in the two patients 
with noun-verb dissociation, so that one task cannot be said significantly more difficult 
than the other.  
The segregation between the two word-classes is also supported by the 
significant AoA effect on tool naming (noun retrieval) but not on action naming (verb 
retrieval). The AoA is held to affect differently words that belong to different classes, 
and are presumably represented in different brain networks (Ghyselinck et al., 2004)4. 
 
4
 Note that AoA can also affect verb retrieval (Colombo & Burani, 2002; Morrison et al., 2003), 
depending on the aspects of word processing tapped by a given task (see Boulenger et al., 2007).  
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Although the lack of correlation between AoA and action naming can merely reflect the 
lack of power in this analysis, our results fully replicated those of Boulenger, Décoppet, 
Roy, Paulignan, and Nazir (2007), in a rating study on normal participants, involving 
similar stimuli (actions and concrete objects), the same task (naming), but a much larger 
number of observations, relative to our study. 
I cannot exclude that action-verbs and tool-nouns share semantic features. As the 
task I used to test comprehension (matching a word to its corresponding action or tool) 
did not tap all aspects of action knowledge associated with a word (e.g., function, 
context), it remains possible that, under different task conditions, semantic similarities 
between word classes may become evident and their representations, closely interactive 
(and overlapping).   
One final consideration concerns the numerical disproportion of patients with 
verb superiority, relative to those with noun superiority, in the naming task. This 
observation is contrary to the distribution of word-class effect in aphasics, which is 
predominantly in favor of nouns (e.g., DeBleser & Kauschke, 2003). I suggest that the 
apparent discrepancy between our results and those reported in literature depends on the 
fact that the inferential method I used to test dissociation in single-patients, takes into 
account controls’ means, standard deviations and correlation between the same two 
tasks, while other methods (i.e., z-scores and within-patient χ2) that are often used to test 
dissociations do not. Laws and colleagues (2005) showed that the higher incidence of 
deficits in processing living, relative to nonliving, items, did not hold when they 
employed the inferential method to compare a patient with controls, like in the RSDT. 
Indeed, as in their analysis controls also performed worse with living than with 
nonliving things, a patient’s poor performance on living things resulted non-
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significantly worse or, paradoxically, less severe than performance on nonliving things, 
even when the row data show the opposite (Laws, 2005; Laws et al., 2005). This seems 
to be the case of our study, where controls performed better on tool naming (M=98 ± 
3.9) that on action naming (M=94 ± 7.7). Therefore, along with Laws and colleagues’, 
our results maintain that the use of inferential methods for dissociation, which do not 
take into account controls’ performance, might have exaggerated the number of verb 
deficits, or underestimated the incidence of noun deficits in previous studies.  
 
2.5.3. Linguistic and nonlinguistic action-related mechanisms  
Task-specific regions  
 Action imitation. In our study, deficit in action imitation was associated with 
lesion in the insula, the postcentral gyrus housing the primary somatosensory cortex 
(SI), and extended to OP that forms the lower margin of the inferior parietal gyrus 
(IPG). The affected portion of OP fairly corresponds to the secondary somatosensory 
cortex (SII, Eickhoff et al., 2006; 2007) consistently with frequent observations of 
imitative deficit following damage to parietal regions (De Renzi & Faglioni, 1999; 
Rumiati, Papeo, & Corradi-Dell’Acqua, 2010, for a review). The left parietal regions 
had been found to be critically involved in executing hand configuration (Goldenberg & 
Hagmann, 1997). In particular, left SI and SII that hold somatotopic body 
representations may provide knowledge of one’s own body structure to transforms the 
perceived action into one’s own action, and somatosensory feedback to allocate the 
hand in the near-body space (e.g., Goldenberg, 1999; Hermsdorfer, Goldenberg, 
Wachsmuth, et al., 2001; Tanaka & Inui, 2002). Consistently with neuropsychological 
observations, imaging studies reported postcentral activation in the processing of 
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referring to knowledge of one’s own body during motor and conceptual tasks (Ruby & 
Decety, 2001; 2003), and SII activation in the encoding of hand position relative to 
one’s own body (Corradi-Dell’Acqua, Tomasino & Fink, 2009).  
 A study on 44 apraxic linked the left insula to deficit in finger posture imitation, 
(Goldenberg & Karnath, 2006), and fMRI studies associated insular activation with the 
encoding of body schema (Chaminade, Meltzoff, Decety, 2005; Corradi-Dell’Acqua, et 
al., 2009), or, as part of limbic system, with the processing of the social/empathic 
component of imitation (Carr et al., 2003). Given the reciprocal connections of insula 
with many cortical (prefrontal, premotor, parietal and temporal) and subcortical (limbic) 
structures, it is difficult, at present, to establish what its specific functional contribution 
to imitation is. 
 Action-verb comprehension. In our patients, comprehension deficit was 
associated with lesion in the IFG and STG, which are classic components of the 
perisylvian-language network, in the superior TP, and in the insula. The role of the pars 
opercularis and triangularis of the IFG (Broca’s area) in verb processing is largely 
documented in neuropsychological (Caramazza & Hillis, 1991; Damasio & Tranel, 
1993; Daniele et al., 1994; McCarthy & Warrington, 1985; Miceli et al., 1988) and 
imaging studies (Kellenbach, Wijers, Hovius, Mulder, & Mulder, 2002; Shapiro et al., 
2005). However, due to its involvement in a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic 
tasks (Bookheimer, 2003; Fink et al., 2006; Friederici, 2002), recent neurobiological 
models of language assign the Broca’s area an executive-like function in controlling the 
retrieval and binding together, into a coherent overall representation, lexical and non-
linguistic information associated with a word, conveyed from posterior regions (e.g., 
Fiez, 1999; Hagoort, 2005; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997) 
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 STG that was marginally encompassed by lesion is another typical correlate of 
comprehension (e.g., Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999; Friederici, Rüschemeyer, Hahne & 
Fiebach, 2003; Scott & Johnsrude, 2003; Vandenberghe, Price, Wise, Josephs, 
Frackowiak, 1996). Although traditional neurological models do not posit a role of TP, 
our findings go along with clinical studies on semantic dementia (see Jefferies & 
Lambon Ralph, 2006), and TMS studies on healthy participants (e.g., Lambon Ralph, 
Pobric & Jefferies, 2009), suggesting that this region is one crucial substrate within the 
neural network for conceptual knowledge. The involvement of TPs is held to be 
bilaterally, but evidence suggests that the left side is specialized for verbal modality 
(Lambon Ralph et al., 2001). Finally, while left insular lesions often elicit speech 
production deficit (Dronkers, 1996; Shuren, 1993), imaging studies have also linked this 
region to the semantic processing of words (Friederici, Rüschemeyer, Hahne & Fiebach, 
2003; Mummery et al., 1999). Mummery et al. (1999) hypothesized that insular 
activation reflects automatic aspects of semantic processing; however, its precise role in 
word comprehension, as well as in speech production (see Hillis et al., 2004) remains 
unclear.  
 Tool use. Lesions of patients with tool-use impairment - a key symptom of 
ideational apraxia - overlapped in a relatively small region centered in postcentral gyrus 
and SMG that forms the anterior part of the inferior parietal lobule. A wealth of studies 
on patients suffering from ideational apraxia suggests that the capacity for highly 
skillful tool use relies on the left inferior parietal lobe (e.g., Rothi et al., 1991; Rumiati 
et al., 2001). Consistently, imaging studies with healthy subjects related the postcentral 
gyrus to execution of visually-guided grasping (e.g., Frey, Vinton, Norlund & Grafton, 
2005), and the left SMG to the access of object-related action schemas during motor 
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performance (Binkofski, 1999; Johnson-Frey et al., 2005; Rumiati et al., 2004), but also 
in non-motor tasks involving tools, such as semantic judgments (Canessa et al., 2008; 
Kellenbach et al., 2003), naming (Chao & Martin, 2000), or passive perception (Mahon 
et al., 2007). 
 Tool-noun comprehension. Regions implicated in deficit of tool-noun 
comprehension were the insular cortex, pars opercularis and, marginally, pars 
triangularis of the IFG (Broca’s area), and superior TP. The fact that these regions 
matched those associated with deficit in action-verb comprehension is not surprising as 
the group of patients with impaired action-verb comprehension involved the same two 
patients (BB, CG) who formed the group with impaired tool-noun comprehension. As 
discussed above, these lesion sites have been related to processes that are broadly 
involved in comprehension, irrespective of task and word content.  
 However, while the deficit of our patients seems to reflect damage to non-
specific semantic processing, this does not exclude the existence of neural systems 
dedicated to particular types of knowledge or word classes. The anatomo-functional 
distinction between verbs and nouns, as suggested in many studies (see Shapiro & 
Caramazza, 2003), might not have been appreciated here, due to limitations of our 
lesion analysis (i.e., small sample size and full overlap of groups with impaired action-
verb and impaired tool-noun comprehension). Double dissociation observed in patients’ 
behavioral implies that the – at least partial – independence of verb and noun 
representations, even when semantically related, is more than a possibility.  
Shared regions for motor performance and action-word comprehension 
 Two regions resulted associated with deficits in both imitation and action-verb 
comprehension: OP and insula. As discussed above, the involvement of OP in imitation 
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may reflect the encoding of spatial location of hand/harm in relation with one’s own 
body (schema) (e.g., Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2009)5. Notice, however, that the 
overlap between imitation- and comprehension-related regions extends more caudally 
relative to the portion of OP associated with imitation deficit only. Therefore, other 
processes held in different portions of OP contributed to imitation deficit. This 
possibility takes into account evidence for four distinct cytoarchitectonic areas in human 
OP, which can be expected to contain separate body representations, or serve different 
functional aspects within the somatosensory system (Eickhoff et al., 2007). 
 In word comprehension, the involvement of OP may relate to the functional 
relevance of the left inferior parietal cortex in understanding written and spoken words, 
as acknowledged for more than a century in clinical investigation (Dajerine, 1892; 
Geshwind, 1965; Hart & Gordon, 1990; Heilman et al., 1982; Mesulam, 2008), and 
supported by imaging studies (Friederici et al., 2000; Price, 1998). OP has also been 
linked specifically to auditory processes for speech perception (Binder et al., 2010; 
Hickok & Poeppel, 2000).  
 OP and its adjacent parietal cortex is part of the frontoparietal circuitry that, in 
the embodied conception, is crucial for action performance (e.g., imitation), as well as 
for action comprehension (Rizzolatti, Fogassi & Gallese, 2001). Despite so, I did not 
find any apparent involvement of motor and premotor cortices in action-word 
comprehension. This is clearly contrary to the central claim of embodied hypothesis that 
action meanings are encoded in these anterior motor regions (see also Hickok, 2009, for 
a similar argument). Thus, I have to conclude that the motor system does not necessarily 
 
5
 Notice that this specific function of PO is coherent with the predominant proportion of hand/arm spatial 
errors (95%) or unrecognizable gestures observed in our patients in action production tasks (i.e. action 
imitation and tool use), relative to semantic or visual errors. 
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support this processing. Moreover, while all our patients with imitative and 
comprehension deficits had damage to OP, it should be reminded that many of them 
(i.e., all but BB) had impaired imitation without comprehension deficit, and one of the 
two patients with impaired comprehension (CG) had preserved imitation. In other 
words, the portion of OP, where networks for imitation and comprehension overlap, 
does not seem necessary for either task.  This observation is better accommodated 
within the frame of a distributed architecture of complex functions (McIntosh, 2000; 
Price & Friston, 2002) predicting that, when there is localized damage, there may be no 
evident cognitive deficit, although the damaged region may be part of the network. As 
Price and Friston (2002) observed, “[i]maging can, in principle, identify the set of 
regions that are sufficient for a cognitive operation and the lesion-deficit model 
identifies which of these areas are necessary” (p. 418). That is, the involvement of a 
given region in a task does not imply that that region is necessary for that task! The 
recruitment of OP in several tasks may be one instance of “one-to-many structure-
function” relationship predicted within the same perspective, whereby a particular area 
may be part of different networks depending on the task context (McIntosh, 2000; Price 
& Friston, 2002). Consistently with that, for instance, OP is activated in disparate 
linguistic tasks and irrespective of the word content, leaving open a possibility that 
distinct neural systems overlap in the same anatomical region (Price, 1998).  
 A similar reasoning applies to the insula that is recruited in surprisingly large 
number of tasks, suggesting that there is no one, but many functions to which insula – 
or different portions of insula – contributes, as a part of different networks.  
 The same two regions, OP and insular cortex, resulted from the intersection-
analysis between tool use- and tool-noun comprehension-related lesions. OP has been 
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independently related both to tool-use ability, as a part the grasp-specific cortical 
network to guide hand-object interactive movement (Frey et al., 2005; Naito & Ehrsson, 
2006), and to word comprehension/perception, as discussed above. Likewise, insular 
cortex has been linked to both (and many other) functions. Again, the lesion analysis 
combined with the behavioral observations, leads to the conclusion that networks for 
tool-use and tool-noun comprehension may overlap in some anatomical regions, (or the 
same regions can be part of the two networks). It remains that no evidence in our 
findings indicates a critical function of motor system in word comprehension.  
 One may observe that, in our patients, none of the praxic deficits was 
specifically associated with damage to motor and premotor areas, but rather resulted 
from disruption of posterior (parietal) components of the sensorimotor circuitry. Hence, 
it can be argued that the interruption in any point of the circuitry contributes to word-
semantic impairment. This possibility has to be excluded on the basis of our patients’ 
behavior: two patients (IN, SN) with damage to OP and impaired imitation could still 
comprehend words (denoting the same actions), and patient IN who was also impaired 
in tool use could still comprehend tool-nouns. I do not mean to exclude that language 
and action are highly interactive systems, especially because our comprehension task 
(word-picture matching) did not exhaust all aspects of action knowledge associated with 
a word. It is plausible that, in other task contexts, sensorimotor regions can gain greater 
relevance for achieving comprehension, a possibility that well meshes with the notion of 
a distributed architecture of cognitive functions. What our results mean is that a 
complex cognitive process, such as word comprehension, cannot be localized to the 
motor cortices, as stated in the strictly embodied view (Rizzolatti et al., 2001; 
Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010). Moreover, the reported double dissociations imply that, 
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even if one assumes that, not the motor cortices, but the whole sensorimotor circuitry 
sustains comprehension, this cannot be regarded as a necessary component of the 
processing.  
  As last remark, results of lesion analyses discussed so far must be taken as 
descriptive and, possibly, suggestive of the neural underpinnings of the investigated 
functions. The limited sample size did not allow us to employ more sophisticated 
methods (i.e., voxelwise lesion mapping), for which power is a major concern 
(Kimberg, Coslett & Schwartz, 2007). Thus, our analysis relied only on evident 
anatomical changes in the patients’ brain. The same limitation resulted in comparisons 
between lesions of small-sized groups, often restricted to two individuals. Moreover, a 
very few patients exhibited deficit in only one task. In particular, the susceptibility of 
naming ability to impairments at many processing levels can explain why I failed to 
detect naming-specific regions. This objective would require having a larger number of 
patients with anomia and spared semantic or motor abilities.  
  
 A case of deep apraxia. Patient NP was a case of deep apraxia, as her disorder 
resulted from damage to subcortical structures (see Figure 8), including insular cortex, 
basal ganglia (head of caudate nucleus, globus pallidus and putamen), thalamic nucleus 
(lateral portion) and surrounding white matter (internal capsule and peristriatal white 
matter). Her deficit in both tool-use and imitation, suggests a functional breakdown at 
the level of the output gestural buffer that temporarily holds the whole action to be 
performed (Cubelli et al., 2000; Rumiati et al., 2010). This diagnosis is consistent with 
the lesion affecting the basal ganglia (and their connections to prefrontal areas), which 
are held to be involved in online action monitoring (Botvinick & Plaut, 2006). On the 
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other hand, Pramstaller and Marsden (1996), in a meta-analysis of single-cases, 
suggested that deep apraxia reflects the interruption of information flow from the left 
inferior parietal lobule to frontal motor regions, due to lesion of white matter (arcuate 
fasciculus and internal capsule) adjacent to basal ganglia and thalamus. For the sake of 
our study, NP’s performance was highly informative as her praxis dysfunction left 
completely unaffected word comprehension. This instance brings further support to our 
conclusion that neither the motor system, nor the whole frontoparietal sensorimotor 
circuitry that in this patient was apparently interrupted in a crucial point, can be 
regarded as a substantial correlate of action-word comprehension. 
 
2.6. Conclusions of chapter 1 
Our findings show that producing actions and processing words related to the 
same actions rely on independent representational systems and dissociable neural 
substrates. This is true even when verbal and nonverbal abilities are acquired equally 
early in life and deal with identical stimuli. Previous neuropsychological studies have 
reported patients with preserved action and object comprehension and apraxia, and 
others with no apraxia but impaired action and object knowledge (e.g. Negri et al., 
2007; see Mahon & Caramazza, 2005, for a review). Here, I have extended this 
dissociation to the relationship between action and action-word representations. A 
productive investigation of the role of basic modality-specific systems in cognition 
should start from the evidence that a person may lose her ability to physically use a 
broom, while she can still be able to grasp what the D.F. Wallace’s “Broom of the 
System” is! 
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Chapter 3.  
The “when” of motor simulation: 
Timing and task-dependency of motor 
activity in word processing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
The hypothesis that motor simulation is the mechanism for understanding action-words 
implies that motor activation occurs automatically, even when a subject’s attention is 
diverted from the motor content of a word (Pulvermüller, 2005). On the contrary, recent 
imaging studies have shown that M1 was activated only in some – but not all – tasks 
involving action language (e.g., Tomasino, Werner, Weiss & Fink, 2007; Willems, Haggort 
& Casasanto, 2010). Establishing whether motor activation is automatic in word processing 
can provide insight on the question as to whether it serves lexical-semantic encoding or not.  
Insight on this question can also be gained by establishing the precise time interval 
in which M1 activity enhances. Word recognition is, in fact, a multistage processing, 
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characterized by lexical, syntactic, semantic and post-conceptual stages, each with its own 
specific time course. If it is true that M1 is an integral part of word representation, it should 
be active during the lexical-semantic stages of word recognition, i.e., within 200 ms. Some 
electrophysiological studies seem to support this hypothesis (Hauk, Davis, Pulvermüller & 
Marslen-Wilson, 2006; Penolazzi, Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2007; Pulvermüller, Shtyrov & 
Ilmoniemi, 2005). For instance, Pulvermüller et al. (2005), using magnetoencephalography 
(MEG), while participants listened passively to a stream of action-words and pseudo-
words, reported that a short-lived activity occurred in frontocentral regions within 200 ms 
after action words appeared. However, given the limited spatial resolution of the technique 
employed, the authors could only conclude that the processing of action words was 
maintained in “different parts of frontocentral cortex, possibly including the prefrontal, 
premotor and motor areas” (ibidem, p. 889). On the other hand, in TMS studies, where 
temporal resolution is combined with a more precise spatial resolution, language-induced 
modulation of M1 was found to be either an early (Buccino, Riggio, Melli, et al., 20051) or 
a late phenomenon (500 ms post-word; Oliveri et al., 2004).  
 In this chapter I addressed two questions. First, does motor activation occur 
automatically, even when participants perform a task that barely requires the explicit 
retrieval of the motor content of the word? Second, what stage of word recognition is most 
likely to activate the motor cortex? Given its intrinsic characteristics, TMS provided the 
ideal instrument to address these questions. In fact, when supra-threshold TMS is applied to 
                                                 
1
 The authors reported that TMS was applied 500-700 ms after the sentence-onset, which always 
corresponded to the second syllable of the action verb (Buccino et al., 2005).  
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M1 at a given point in time, it elicits motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in peripheral muscles 
responding to the stimulated area. MEPs provide a direct measure of motor excitability at 
that time, as their amplitude is proportionate to the level of motor activity. Moreover, TMS 
delays or disrupts the ongoing behavior in the stimulated areas (Harris, Clifford & 
Miniussi, 2008), thus, investigating whether and to what extent behavioral performance 
changes when M1-activity is temporarily disrupted can throw light on the question as to 
whether M1 activity critically (necessary) contributes to processing action-word. 
TMS was applied to the left hand-M1 and MEPs were recorded from hand muscles 
while participants performed a semantic and a syllabic-segmentation task. The semantic 
task, where participants were instructed to judge whether each verb was action-related, 
required the explicit retrieval of the implied motor representation. The syllabic-
segmentation task asking participants to decide on the number of syllables in each verb, 
primarily directed their attention to the sub-lexical (orthographical-phonological) features 
of a word (e.g., Carreiras, Vergara & Barber, 2005). Semantic activation is rather automatic 
in visual word recognition, but it might be only implicit when the retrieval of word 
meaning is not necessary in order to perform the task, as is in the syllabic segmentation 
(MacLeod, 1991; Neely, 1977). If M1 activation is automatic in response to action words, 
MEPs should be greater for action than for non-action verbs irrespective of the task, i.e. 
syllabic segmentation and semantic encoding.  
Three separate experiments were carried out, in which TMS was applied at different 
timings after word onset (hereafter, post-stimulus). In Experiment 1, TMS was delivered 
170 ms post-stimulus, as Event-related Potential (ERP) studies indicate that lexical access 
occurs already at 100-200 ms after the visual presentation of a word, in posterior regions 
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(Sereno, Rayner & Posner, 1998), and early semantic processes may start prior to 200 ms, 
in anterior regions (Pulvermüller, Harle & Hummel, 2001). In Experiment 2, TMS was 
triggered 350 ms post-stimulus, the time when the brain is thought to encode category-
specific attributes of word meaning. Over the 300-350 ms latency range, in fact, a greater 
negativity (N400 component) in posterior regions was found for motor words compared to 
visual or abstract words (Kellenbach, Wijers, Hovius et al., 2004). With a similar latency, 
parietal and frontal positivity (P300-like) correlate with more fine-grained aspects of 
action-word meaning, such as the body segments involved in the implied action 
(Pulvermüller et al., 2001). In Experiment 3, TMS was applied 500 ms post-stimulus, i.e. in 
post-conceptual stages of word recognition.  
Manipulating the delay between stimulus onset and magnetic stimulation across 
experiments served to investigate the time-course of M1 activity when participants 
performed different linguistic tasks. It also provided a methodological control for 
distracting/alerting effects and acoustic and tactile sensations associated with TMS. This 
control is based on the assumption that nonspecific effects of TMS are independent, 
whereas the behavioral effects are highly dependent on the precise interval between the 
event and the stimulation (Robertson, Théoret & Pascual-Leone, 2003). This procedure 
proves to be particularly appropriate for single-pulse TMS protocols, where stimulus and 
pulse are not delivered simultaneously (Walsh & Rushworth, 1999). In addition to MEPs, 
accuracy rates and reaction times (RTs) were collected as measures of participants’ 
performance. Thus, besides identifying the mental operations that most likely modulate M1 
(explicit or implicit encoding of motor content), insight was gained as to when M1 is 
recruited and what the nature of its relationship (causal?) is with linguistic performance.  
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3.2. Materials and Methods 
 
3.2.1. Participants 
 Eleven individuals (7 men, 4 women; mean age = 24.5 ± 4 years) took part in 
Experiment 1, fourteen (5 men, 9 women; mean age = 25.7 ± 3.5 years) in Experiment 2, 
and eleven (5 men, 6 women; mean age = 26.3 ± 5 years) in Experiment 3. All the 
participants were right-handed (mean laterality quotient: Experiment 1, 83, range 65-100; 
Experiment 2, 80, range 60-100; Experiment 3, 86, range 65-100; Oldfiled, 1971), and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of them had ever participated in a TMS 
experiment before. The participants were provided with an explanatory leaflet on TMS 
prior to the experiment, and filled in a questionnaire to ensure they were clear of 
contraindications to TMS (Wessermann, 1998). They confirmed their voluntary 
participation in writing, gave their written consent, and received compensation for their 
collaboration. The study was approved by the local ethics committee. 
 
3.2.2. Stimuli 
 A norming study was conducted, in which a list of 375 verbs was shown to ten 
healthy university graduates or undergraduates who were not involved in the main 
experiments. This set of items was selected following the criteria of the linguistic tradition 
that distinguishes between action verbs referring to physical acts, and state or psychological 
verbs with no reference to a physical object (Taylor, 1977; Vendler, 1957). Participants 
were asked to decide whether each verb was related to an action, and for those that were 
judged so, to specify the associated body effector among the following alternatives: “upper 
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limb”, “lower limb”, “head” or “whole body”. Verbs indicated as action-related by at least 
80% of the panel were included in the TMS study, resulting in a final set of 256 items. This 
set included 128 action-verbs (64 associated with hand, e.g., “mescolo”, I stir; and 64 
associated with other body effectors, “salto”, e.g., I jump) and 128 non-action verbs (e.g., 
“medito”, I wonder), presented in the first person singular of the present tense (see 
Appendix B). Fifty percent of verbs in each category (hand-action, non-hand action and 
non-action) were 3-syllable words; the remaining 50% was divided equally between 2- and 
4-syllable words. In addition to length (i.e., number of syllables), hand-action, non-hand 
action and non action verbs were matched for written frequency (Dizionario di frequenza 
della lingua italiana, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, C.N.R.- I.L.C.), t-tests n.s. 
 
3.2.3. Procedure 
 Participants performed two tasks, a semantic and a syllabic segmentation task, both 
involving action and non-action verbs. In the semantic task, they were asked to judge 
explicitly whether each verb implied a physical act (e.g. “mastico”, I chew) or not (e.g. 
“adoro”, I adore). In the syllabic-segmentation task participants decided on the number of 
syllables in each verb (3 or different from 3, i.e., 2 or 4). They sat on a height-adjustable 
chair at approximately 1 meter from a 17’ CRT screen that displayed the stimuli (font: 
Arial 38). The height of the chair was regulated to align the participants’ gaze with the 
centre of the display. Each trial began with an acoustic alert of 1500-Hz pure tone followed 
by a blank screen for 100 ms and then, by a fixation cross displayed in the centre of the 
screen for 1750 ms. After a 200-ms blank, the verb was projected in the centre of the screen 
for 375 ms, which gave the participants sufficient time to read the stimulus (Sereno et al., 
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1998). The verb was then substituted by three dots which were displayed for 3975 ms, to 
allow participants to provide the vocal response. On conclusion of this cycle, the next trial 
began. Each trial lasted 6200 ms from start to finish, a time sufficiently long to prevent 
interaction between consecutive TMS-pulses (Robertson et al., 2003).  
 Participants were instructed to give yes-or-no vocal responses to all the stimuli in 
both tasks. Half of the participants had to respond “yes” to action-related verbs and “no” to 
non action verbs in the semantic task, while in the syllabic task the yes-response was to 
correspond to 3-syllable verbs and the no-response to 2- or 4-syllable verbs. The other half 
of the participants received opposite instructions. The voice-onset time was recorded as a 
measure of RTs, using a microphone connected to the external response box of an E-prime 
PC-controlled system (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). Response 
accuracy was recorded online by the experimenter who pressed one of the two mouse keys: 
the right for yes-responses and the left for no-responses.  
The experiment consisted of four blocks of 64 trials each, for a total of 256 items: 
semantic task (64 verbs) and syllabic task (64 verbs) with TMS, and semantic task (64 
verbs) and syllabic task (64 verbs) with sham stimulation, as control. I obtained 128 MEPs 
for each participant, as one magnetic pulse was applied for each item (pulses delivered 
during the two sham-blocks did not elicit MEPs). Hand-action, non-hand action and non-
action verbs were randomly presented within each block, and a pause was administered 
after every 32 items. Participants were given four practice trials before each block. The 
order of the two tasks, the mapping of the verb type (action vs. non-action verb and 3 vs. 
2/4 syllables) to a response (“yes” or “no”), and the verb lists in TMS and the sham 
condition were all counterbalanced across participants.  
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3.2.4. Single-pulse TMS protocol 
TMS site and TMS intensity. Single-pulse TMS was applied to the left M1, using a 
Magstim 200 stimulator (Magstim Company, Withland, UK) connected to a figure-of-eight 
coil (70 mm in diameter). The coil was positioned by mapping the cortical representation of 
the first dorsal interosseus muscle (FDI) of the right hand, starting from the Cz reference 
point of the international 10-20 EEG system (Jasper, 1958) and moving the center of the 
coil approximately 6 cm to left, i.e., position C3/C4. The optimal scalp position for the 
induction of MEPs with maximum amplitude in the right FDI muscle was individuated for 
each participant. The coil rested tangential to the scalp surface. The target site was marked 
on the participant’s head with a cosmetic pencil, and the coil was maintained in position by 
an articulated, metallic arm.  
TMS intensity was adjusted to 120% of the motor threshold at rest, which is defined 
as the minimum intensity to evoke MEPs with ≥ 50 µV peak-to-peak amplitude in the 
relaxed FDI, in 3 out of 5 consecutive pulses (Rossini et al., 1994). The mean motor 
threshold for participants of Experiment 1 was 37.6 ± 1.4% of the maximum stimulator 
output. The means in Experiment 2 and 3 were 38.7 ± 1.4 and 38.9 ± 2.2 respectively. 
Participants were instructed to keep their right arm/hand and head motionless and the 
muscle relaxation was monitored throughout the experiment to check for involuntary 
movements. A visual feedback consisting of a muscle twitch, i.e. an abduction movement 
of the right forefinger, was always present after actual TMS delivery.  
The same intensity was used for sham stimulation. In this condition, the coil was 
held perpendicularly to the surface of the scalp over the left M1, so that it mimicked the 
noise and the mechanical vibration of TMS, although no magnetic stimulation actually 
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reached the scalp (Robertson et al., 2003). The order of the two stimulation conditions 
(TMS and sham) was counterbalanced across subjects according to Latin square. 
Participants were not informed whether they were going to receive TMS or sham 
stimulation.  
Timing of TMS delivery. The same protocol was adopted for all three experiments, 
the only difference being the timing of the TMS application. In Experiment 1, TMS pulses 
were triggered 170 ms after the onset of each stimulus. In Experiments 2 and 3, TMS was 
applied 350 and 500 ms post-stimulus, respectively. TMS-induced MEPs were recorded by 
a pair of gold surface electrodes placed over the FDI (active electrode) and the 
metacarpophalangeal joint of the index finger (reference electrode). The ground electrode 
was placed on the ventral surface of the right wrist. The electromyographic (EMG) signal 
was amplified and filtered (bandpass 20 to 2000 Hz) through a Grass amplifier (P122 
Series) and recorded with the Biopac system (MP150 model) at a sampling rate of 5 kHz. 
EMG data were transferred to a personal computer for offline analyses run with Matlab 
(The MathWorks, Natick, Massachusetts, USA). The delay of TMS delivery in each 
experiment was replicated in the sham condition.  
 
3.3. Statistical analysis 
 The same statistical analyses on RT, accuracy and MEP data were performed in 
Experiments 1-3 as the experimental design itself was identical. Practice trials, trials with 
RTs shorter than 100 ms and longer than 2500 ms, and those in which the participants made 
errors in the syllable count or in semantic judgement (according to the norming study), 
were excluded from the offline analysis. Mean RTs and accuracy were submitted to a 2 x 2 
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x 3 analysis of variance (ANOVA), with TMS condition (left M1 vs. Sham), task (semantic 
vs. syllabic) and verb category (hand-action vs. non-hand action vs. non action) as within-
subjects factors.  
Notice that, although both action-related, hand-action and non-hand action verbs 
were considered as separate levels of the verb-category factor. Indeed, while some studies 
reported increased hand-M1 activity associated with rather heterogeneous stimuli (e.g., 
action verbs related to several body effectors and nouns of manipulable objects; Oliveri et 
al., 2004; concrete nouns such as “house” and “collar”; Meister et al., 2003), other studies 
showed that M1 was activated in a somatotopic fashion, according to the body-effector of 
the implied-language action (see Pulverüller, 2005). Given the uncertainty on the 
involvement (general or specific) of hand-M1 in language, I considered, in this analysis, 
that TMS to the hand-M1 might affect differently hand- and non-hand action verbs. 
 The peak-to-peak amplitude (mV) of each MEP was computed by an automatic 
Matlab script and then normalized. MEP amplitudes inferior to 0.1 mV were not included. 
Z-scores were calculated using the individual mean and standard deviation of each mini-
block of 32 trials. Given the high variability of individual MEPs, Z-scores were used to 
increase the comparability of mini-blocks, within- and between-participants. Normalized 
MEP peak-to-peak amplitudes were subjected to a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with 
task (semantic vs. syllabic) and verb-category (action hand-action vs. non-hand action vs. 
non-action) as within-subject factors. All post-hoc comparisons between single factors were 
carried out using LSD Fisher’s test (α ≤ .05). 
 
 89 
3.4. Results 
Table 1, 2 and 3 summarize the results of the RT, accuracy and MEP analyses for 
the three experiments.  
 
3.4.1. Experiment 1: M1 activity during lexical access (TMS 170 ms post-stimulus) 
RTs. The main effect of task was significant, F(1,10)=6,27, p=0.03, revealing that 
semantic judgments were given, on average, 106 ms faster than syllabic judgements. The 
effect of category was also significant, F(2,20)=10.33, p<0.001, with action verbs (both 
hand and non-hand related) being processed faster than non action verbs (ps<0.001). The 
task x category interaction was significant, F(2,20)=10.33, p<0.001, suggesting that the 
effect of verb category was dependent on the type of task performed (see Figure 1A). Post-
hoc tests revealed that, in the semantic task, participants responded faster to hand- and non-
hand action verbs than non action verbs, (ps<0.001), with no difference between the two 
action-verb categories (p>0.1). Instead, the three verb categories did not differ in the 
syllabic task (ps>1). This effect was independent of TMS, as the interaction between 
stimulation condition, task and category did not approach significance, F(2,20)<1, n.s. 
Thus, the semantic encoding was faster for action than for non-action verbs; the syllabic 
segmentation did not give rise to difference across verb categories. 
 
 Accuracy. The effect of task resulted significant, F(1,10)=5.13, p<0.05, the 
semantic judgments being more accurate than the syllabic judgments. There was a trend for 
the interaction between task and category, F(2,20)=2.77, p=0.08 (see Figure 2A). Post-hoc 
comparisons showed that semantic judgments were more accurate on the two action-verb 
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categories, relative to non-action verbs (ps<0.05), whereas the syllabic task was performed 
equally well with the three categories (ps>0.1). This pattern of results allowed us to rule out 
that a speed-accuracy trade-off could explain participants’ performance. 
MEPs. The analysis of the normalized MEPs led to no significant effect or 
interaction (all ps>0.2).  
 
3.4.2. Experiment 2: M1 activity during semantic processing (TMS 350 ms post-stimulus) 
  
 RTs. The effect of task was significant, F(1, 13)=13.53, p=0.003, as well as the 
effect of category, F(2,26)=12.00, p=0.001. RTs in the syllabic task were slower than those 
in the semantic task, and hand-action verbs were processed faster than non-hand action and 
non-action verbs (ps<0.01). The task x category interaction was significant, F(2, 26)=10.4, 
p<0.01 (see Figure 1B). In the semantic task, hand-action and non-hand action verbs were 
processed faster than non-action verbs (ps<0.01), and hand-action verbs were judged also 
faster than non-hand action verbs (p<0.01). The three categories did not differ in the 
syllabic task (ps>0.2). The three-way interaction between TMS, task and category was also 
significant, F(2, 26)=4,27 p=0.02 (Table 1), showing that in the semantic task, TMS further 
delayed participants’ performance on non-action verbs compared with the sham condition 
(p=0.02). No TMS effect was observed in the semantic task for the two action-verb 
categories (ps>0.1). Conversely, in the syllabic task TMS slowed down responses to both 
action-verb categories compared with the sham condition (p<0.05).  
Thus, like in Experiment 1, here, participants processed action verbs faster than 
non-action verbs in the semantic but not in the syllabic task. In addition, the three-way 
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interaction revealed that TMS delivery to M1 delayed participants’ responses when they 
performed the semantic task on non-action verbs, and when they performed the syllabic 
task on action verbs.  
Accuracy. The effect of TMS was significant, F(1, 13)=6,83, p=0.02, participants 
being less accurate during TMS than sham stimulation. The main effect of category was 
also significant, F(2, 26)=10,59, p<0.001, whereby hand-action verbs were processed more 
accurately than non-hand action and non-action verbs (ps<0.001). There was also a 
significant task x category interaction, F(2, 26)=4,71, p=0.02 (see Figure 2B). Accordingly, 
participants were more accurate with hand-action than non-hand action and non-action 
verbs, in the semantic task (ps=0.001), while no difference was found across verb-
categories in the syllabic task (ps>0.1). The agreement between accuracy and RT results 
excluded the speed-accuracy trade-off effect as explanation of participants’ performance. 
 
MEPs. The ANOVA revealed only a trend for the effect of category, F(2, 26)=3,26, 
p=0.05, according to which MEPs were the greatest for non-action verbs. However, the 
lack of interaction between task and category, F(2, 26)<1, n.s., did not allow any obvious 
conclusion concerning the involvement of left M1 in word processing.  
 
3.4.3. Experiment 3: M1 activity during post-conceptual processing (TMS 500 ms post-
stimulus) 
 RTs. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of task, F(1, 10)=13.95, p<0.01, 
the semantic task being faster than the syllabic, and a main effect of the verb-category, F(2, 
20)=6.03, p<0.01, whereby hand-action verbs were processed faster than non-hand and 
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non-action verbs (ps<0.05). Although the interaction between task and category did not 
approach significance, F(2,20)<1, n.s., the pattern of participants performance was 
qulitatively comparable to that of Experiments 1-2 (see Figure 1C). 
Accuracy. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of task, F(1,10)=5,27, 
p=0.04: the semantic task was performed better than the syllabic task (0.90 ± 0.02 vs. 0.83 
± 0.004). Qualitatively, the pattern of participant’s performance in the two tasks, with the 
three verb-categories was consistent with that of Experiments 1-2 (see Figure 2C), but no 
interaction approached significance (ps>0.1). 
 MEPs. The effects of task and category were not significant (p>.05), but the 
interaction between the two factor was, F(1, 10)=8.872, p=0.01. Post-hoc tests showed that 
the semantic processing of hand-action verbs elicited greater MEPs, as compared with non 
action verbs (p=0.03), whilst the MEP amplitude for non-hand action verbs did not differ 
from that for non-action verbs (p>0.1). In the syllabic task, M1 excitability verbs was 
significantly smaller following hand-action than non-hand action and non-action verbs 
(ps<0.03). Again, there was no difference in the MEP amplitude between non-hand action 
and non-action verbs (p=0.6).  
A difference was also observed in the MEP amplitude between the semantic and 
syllabic processing of hand-action verbs (p=0.001): M1 activity significantly increased and 
decreased, depending on whether the same verbs were processed semantically and 
syllabically, respectively. A similar difference between tasks was not observed for the other 
two verb-categories (ps>0.1). Thus, the enhancement of M1 activity occurred only when 
participants explicitly encoded the content of the hand-action verbs, but not when they 
encoded their phonology. In the latter condition, M1 activity resulted to be rather inhibited.  
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Table 1. Mean RTs (ms) in all experimental conditions of Experiments 1-3. 
 
 
 Semantic task   Syllabic task  
 
 Hand-act Non-hand act Non-act Hand-act Non-hand act Non-act 
Experiment  1 TMS 730 726 853 948 905 909 
 Sham 722 705 882 818 844 836 
Experiment  2 TMS 781 845 962 1156 1166 1105 
 Sham 774 848 886 1065 1101 1111 
Experiment  3 TMS 627 683 713 843 856 862 
 Sham 560 612 683 767 814 762 
Tabled mean RTs (ms) following the semantic and the syllabic processing of the hand-action (Hand-act), the 
non-hand action (Non-hand act) and the non action (Non-act) verbs, during TMS and sham stimulation, in 
Experiments 1-3. The regions in bold type showed the only significant differences between TMS and sham 
(Experiment 2). 
 
Table 2. Mean Accuracy (proportion of correct responses) in all experimental conditions of 
Experiments 1-3. 
Tabled mean accuracy (proportion of correct responses) following the semantic and the syllabic processing of 
the hand-action (Hand-act), the non-hand action (Non-hand act) and the non action (Non-act) verbs, during 
TMS and sham stimulation, in Experiments 1-3. A difference between TMS and sham stimulation was never 
observed. 
 
   Semantic task   Syllabic task  
  Hand-act Non-hand act Non-act Hand-act Non-hand act Non-act 
Experiment  1 TMS 0.93 0.93 0.83 0.87 0.84 0.87 
 Sham 0.94 0.91 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.86 
Experiment  2 TMS 0.97 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.86 0.88 
 Sham 0.99 0.92 0.88 0.93 0.90 0.93 
Experiment  3 TMS 0.94 0.90 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.82 
 Sham 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.84 0.84 0.82 
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Figure 1. Mean RTs (ms) as a function of the tasks (semantic and syllabic) for the verb categories (hand-
action, “hand”; non-hand action, “non-hand”; and non action, “non-act”). Vertical bars denote the Standard 
Error of the mean. In Experiment 1 (A) and 2 (B), both action-verb categories were processed faster than non-
action verbs in the semantic task; RTs for the three categories did not differ in the syllabic task. In  
Experiment 3 (C), the pattern of performance was similar to that of Experiments 1-2, although the interaction 
did not approach significance. 
 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 2: Mean accuracy (proportion of correct responses) as a function of the tasks (semantic 
and syllabic) for the verb categories (hand-action, “hand”; non-hand action, “non-hand”; and non action, 
“non-act”). Vertical bars denote the Standard Error of the mean. (A) Experiment 1: in the semantic task, both 
the action-verb categories were processed more accurately than the non action verbs; accuracy did not differ 
for the three verb categories in the syllabic task. (B) Experiment 2: hand-action verbs were processed more 
accurately than the other verb categories in the semantic task; the three categories did not differ in the syllabic 
task. (C) Experiment 3: qualitative, the pattern of performance was consistent with that of Experiments 1-2, 
although the interaction did not approach significance. 
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Table 3. Means of normalized (sem) MEP peak-to-peak amplitudes in all experimental 
conditions of Experiments 1-3. 
  Semantic task   Syllabic task  
 Hand-act Non-hand act Non-act Hand-act Non-hand act Non-act 
Experiment 1 -0.05 (0.05) 0.06 (0.08) -0.02 (0.06) 0.03 (0.07) -0.09 (0.06) -0.003 (0.03) 
Experiment 2 0.04 (0.05) -0.17 (0.07) 0.06 (0.04) -0.04 (0.08) -0.09 (0.09) 0.06 (0.04) 
Experiment 3 0.12 (0.04) 0.07 (0.08) -0.07 (0.04) -0.19 (0.07) 0.01 (0.07) 0.05 (0.05) 
 
Tabled mean normalized MEP amplitude following the semantic and the syllabic processing of the hand-
action (Hand-act), the non-hand action (Non-hand act) and the non action (Non-act) verbs in Experiments 1-
3. The regions in bold type showed the facilitation in the semantic task and the inhibition in the syllabic task, 
for hand-action verbs only, as compared to non-action verbs (Experiment 3). A similar dissociation between 
tasks was not observed for the other verb categories in any of the three experiments. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Analysis of normalized MEP peak-to-peak amplitude for the verb categories (hand-action, non-
hand action and non action verbs) as a function of the tasks (semantic and syllabic) and the timing of TMS 
delivery (170, 350, 500 ms). At 500 ms post-stimulus, MEP amplitude increased when the participants 
performed the semantic task on hand-action verbs compared with non-action verbs. It decreased, relative to 
non-action verbs, when they performed the syllabic task on the hand-action verbs. The difference in MEP 
amplitude between the two task was significant for hand-action verbs. A similar dissociation was never 
observed for the non-hand action verbs. Vertical bars denote the Standard Error of the mean. 
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3.4.4. Between-subjects analysis 
 MEP data from all the three experiments were subjected to an ANOVA with factors, 
2 task and 3 verb-category, manipulated within subjects, and 3 timing of TMS delivery as a 
between-subjects factor. This analysis was performed in order to investigate the time-
course of M1 activity associated with each verb category during their semantic and syllabic 
processing. The three-way interaction between task, category and TMS timing approached 
significance, F(4,66)=2,1656, p=0.08 (see Figure 3). Post-hoc comparisons revealed a 
different pattern of M1-activity for hand- vs. non-hand action verbs, when compared with 
non-action verbs.  
 
Hand-action verbs. At the first two timings of TMS delivery (i.e., 170 and 350 ms 
post-stimulus), MEP amplitude for hand-action verbs was not different from that for non-
action verbs, in either task (all ps>0.3). Moreover, at these latencies, MEP amplitude 
following the semantic and the syllabic processing of hand-action verbs did not differ 
(p>0.3). When recorded at 500 ms post-stimulus, the difference between MEPs for hand-
action verbs and non-action verbs approached significance in the semantic task (p=0.07), 
and reached significance in the syllabic task (p=0.03). Moreover, M1 activity for hand-
action verbs resulted greater in the semantic than in the syllabic task (p<0.01). Confirming 
the results of the individual experiments, this analysis suggests that M1 activity is 
modulated by hand-action verb processing only during post-conceptual stages of word 
recognition (500 ms post-stimulus), with the direction of the modulation (increase or 
decrease) depending on the task-demand.  
 
 97 
Non-hand action verbs. The pattern of M1-activity following non-hand action verbs 
proved to be different from that of hand-action verbs. At 350 ms, I observed a dramatic 
decrease of MEP amplitude for non-hand action verbs relative to the other two verb-
categories, in the semantic task only (ps<0.05). However, besides this effect, the MEP 
amplitude associated with non-hand action verbs never differed from that of non-action 
verbs in either task condition, and at any time interval (all ps>0.2). No difference was 
found when the same verbs were subjected to the two tasks (p=0.5). In other words, the 
difference in MEP amplitude between semantic and syllabic tasks, I observed for hand-
action verbs at 500 ms post-stimulus, never occurred for non-hand action verbs. 
 The results of the between-subject analysis confirmed those of the single 
experiments. The effect of action-verb processing on M1 activity was observed at 500 ms 
post-stimulus when hand-M1 activity for hand-action verbs increased during the semantic 
task, and decreased during the syllabic task. Motor activation associated with action verbs 
did not occur within 350 ms, i.e. in the time interval for lexical-semantic access. In other 
words, hand-M1 activity increased only after the lexical-semantic access to representations 
of hand-action verbs, and only when the task explicitly required processing the motor 
information associated with a word. At this latency, the syllabic segmentation of the same 
hand-related items led to an inhibition of motor activity. The fact that this pattern was 
observed only with hand-action verbs indicates that the phenomenon of language-induced 
motor activity occurs in a somatotopic fashion, reflecting the implied-language content.  
The pattern of M1 activity associated with non-hand action verbs appears quite 
unclear. No conclusion can be drawn, also because it is not possible to establish whether 
any MEP effect for this verb-category actually resulted from hand-M1 activity, or from 
 98 
activity in other M1 sites (e.g., leg- or face-area) spreading to hand-M1, through horizontal 
cortico-cortical connections (Schieber, 2001). On the other hand, the different apttern of 
M1 activity associated with the processing of hand-action and non-hand action verb, 
suggests that the interaction between action-word meanings and motor system is sensitive 
to the somatotopic organization of M1 (Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin & Ilmoniemi, 2005). 
 
3.5. Discussion 
 In this chapter, TMS has been used to measure the excitability of the participants’ 
left M1 while they processed action verbs. RTs and accuracy were analysed to assess 
whether action verb processing was significantly affected by TMS interference with M1 
activity. The results challenge the view that motor activity is automatic in response to 
action-words, and crucially contributes to their processing.  
Participants’ performance showed that action verbs (both hand and non-hand 
related) were processed faster (and better) relative to non-action verbs, in the semantic but 
not in the syllabic task (Experiments 1-2). Relative to sham, TMS delayed the semantic 
judgments of non-action verbs and the syllabic segmentation of action verbs when applied 
350 ms post-stimulus (Experiment 2). Although the semantic processing was sometimes 
faster and more accurate for hand-action than for non-hand action verbs (Experiments 2-3), 
these two categories interacted similarly with the other factors, and differently with respect 
to non-action verbs. MEP results showed no enhancement of hand-M1 activity within the 
response latency critical for lexical-semantic processing (Experiments 1-2). The hand-M1 
activity was modulated by the word content only when measured at 500 ms post-stimulus. 
In particular, relative to non-action verbs, M1 activity increased when participants 
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performed the semantic task on hand-action verbs, and decreased when they performed the 
syllabic task on the same items (Experiment 3). A similar pattern was not observed for non-
hand action verbs: M1 activity associated with these stimuli did not differ from that 
associated with non-action verbs, both in the semantic and in the syllabic task. The MEP 
analysis, where the timing of TMS delivery was included as a between-subjects factor, 
confirmed the findings of the three individual experiments.  
 
3.5.1. Verb processing with and without M1 TMS  
 The overall advantage of action verbs relative to non-action verbs is well 
established in the literature on lexical-semantic processing. Using ERP, Kellenbach et al. 
(2004) found that the earliest effect associated with the processing of semantic attributes 
was elicited by motor words at about 250 ms, compared with abstract and visual words. 
Notice, however, that while this study revealed a temporal precedence of cortical responses 
to motor attributes, it found no difference in the cortical networks involved in processing 
the different word categories. Accordingly, behavioral studies on healthy participants 
showed that the comprehension of language with associative-functional (motor) attributes is 
faster than the processing of items with non-motor (visual) attributes (Laws, Humber, 
Ramsey & McCarthy, 1995). Following these findings, Laws et al. (1995) proposed that the 
former category may be characterized by a more extensive and complex cortical 
representation than the other categories, possibly because the motor information “attached” 
to action-word representations provides a relational context - including path, manner, 
results and instruments - that instantiates and enriches their conceptualization. This 
possibility well matches the classical concreteness and imageability effects, whereby more 
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concrete and imaginable words are processed faster, which characterizes word retrieval and 
recognition of both healthy and brain-damaged individuals (Berndt, Haendiges, Burton & 
Mitchum, 2002; Luzzatti, Raggi, Zonca et al., 2002; see Paivio, 1971).  
 In Experiment 2 two further effects were observed: compared with the sham 
condition, M1 TMS delayed RTs in (1) the semantic encoding of non-action verbs, and (2) 
the syllabic segmentation of action-verbs (both hand and non-hand related). These results, 
which were quite unexpected and only partial (i.e., no facilitation was found for action 
verbs in the semantic task), can be tentatively interpreted in the framework of congruence 
effects between stimulus and response or between concurrent stimuli (Kornblum et al., 
1990). In general, when multisensory stimuli co-occur, the information they convey is 
combined to generate the response (Laurienti, Kraft, Maldjian et al., 2004). Thus, the 
former effect may be the consequence of accessing the semantics of words with non-motor 
content, while a concurrent motor stimulation was provided. By eliciting overt hand 
movements, TMS might have acted as an incongruent prime-like stimulus when 
participants processed non-action word content (see Pulvermüller et al., 2005; Tomasino et 
al., 2008)2. A similar mechanism possibly explains the latter effect. Here, the co-occurrence 
of motor stimulation (or the view of hand movement elicited by TMS) and an action verb, 
might have facilitated the automatic activation of the task-irrelevant motor information 
associated with the word, which had to be inhibited before responding, with a processing 
                                                 
2
 The reason why we failed in detecting a facilitation of the semantic processing of hand and non-hand action-
verbs might be that, as these were the fastest of the experimental conditions, RTs could not be further 
shortened - with a statistically significant time period - by a congruent stimulation. 
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cost in terms of RTs (Eimer, Hommel & Prinz, 1995; Kornblum, Hasbroucq & Osman, 
1990; Lu & Proctor, 1995). The assumption here is that, although syllabic segmentation 
primarily involved phonological computations, automatic access to semantics occurs 
whenever a word is read (MacLeod, 1991; Neely, 1977).  
Congruence effects suggest that a stimulus-response or a stimulus-stimulus (as in 
our case) set overlap for any dimension, and the two underlying systems interact at some 
unspecified level (Kornblum et al., 1990). In the context of our study, these effects were 
observed just at the latency (350 ms) when word’s motor or non-motor attributes are 
alleged to be processed, but were not accompanied by a specific M1 activation. Thus, while 
they may suggest an interaction between language and motor systems, such interaction 
seems to occur at the stage of processing when abstract, conceptual representations of 
words and actions are contacted, with no involvement of lower-level motor programs.  
 
3.5.2. M1 activity in different stages of action and non-action verb processing  
M1 activity increased when TMS was applied 500 ms post-stimulus, only when 
participants performed the semantic task with hand-action verbs, suggesting that language-
induced motor activation depends upon the explicit retrieval of the motor content of the 
word. On the contrary, in the syllabic task, I detected a decrease of M1 activity following 
hand-action verbs, which may reflect the inhibition of motor processes not required by the 
task.  
The increase and the decrease of corticospinal excitability have been previously 
associated with facilitation and inhibition of motor processes, respectively (Koch, Franca, 
Del Olmo et al., 2006; Reynolds & Ashby, 1999). In particular, Koch et al.'s (2006), in a 
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paired-pulse TMS study on the functional connectivity between premotor cortex and M1, 
found that MEP amplitude increased when a response had to be performed, and decreased 
when a response was one of the possible alternatives, but not the correct one, and therefore, 
had to be suppressed. Interestingly, M1 activity was modulated, in a top-down manner, by 
the activity of higher-level motor areas selecting the response, among the alternatives, to 
satisfy the task demand (Koch et al., 2006). Similarly, in our study, the modulation 
(increase or decrease) of hand-M1 activity appears as strongly constrained by the demand 
of the task.  
This chapter contains the first study in which M1 activity has been measured at 
different timings, during different linguistic tasks involving the very same stimuli, and in 
which the effects of its temporary disruption have been tested on participants’ behavior. 
According withy previous studies, our results show that the motor system does activate in 
action word processing. However, relative to previous studies, ours adds that this activity 
depends on whether the task required explicitly processing the motor content of the word, 
or not. Moreover, the late co-occurrence of M1 activity, together with the lack of effect on 
participants’ performance, when TMS interfered with M1 activity, suggests that this region 
is not part of network subserving the lexical-semantic encoding of action-words.  
A previous TMS study, in which M1 activity was tested at different time intervals 
while participants were reading concrete nouns aloud, found enhancement at 600 ms post-
stimulus and later, but not before (Meister, Boroojerdi& Foltys, 2003). To the best of our 
knowledge, this time interval falls far beyond that for lexical-semantic encoding, within 
post-conceptual stages. The existence of post-conceptual stages of language processing has 
been suggested by the activation of a fronto-temporal network, after the lexical-semantic 
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access, which may sustain the supramodal contextual integration of different levels of 
information from different modalities (Marinkovic, Dhond, Dale et al., 2003). In the case of 
action verbs, the retrieval of conceptual representations may lead to the implicit activation – 
or generation - of motor images that, in turn, activate M1 (e.g., Kosslyn, Thompson, Wraga 
& Alpert, 2001). This form of imagery is known to be engaged automatically as a strategy 
to perform tasks with sensorimotor components that “cannot easily be inferred from […] 
verbal material” (Kosslyn, Behrmann & Jeannerod, 1995; p. 1337) or, I add, whose recall is 
more effective via simulation. The time at which language-related M1 activation (500 ms) 
was found in the present study, fell fairly within the lengthy interval for imagery processes 
(from 400 ms to 750 or more; Ganis, Keenan, Kosslyn & Pascual-Leone, 2000; Iwaki, 
Ueno, Imada & Tonoike, 1999). Finally, M1 is involved in motor imagery in a somatotopic 
fashion (e.g., Ehrsson et al., 2003), therefore, it is not surprising that the effect I reported 
was specific for hand-action verbs, when only hand-M1 was stimulated.  
M1 activation would result from understanding action verbs rather than contributing 
to it: it may reflect post-conceptual operations resulting from the explicit retrieval of motor 
information associated with a word. Here, I suggest that the strategic function of motor 
imagery can provides an insight as to why language processing goes beyond the completion 
of lexical-semantic encoding and engages the motor system.   
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Chapter 4.  
“She” is not like “I”:  Agent-dependent 
motor activity in verb processing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Embodied cognition holds that action understanding results from the automatic mapping of 
a perceived action onto the perceiver’s motor system (“self-other shared representation”), 
where a simulation of that action is carried out (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). This 
mirror matching may be accomplished by neurons in the motor circuits that “respond to the 
action itself, rather than to the body (or the person) who performs that action” (Jeannerod, 
2004, p.423). As activations in left motor and premotor regions in humans have been 
reported not only when an action was observed (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 
1995), but also when a presented word implied an action (Hauk, Johnsrude, & 
Pulvermüller, 2004), mirror matching has been generalized to language. Lexical-semantic 
processing of action words, like the processing of any other action-stimulus, may depend 
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upon the early (within 250 ms) and automatic activation of agent-neutral motor 
representations via motor simulation (Pulvermüller, 2005). Moreover, the idea of “self-
other shared representation” grounding the mirror matching implies that the motor system 
responds equally to words with self- and other-related action meaning.  
While the motor facilitation for self versus others’ action has been widely studied in 
action observation (Decety & Chaminade, 2003), only Tomasino, Werner, Weiss and Fink 
(2007) have explored this phenomenon using word as stimuli The authors reported no 
difference in BOLD signal in the primary motor cortex (M1), when participants imagined 
the content of action phrases adopting the first-person (1P) or the third-person (3P) 
perspective. However, as participants had to report whether the mental scene took place 
indoor or outdoor, it is possible that they failed to focus on the subject of the verb and used 
the egocentric perspective by default, as it is likely to occur during simulation (Willems, 
Hagoort & Casasanto, 2010). 
Soliciting the integration of the subject with the meaning of an action verb can 
crucially contribute to establish how self and others’ actions modulate motor activity. In 
action observation, the diversity in stimulus orientation between 1P and 3P actions can 
produce, on its own, different effects on the motor system (Saxe, Jamal, & Powell, 2006), 
and it is not easy to isolate this visual effect from the effect of the agent on the system. In 
contrast, words enjoy the advantage of holding constant visual inputs associated with either 
action perspective. 
In this chapter I report a study in which transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
was combined with a linguistic task to test word-related motor facilitation. Participants 
were requested to read and report the subject of action and nonaction verbs presented in 1P 
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(afferr-o) or 3P (afferr-a). TMS was applied to the left hand-M1 to measure cortico-spinal 
excitability, defined by the amplitude of TMS-induced motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in 
peripheral muscles responding to the stimulated area. This approach permitted the 
investigation of two hierarchical questions. First, are motor responses to action verbs 
automatic and independent of the subject of the action? A positive answer to this question 
would support the hypothesis that neurons with mirror properties contribute to action 
language processing. Alternatively, is motor activation greater for self-referential or for 
other-referential action verb meaning? 
 
4.2. Materials and Methods 
 
4.2.1. Participants 
Sixteen native-Italian university graduates and undergraduates (8 female; 20-35 
years) participated in the experiment. All were right-handed (laterality quotient: 80-100; 
Oldfield, 1971) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Before the experiment, they 
received information about TMS, compiled a questionnaire to ensure they were clear of 
contraindications (Wassermann, 1998), and confirmed their voluntary participation in 
writing. The study was approved by SISSA Ethics committee. 
 
4.2.2. Stimuli 
Sixty-four Italian verbs associated with hand-actions (“mescolare”, to stir), and 64 
nonaction verbs (state/psychological verbs; “meditare”, to wonder) were used, each 
presented in both 1P and 3P of the present tense, yielding a total of 256 items. Verbs were 
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chosen from a larger database used in a previous study (see Chapter 2), where 375 verbs 
were selected according to the criteria of linguistic tradition (e.g., Taylor, 1977), and then 
assessed by a panel of 10 judges for their semantic association with action and the body 
part involved. The selected experimental stimuli were divided in two equivalent lists, 
matched for length (number of graphemes) and written frequency (Laudanna, Thornton, 
Brown, Burani, & Marconi, 1995), in which each verb appeared only in one of the two 
possible forms (either 1P or 3P). The present tense inflectional morphology of all the verbs 
was regular. 
 
4.2.3. Procedure 
Participants sat on a height-adjustable chair at 1 meter from a LCD screen that 
displayed the stimuli (font: Arial 45); they had to read each verb and state whether the 
subject was the 1P or 3P. They were encouraged to read the verbs accurately in order to 
perform a successive recognition test. Each trial began with a 1500-Hz pure tone followed 
by a 100-ms blank screen, after which a central fixation was displayed for 1450 ms. The 
screen went blank again for 50 ms, then the verb appeared in the centre for 350 ms. Finally, 
three dots were displayed for 4075 ms, soliciting the participants’ response. On conclusion 
of this cycle, the next trial began. Each trial lasted 6025 ms, a time sufficient to prevent 
interaction between consecutive TMS-pulses (Robertson, Théoret & Pascual-Leone, 2003). 
Half of the participants were instructed to respond /ba/ when the subject was 1P, and /da/, 
when the subject was 3P. The remaining participants were given opposite instructions. 
These syllables were preferred to the obvious “I” and “s/he” in order to avoid response bias 
due to phonological difference between the two responses. The voice-onset time was 
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recorded as a measure of RTs, using a microphone connected to the external response box 
of an E-prime PC-controlled system (Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). 
Response accuracy was recorded online by an experimenter pressing the right mouse-key 
for 1P-responses and the left one for 3P-responses. Each participant performed a 8-trials 
training phase and then 2 blocks, one with M1 TMS and one with sham stimulation, each 
comprising a list of 128 items (32 1P-action verbs, 32 3P-action verbs, 32 1P-nonaction 
verbs and 32 3P-nonaction verbs), for a total of 256 randomized trials. The mapping 
between the list in a block and the stimulation condition (TMS or sham) was 
counterbalanced across subjects. A pause was allowed every 32 trials. The experimental 
design was 2 x 2 x 2 with factors TMS (M1 TMS and sham), person (1P and 3P) and verb 
category (hand-action and nonaction), all manipulated within-subjects.  
 
4.2.4. TMS protocol 
 
Site and intensity. Single-pulse TMS was applied to the left M1, using a Magstim 
200 stimulator (Magstim Company, Withland, UK) connected to a figure-of-eight coil, 
positioned over the cortical representation of the right-hand first dorsal interosseus muscle 
(FDI). This site was mapped starting from the Cz reference point of the international 10–20 
EEG system (Jasper, 1958), and moving approximately 6 cm leftward, i.e. position C3/C4. 
The optimal scalp position for the induction of maximum MEP amplitude in the right FDI 
muscle was individuated for each participant and marked with a cosmetic pencil. The coil, 
tangential to the scalp surface, was maintained in position by an articulated arm. The TMS 
intensity was adjusted to 120% of the motor threshold at rest (mean threshold: 40±2.8% of 
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the maximum stimulator output), defined as the minimum intensity to evoke MEPs with 
≥50 µV peak-to-peak amplitude in the relaxed FDI, in at least 3 of 5 consecutive pulses. 
Participants were instructed to keep their right arm/hand and head motionless and were 
monitored throughout the experiment to control muscle relaxation and the presence of a 
muscle twitch, an abduction movement of the right forefinger, after each M1-TMS 
delivery.  
The same magnetic pulse intensity was used for both TMS and sham stimulation. In 
sham, the coil was held perpendicularly to the scalp surface over the left M1. This 
condition provides a control for nonspecific effects of TMS, as it mimics the characteristic 
TMS noise and the mechanical vibration, without magnetic stimulation reaching the scalp 
(Robertson et al., 2003). The order of the two stimulation conditions was counterbalanced 
across the participants, who were not informed whether they were going to receive TMS or 
sham stimulation. TMS-induced MEPs were recorded by a pair of gold surface electrodes 
placed over the FDI (active electrode) and the metacarpophalangeal joint of index finger 
(reference electrode). The ground electrode was placed on the ventral surface of the right 
wrist. The electromyographic (EMG) signal was amplified and filtered (bandpass 20-2000 
Hz) through a Grass amplifier (P122 Series), and recorded with the Biopac system (MP150 
model) at a sampling rate of 5 kHz. EMG data were transferred to a personal computer for 
offline analyses with Matlab (The MathWorks, Natick, Massachusetts, USA).  
 
TMS timing. In both stimulation conditions, TMS was delivered 250 ms after the 
stimulus-onset. This timing was set empirically, on the basis of pilot tests. In the first pilot, 
the approximate timing for the retrieval of referential information was estimated 
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implementing the same experimental paradigm as in the main TMS experiment, except that 
TMS was not used and participants (9 right-handed native-Italians, 7 female, 20-35 years) 
had to respond /io/ for 1P verbs and /lui/ for 3P verbs. The mean RT for referential 
judgments across all conditions was 288 ms. This delay is consistent with both 
electrophysiological studies reporting a negative deflection before 300 ms after word-onset, 
associated with referential processes (Van Berkum, Koornneef, Otten, & Nieuwland, 2007) 
and electrophysiological responses in frontocentral regions associated with action-word 
processing (Pulvermüller, 2005). I also found that 1P verbs were processed faster than 3P 
verbs, F(1,8)=9.71, p=0.01. As this result could be biased by phonological difference in 
vocal responses, a second pilot was run with 8 new participants (5 female, 20-31 years), 
who responded with the syllables /ba/ and /da/, as in the TMS experiment. The mean RT 
was 406 ms, and 1P verbs were again processed faster than 3P verbs, F(1,7)=22.87, p<0.011. 
While the increase of mean RTs in the latter experiment probably reflected additional 
processing needed to map the intended responses to the appropriate label, the pattern of 
results confirmed the temporal advantage in processing 1P over 3P verbs.  
 
4.2.5. Recognition test 
Participants performed a recognition test after the TMS session, to test whether they 
had actually processed the whole verbs and not just its last part (i.e., the verb suffix) that is 
often sufficient in Italian for extracting information about the subject. The experimental 
setup was the same as before, except that TMS was removed from the participant’s head 
                                                 
1
  Mean RTs to the verbs in the two experiments were tightly correlated (N=256; r=0.24, p>0.0001). 
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and turned off. Eighty verbs were randomly presented, one at a time, on the computer 
screen in their infinitive form: 40 (20 action- and 20 nonaction-related) were selected from 
the experimental stimulus-set (“old” list); the remaining 40 were new action (N=20) and 
nonaction (N=20) verbs (“new” list). The old and new verb lists were matched for 
frequency and length. Each trial began with a fixation cross remaining on the screen for 400 
ms and followed by the verb, shown up to 20 sec. Participants were instructed to read and 
decide whether the verb had been presented during the TMS section, by pressing the right 
mouse-key for yes-response and the left for no-responses. They were encouraged to favor 
response accuracy over speed, and received feedback about the correctness of response for 
each trial. 
 
4.2.6. Analysis 
The criterion for including a participant in the offline analysis was the successful 
performance on the recognition test. Therefore, a binomial test was performed on each 
individual performance (number of correct response), to check that it was significantly 
above the chance-level (50%). This led to the exclusion of 3 participants (ps>0.05). 
The remaining 13 participants were all included in the following analysis. The all 
achieved at least 90% accuracy (M=97%) in the referential-judgment task administered 
during the TMS experiment. Mean accuracy and RTs were entered in a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with factors TMS (M1 TMS vs. sham), person 
(1P vs. 3P) and verb category (hand-action vs. nonaction). In the RT analysis, trials in 
which participants provided an incorrect response (3%) and those with RTs 2 standard 
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deviations (SD) above or below the individual condition mean (5% of correct responses), 
were excluded. Post-hoc comparisons were carried out using LSD Fisher’s test (α ≤0.05). 
In the MEP analysis, the peak-to-peak amplitude (mV) of each of the 128 MEPs 
obtained from each participant was computed with Matlab and then normalized. Trials in 
which participants provided an incorrect response were discarded (6%). Z-scores of the 
remaining MEPs were calculated using the individual condition mean and SD. Normalized 
values were then subjected to a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with person (1P vs. 3P) 
and verb-category (hand-action vs. nonaction) as within-subject factors.  
 
4.3. Results 
 
MEP. The interaction between Person and Verb-category was significant 
F(1,12)=8.27, p=0.01 (Fig. 1): motor facilitation was greater for 1P-action verbs than for 3P-
action verbs (p<0.03), while no difference was found between 1P- and 3P-nonaction verbs 
(p>0.1). Motor facilitation for 1P-action verbs was also greater relative to 1P- and 3P-
nonaction verbs (ps<0.05), while it did not differ for 3P-action verbs and 1P- and 3P-
nonaction verbs (ps>0.1). Neither the main effect of Person nor the main effect of Category 
resulted significant (ps>0.1). 
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Figure 1. A) Sample MEPs (mV) for 1P and 3P hand-action and nonaction verbs. Data from one 
representative subject. B) Mean normalized peak-to-peak MEP amplitude for 1P and 3P as a function of the 
Verb category (hand-action and nonaction). 1P-action verbs enhanced cortico-spinal excitability to a greater 
extent than 3P-action verbs and (1P and 3P) nonaction verbs. Vertical bars denote SEM. 
 
 
 
 
  114 
Accuracy. The analysis revealed significant effects of TMS, F(1,12)=5.29, p=0.04, 
and Verb category, F(1,12)=7.61, p=0.01. Accordingly, participants were more accurate 
during sham TMS than during M1-TMS delivery, and performed better on nonaction than 
on hand-action verbs. However, the two factors did not interact, F(1,12)<1. The main effect 
of Person was not significant, F(1,12)<1. 
 
RTs. The effect of Person was significant, F(1,12)=6.43, p=0.02: participants’ 
responses were faster on 1P than on 3P verbs. The TMS x Person interaction approached 
significance, F(1,12)=4.36, p=0.05 (Fig. 2): during sham, participants were faster when 
processing 1P verbs than 3P verbs (p<0.01); this advantage was abolished during M1-TMS 
delivery (p>0.1). Neither the main effect of TMS, nor the main effect or category resulted 
significant, F(1,12)<1. Mean accuracy and RTs are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Mean RTs and accuracy (standard error of the mean, SEM) in each experimental 
condition. 
  RTs (ms) Accuracy* 
  1P 3P 1P 3P 
TMS hand-action 586 (66) 592 (64) 95 (1.3) 95 (0.9) 
 Nonaction 568 (60) 574 (62) 97 (1.1) 97 (1.2) 
Sham hand-action 554 (69) 592 (78) 97 (1.1) 96 (1.2) 
 Nonaction 561 (75) 612 (88) 98 (0.5) 98 (0.9) 
* Percentage of correct responses 
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Figure 2. Mean RTs (ms) for 1P and 3P as a function of the Verb category (hand-action and nonaction) in 
each TMS condition (M1 TMS and sham). M1 TMS abolished the temporal difference in processing 1P and 
3P verbs, observed during sham, independent of the verb category. Vertical bars denote SEM. 
 
 
Additional analysis. The RT results showed that 1P verbs were processed overall 
faster than 3P verbs (in sham condition), consistently with what we found in the two pilot 
tests (see above). One possibility is that the (early) timing of TMS delivery, in our study, 
allowed detecting motor facilitation only for verbs that were processed faster. In other 
words, we might not have detected motor facilitation for 3P-action verbs because, on 
average, they were processed later than the average of 1P-action verbs. 
 To check this, we analyzed the MEPs corresponding to 3P verbs with the fastest 
RTs, i.e., with RTs falling within the first and the second percentile of the RT distribution 
of each participant. The mean RTs for the first quartile were 417 ms ± 49 (sem) and 419 
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±54 for 3P-action and nonaction verbs, respectively. The two-tail t test revealed no 
difference between 3P-action versus nonaction verbs, t(12)=-1.80, p>0.09, and, on average, 
the MEP amplitude was greater for 3P-nonaction verbs (3.3±0.44) than for 3P-action verbs 
(3±0.44). The same analysis was run considering the MEPs corresponding to 3P verbs with 
RTs belonging to the second quartile of each participant’s distribution. The mean RTs were 
532 ±52; 526 ±51 for 3P-action and 3P-nonaction verbs, respectively. Notice that these 
values approach closely the mean RTs for 1P-action (586 ±33) and nonaction (568 ±30) 
verbs. Again, the two-tail t test revealed no difference in MEPs between 3P-action and 3P-
nonaction verbs, t(12)=-0.6, p>0.55, with MEP amplitude for 3P-nonaction verbs 
(3.5±0.54) being qualitatively greater than for 3P-action verbs (3.4±0.47). 
To conclude, there was no difference between 3P-action and nonaction verbs, even 
when processing time for these items matched that for 1P verbs.  
 
 
4.4. Discussion 
 
In the present study, I compared TMS-induced MEPs when participants processed 
1P or 3P hand-action and nonaction verbs. Our results provide novel demonstration about 
the specificity of motor facilitation during action verb processing: M1 activity increased for 
action (as opposed to nonaction) verbs, only when presented in 1P. Significant lower 
excitability was found when the same verbs were presented in 3P. In this case, no 
difference between action and nonaction verbs was found. Furthermore, I found that, during 
sham, participants were faster in processing 1P verbs relative to 3P verbs, but this temporal 
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advantage dasappeared when TMS interfered with M1 activity. Our data have critical 
implications in relation to whether primary motor response to action verbs is automatic, and 
to what extend motor circuits house shared representation for self and others’ actions. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first demonstration that motor system does 
not respond automatically to any action word but only to those implying self-referential 
action meaning. Since I compared motor facilitation on randomly interleaved trials, the 
effect appears immediate and not attributable to long-term contextual fluctuations of 
participants’ cortical states, which can threaten block designs. I can also exclude that task-
related cognitive effort, which may cause increased cortical excitability (Scott, McGettigan, 
& Eisner, 2009), accounts for this interaction: during sham stimulation, participants were 
faster in responding to 1P than to 3P verbs and, although they were overall more accurate 
on nonaction compared to action verbs, there is no indication that processing 1P-hand 
action verbs was more difficult relative to 3P-hand action verbs.  
The first implication of the non-automatic motor activity is that the motor system is 
not a necessary component of the lexical-semantic network, as proposed by some embodied 
accounts of language-induced motor activity (Pulvermüller, 2005). If the motor system 
directly encoded the motor attributes of a word, motor facilitation would have followed 1P- 
and 3P-action verbs to an equal extent, as the same attributes applied to both. On the 
contrary, the involvement of M1 in conceptual processing seems to depend on the word 
having an action meaning, as well as on the agent of the implied action.  
The difference in motor facilitation between 1P- and 3P-action verbs also unhinges 
the core principle of the embodied hypothesis that action understanding results from a 
direct coupling between a perceived action and one’s own motor representation. In fact, the 
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motor cortex seems capable of distinguishing between self and other, by representing 
action contents in a subject-specific (1P), rather than subject-neutral format. The hypothesis 
that self and other actions share the same representation has been already challenged in the 
domain of action observation. For instance, using TMS, Maeda, Kleiner-Fisman and 
Pascual-Leone (2002) found that action observation modulated the left M1 activity 
maximally when the observed action matched the observer’s orientation. Likewise, Jackson, 
Meltzoff and Decety (2006) reported greater BOLD responses in left motor system for 1P 
than for 3P views of actions. In our study, the role of the acting subject in modulating 
motor activity has been extended to language processing.  
A more general role of M1 in self-other distinction is suggested by the abolition of 
the participants’ advantage in processing 1P over 3P verbs, when TMS disrupted M1 
activity. This advantage found both in the pilots and the main experiment with sham 
stimulation, conforms to previous evidence of “self-reference” effect, whereby self-related 
words are easier (e.g., faster RTs) to process than other-related words (Markus, 1977). 
Notice that TMS slowed down participants’ performance but did not impede their ability to 
do the task (in the accuracy analysis, the TMS x Person interaction was not significant). 
This suggests that the self-other distinction is maintained by the joint activity of a 
constellation of brain regions forming the “self-other distinction network” that assigns an 
action to an agent (Jeannerod, 2004). Our data corroborate previous evidence that the left 
M1 belongs to this network (Ruby & Decety, 2003).  
In summary, I have shown that processing action words modulate the motor system, 
depending on the agent to whom the implied action is attributed: processing 1P-action 
verbs does facilitate the motor system, whilst processing 3P-action verbs do not. It follows 
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tha the motor system does not respond automatically to the word’s action content itself, but 
it does only when the conceptual representation of a word integrates the action with the self 
as the agent of that action. 
Intriguingly, these constraints parallel those that typically elicit kinaestethic motor 
imagery. Imagery, the internal rehearsal of motor acts, is accompanied by kinaesthetic 
sensations and motor activations similar to those of the corresponding execution, when 
people generate and transform images of body movements (Solodkin, Hlustik, Chen & 
Small, 2004). Moreover, activity in M1, premotor and somatosensory regions is greater 
when people represent actions in 1P perspective, than in 3P perspective (Jackson et al., 
2006), and when they imagine to manipulate objects with their own hands rather than when 
they imagine objects rotating on their own (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001), to the 
extent that a virtual identity has been established between kinaestethic motor imagery and 
first-person imagery.  
The idea that language-induced motor activations would reflect opportunistic - 
rather than obligatory - implicit imagery (or simulation) triggered by the words’ motor 
content, accommodates at best recent observations for motor activation during certain but 
not all conditions of action-word processing. In particular, TMS and imaging studies 
reported increased motor activity only during tasks that focused participants’ attention on 
the motor attributes of words (Papeo et al., 2009; Tomasino et al., 2007), or when action 
words were presented in a context (i.e., a sentence) that emphasized the representation of 
body movements (Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009). However, none of those 
studies compared directly motor activation for action verbs with different subjects, or asked 
participants to process, or mentally represent, referential information. If people do not 
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routinely attend to this information and use the egocentric perspective as default in mental 
simulation (Willems et al., 2010), the motor aspects of word meaning to which the 1P 
perspective is applied, could be themselves sufficient to elicit motor activity.  
While no one denies that “images play an important role in many cognitive 
processes” (Fodor, 1975, p.184) and motor imagery can be implicitly triggered by virtually 
any stimulus or task with sensorimotor components (Kosslyn, Behrmann, & Jeannerod, 
1995), only the classic embodied account of comprehension predicts that motor simulation 
is obligatorily engaged in processing action-related words. The study I reported in this 
chapter seriously challenges this interpretation of the relationship between language and 
motor system.   
 
 
 
 
  
121 
Chapter 5.  
Human versus object motion:  
The stimulus-dependency of motor 
processes in language comprehension 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
When people process the sentence "Close the drawer" implying an action away 
from the body, they are faster in performing a response movement in a congruent direction 
than in the opposite (toward the body) direction (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). These 
congruence effects suggest that language and motor system interact because “the stimulus 
and response sets in the ensemble have properties in common, and elements in the stimulus 
set automatically activate corresponding elements in the response set” (Kornblum et al., 
1990, p. 253). That is, they prove that the comprehender activates a motor representation of 
the implied-language motion, which shares features with motor processes for response. The 
activation of motor representations in language comprehension is widely accepted to reflect 
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motor simulation (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg et al., 2008; Rizzolatti & Crighero, 2004), the 
mental rehearsal of a motor act that relies on motor neural substrates but is not 
accompanied by overt body movements (Jeannerod, 1995; Porro et al., 1996). Motor 
simulation is experienced implicitly (i.e., unconsciously), during action observation, 
understanding, planning or anticipation (Jeannerod & Decety, 1995). The term is often used 
as a synonym of motor imagery, which is considered its conscious counterpart, as both deal 
with motor representations and are associated with largely overlapping neural substrates in 
the motor areas (Grèzes & Decety, 2001). However, the two operations may differ with 
respect to some properties. For instance, imagery, being a conscious process, may require 
greater specification of the imagined movement, relative to motor representations implicitly 
triggered during simulation (Willems, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2010).  
The extent to which the simulation process involved in motion-language 
comprehension shares properties with imagery process it is still not clear. To address this 
question, in the current study, we tested whether the conditions triggering motor simulation 
in the case of language are the same as those triggering motor imagery for other cognitive 
operations (e.g., mental rotation), or whether a special relationship exists between motor 
simulation and language comprehension. The latter hypothesis has been forwarded in the 
embodied theories of language, according to which motor simulation determines the 
understanding of motion-language, because motor meanings are directly mapped into the 
comprehender’s motor representations (Rizzolatti Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). This implies 
that motor simulation is necessarily recruited, whenever an action word is processed. On 
the other hand, studies on imagery have shown that perceiving a motion-stimulus is not 
sufficient to elicit motor processes or simulation (e.g., Solodkin, Hlustik, Chen, & Small, 
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2004). Establishing whether motor simulation is recruited in language comprehension, and 
motor imagery in other cognitive operations (e.g., mental rotation) following the same 
constrains, will help define the nature of the relationship between language and motor 
processes. 
What do we know about the involvement of motor processes in imagery? A wealth 
of studies demonstrated that motor processes support imagery when individuals imagine the 
rotation of body parts and bodily or manual interactions with objects (Kosslyn, Thompson, 
Wraga, & Alpert, 2001). In other words, imagery recruits motor processes when a stimulus 
is transformed in an egocentric frame of reference, or in a “personal” perspective (Jackson, 
Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006), and its motion is associated with the kinesthetic feelings of 
moving one’s own body (Solodkin et al., 2004). In contrast, imagining stimuli moving in an 
object-centered visual space engages processes analogous to those recruited for visuospatial 
perception within the posterior parieto-occipital regions (see Zacks, 2008). Thus, imagery is 
not a unique, undifferentiated ability, but it relies on different sets of processes, or 
strategies, which can be independently employed or disrupted by brain injury (Tomasino & 
Rumiati, 2004).  
Moreover, even in those cases when a motor strategy is triggered, the motor system 
responds differently, depending on the properties of the movement involved. The kinematic 
and kineasthetic features of a movement, indeed, determine the way that movement is 
represented. Movements conforming to postural bias are easily and frequently performed 
and, therefore, have more accurate, detailed representations owning the same features as the 
actual physical motion (Cooper & Shepard, 1975; Parsons, 1987). This isomorphism results 
in a linear relationship between the time for simulation and execution of those movements 
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(Parsons, 1994). In contrast, movements opposite to postural bias, which require reaching 
uncommon postures near the extremes of joint limits and are associated with more 
uncomfortable kinaesthetic sensations, have less detailed mental representations, resulting 
in a weaker, non-linear relationship between their mental simulation and actual execution 
(Parsons, 1994). This phenomenon, named awkwardness effect (Sekiyama, 1982), has 
typically been observed in the mental rotation of hands (Funk et al., 2005; Parsons, 1987; 
1994). Recent imaging studies further support the role of the familiarity of a movement on 
motor activity: motor regions are more active when people perceive familiar movements 
(movements that they often perform), relative to less familiar ones (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, 
Grèzes, Passingham, Haggard., 2005; see also Cross, Kraemer, Hamilton, Kelley, Grafton, 
2009). 
In the current study, we selected sentences describing a manual action requiring 
either clockwise (CW) or counterclockwise (CCW) rotation performed by a human agent 
(e.g., The worker is screwing the light bulb into the lamp), and the CW or CCW rotation of 
a mechanical, non-manipulable object (e.g., The video-tape is rewinding). Although both 
human- and object-related sentences included similar motor words (i.e., verbs) and referred 
to motion, the sentential context was varied in order to elicit kineasthetic or visuospatial 
representations, respectively. Right-handed participants were asked to listen to motion 
sentences (and nonsensical sentences) and provide yes-or-no sensibility judgments by 
turning a knob either CW or CCW with the right hand/wrist (see Methods). The CCW wrist 
rotation is an awkward movement, as it has very limited degrees of freedom toward a 
posture close to the limits of the wrist’s joint, and opposite to the bodily postural bias. In 
contrast, the CW manual rotation has more degrees of freedom and is far from 
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biomechanical constraints; therefore, it is likely to be more comfortably and frequently 
performed than the CCW one.   
If motor simulation determines the understanding of motion-related words, both 
human- and object-related motion sentences should affect the subsequent motor response, 
as they both include verbs with motor meaning. If, on the other hand, motor processes serve 
a motor strategy that supports the retrieval of kineasthetic information associated with a 
linguistic utterance, language should affect the subsequent motor response only when 
sentences elicit representations with kinaesthetic, embodied, motor components (i.e., human 
actions). If this is the case, we also expect that the interaction between motor simulation 
elicited by kineasthetic language and motor processes, is affected by the type of movement 
involved. In the case of common movements having presumably more accurate 
representation (CW rotations), the simulation elicited by a sentence should fit the motor 
representation for performing a similar movement (CW rotation), resulting in a congruence 
effect. When an awkward movement (CCW rotation) is involved, the interaction between 
the mental simulation of that movement and the motor representation activated for 
performing a similar movement is expected to be weaker, thus resulting a diminished or 
less stable congruence effect.   
 
5.2. Experiment 1: congruence effect between implied-language and physical rotation 
Participants were asked to make yes-or-no sensibility judgments (i.e., semantic-
judgment task) on sensible and nonsensical sentences, including a selected subset (see 
Norming study) that described human-hand or mechanical-object CW and CCW rotations. 
Participants provided the response by turning a knob either CW or CCW. We tested 
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whether motion-related words automatically elicit motor representations that interact with a 
subsequent motor response. Alternatively, and consistently with the mechanisms of mental 
imagery, motor simulation may be recruited only when participants process sentences 
where motion words are used to build kinaesthetic motor representations, such as bodily 
motion, but not external-object motion.   
 
5.2.1. Materials and methods 
 
5.2.1.1. Stimulus selection  
Twelve Italians were asked to assess whether 72 sensible Italian sentences described 
motion. After judging a sentences as motion-related, participants had to specify the type of 
motion, choosing between “manual” (e.g., The worker is screwing the light bulb into the 
lamp), “mechanical” (e.g., The video-tape is rewinding) or “other”, and its direction (CW, 
CCW or other). Fifty-six sensible sentences, 28 motion and 28 state items, judged 
consistently in each of the above dimensions by at least 85% of the panel, were thus 
selected. Of the 28 motor sentences (see Appendix C), 14 described human actions 
requiring CW (N=7) or CCW (N=7) manual rotation, and 14 described external objects 
rotating CW (N=7) or CCW (N=7) by a mechanical device. The 28 sensible state sentences, 
matched for length with motion sentences (number of phonemes, p > .1), described 
psychological or physical state of people (N=14) or objects (N=14; e.g. “Stars are shining 
in the night sky”).  
In all sentences, verbs had an imperfective aspect (e.g., is turning), as it activates 
event knowledge more strongly than the perfect aspect (e.g., had turned), and is most likely 
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to elicit a mental image of the implied language context (Ferretti, Kuta, & McRae, 2007). 
The verb in each sentence was followed by 2-6 words that specified the context, the manner 
and the path (i.e., direction) of motion described by the verb. In Italian, very few verbs 
denote a rotation and the same verb can be used to describe different kinds of motion; the 
argument of the verb was therefore necessary to define motion (rotation) and its direction. 
For instance, in the sentence “The child is sharpening the colored pencil”, the direct object 
(the pencil) is crucial to denote a rotating motion, whilst sharpening with a knife would 
change radically the manner and path of motion. In order to allow the semantic-judgment 
task, 56 nonsensical sentences with the same structure as the sensible ones (subject, verb 
and 2-6 words as complement) and comparable length (p > .1) were created. 
 
5.2.1.2. Norming study 
A Norming study was carried out with the objective to collect basic information 
about the selected sentences. Mean reaction times (RTs) to each sentence were obtained 
with a semantic-judgment task, where the above 56 sensible and 56 nonsensical sentences 
were presented acoustically to 29 right-handed Italians. They had to decide whether each 
sentence made sense by pressing a key (see Appendix D).  
At the end of the experiment, the same volunteers completed a questionnaire to 
evaluate whether CW and CCW human sentences and CW and CCW object sentences were 
comparable for those attributes that might influence the relationship between language and 
motor processes. The familiarity tightly correlates with the processing time of an item, and 
the imageability of an utterance affects the ability to mentally represent its content 
(Connine, Mullennix, Shernoff, & Yelen, 1990). Moreover, features such as amplitude and 
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continuity of implied-language motion need to be controlled as they might render the 
motion implied in some items, more perceptually salient and suitable to the interaction with 
motor processes, than others. The same features might modulate the processing times of 
sentences, because, if simulation is triggered, the time spent for mentally rotating a stimulus 
is proportional to the degrees of rotation (e.g., Shepard & Metzler, 1971; Shepard & 
Cooper, 1982). Thus, participants were asked to rate the familiarity, imageability, 
amplitude and continuity (i.e., whether the implied motion was continuous or part-way) of 
the motion implied by each sentences.  
The results of the questionnaire showed that CW and CCW human sentences were 
matched for all the assessed dimensions. The same was true for CW and CCW object 
sentences. Therefore, besides length and structure complexity, CW and CCW sentences 
within each stimulus-type were comparable for familiarity, imageability, amplitude and 
continuity of implied motion. The RTs analysis revealed that participants processed CW 
and CCW human sentences equally fast, t(28) = 0.88, p = .3; for object sentences, they 
showed a temporal advantage in processing CW items over the CCW ones, t(28) = 2.17, p 
= .03, t(28)item=2.62, p=.01 (Fig. 1). This preliminary study provided information on 
participants’ performance in a response condition (i.e., keypress) that did not elicit 
congruence effect with the implied-language motion. In the following experiment, we 
investigated whether and to what extent the congruence between implied and actual motion 
affected participants’ performance. Additional information on procedure, analysis and 
results of this norming study is given in the Appendix D. 
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Figure 1. Norming study: mean RTs (ms) for the processing of human sentences and object sentences 
implying clockwise (“implied cw”) or counterclockwise (“implied ccw”) motion. Vertical bars denote the 
Standard Error of the mean.  
 
5.2.1.3. Participants 
Forty-four healthy, native Italian speakers (14 males; 18-36 years), all university 
graduates or undergraduates, participated in the study. They were all right-handed, 
according to the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI, Oldfield, 1971). 
 
5.2.1.4. Procedure  
The 56 rational sentences (28 motion-related and 28 state items) and 56 nonsensical 
sentences described above were presented to participants. All items had been previously 
read aloud and recorded (http://audacity.sourceforge.net/) by a female Italian speaker. They 
were transmitted through headphones, their length ranging from 2.066 to 3.995 ms. 
Participants made yes-or-no sensibility judgments by turning a knob (diameter 7 cm) 
requiring a power grip and wrist rotation in a CW or CCW direction from a central 
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position. The knob was fixed to a panel, orthogonal to the table. Participants sat in front of 
the panel and handled the knob with their right hand. They were instructed to keep the right 
elbow motionless on the table, so that the knob could be rotated only by wrist. The knob 
triggered a metallic stick, hidden behind the panel, which stopped the rotation after 60° in 
either direction by touching a micro-switch. Left and right micro-switches, connected to the 
external response box of an E-prime PC-controlled system (Psychology Software Tools, 
Inc., Pittsburgh, PA), acted as key-presses. Responses were recorded from the onset of each 
sentence; RTs used in the analysis were calculated by subtracting the sentence length from 
this value. 
Each sentence was presented twice for a total of 224 items. Participants were 
divided into two equal groups. Group 1 was instructed to turn the knob CW for yes-
response and CCW for no-response, and Group 2 was instructed to do the opposite (i.e., 
CW rotation for no-response and CCW rotation for yes-response). Thus, in Group 1, 
responses to critical items (i.e., motion sentences) were congruent with sentences implying 
CW rotations and were incongruent with sentences implying CCW rotations; the opposite 
was true for Group 2. The manipulation of the relationship between implied and actual 
rotation was never mentioned and the critical sentences constituted only 25% of the whole 
stimulus-set; therefore, it was unlikely that participants became aware of the critical 
sensorimotor components of the task and generated expectations that could bias the 
performance (Frith & Dolan, 1997; Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 1997).  
 Prior to the experiment, participants were trained in handling the knob with an 8-
trial familiarization phase. They were instructed to respond as quickly as possible, but not 
before they had listened to the whole sentence, as most nonsensical sentences could not be 
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recognized as such, until the last word had been heard. After completing the experiment, 
participants were debriefed to assess whether they were aware of the critical task 
manipulations and how they felt during CW and CCW movements. 
The experimental manipulations yielded a 2 x 2 x 2 design with factors: (i) 
Stimulus-type (human and object sentences), (ii) Congruence (congruence and 
incongruence between implied language and manual rotation), and (iii) Group (CW 
responses to critical items in Group 1 and CCW responses in Group 2) as the only between-
subjects factor. 
 
5.2.1.5. Analyses 
Familiarization, state and nonsensical trials were discarded from the off-line 
analysis. All participants achieved at least 85% accuracy (M=97%) in sensibility judgments 
and were all included in the RT analysis. Incorrectly judged trials (3.2%) and those with 
response latencies 2 standard deviations (SDs) away from the individual condition mean 
(4.5% of correct responses) were discarded (Ratcliff, 1993). The remaining data were 
subjected to a 2 Stimulus-type x 2 Congruence x 2 Group repeated-measures ANOVA. 
Planned comparisons between critical conditions were run using two-tailed t-tests (≤ .05). 
To test for the generalizability of the effects over the items (Clark, 1973), the by-item 
analysis was performed with regressions of repeated measured data, according to the 
method proposed by Lorch and Myers (1990). 
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5.2.2. Results 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the RT analyses for Experiment 1 (and for the 
following Experiments 2 and 3).  
The main effect of Stimulus-type was significant: participants were faster in judging 
human than object sentences, F(1,42)= 34.74, p<.001, p2=.45. The Congruence x Group 
interaction was significant, F(1,42)= 18.57, p<.001, p2=.30. Participants in Group 1 (CW 
responses) were faster on congruent than on incongruent trials, p <.001; conversely, those 
in Group 2 (CCW responses) were slower when processing incongruent relative to 
congruent trials, p = .02. The three-way interaction between Stimulus-Type, Congruence 
and Group was also significant, F(1,42)= 4.08, p = .05, p2=.09 (Figure 2A). Two-tailed t 
tests between critical conditions revealed that in Group 1, manual rotation was faster when 
it was congruent with the rotation implied by both human, t(21)= -2.44, p=.02, t(21)item= 
4.33, p < .001, and object sentences, t(21)= -2.75, p = .01, t(21)item= 2.16, p = .01. In 
Group 2, this difference was no longer significant for human sentences, p > .1, whilst for 
object sentences, judgments of incongruent trials were faster than those of congruent trials, 
t(21)=2.24, p = .03, t(21)item=1.82, p = .08.  
Importantly, incongruent trials in Group 2 involved the same CW object-related 
sentences that led to faster responses in Group 1. This suggests that there was always a 
temporal advantage for CW object sentences, irrespective of the direction of the manual 
response. This bias was already found in the norming study, where participants responded 
with a keypress. It is possible, however, that in Group 2 the congruence between CCW 
sentences and the motor response (CCW rotation) facilitated its execution, thus reducing 
the size of the bias (i.e. the RT difference between CCW and CW trials) in this group, 
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relative to Group 1. In other words, a congruence effect might have taken place also for 
object sentences. To check this, we compared the size of the bias in the two groups, which 
was far from being significant, t(21)= 1.16, p >.1. This confirmed that CW sentences were 
always processed faster relative to the CCW ones, the size of this bias remaining unaffected 
by the status of congruence between implied and actual rotation. As expected, in the post-
experimental debriefing, all participants reported greater discomfort associated with CCW 
than CW manual responses. 
 
Table 1. Mean RTs (ms) in all experimental conditions of Experiments 1-3. 
 
Tabled mean RTs (ms) in Experiments 1-3, following the processing of human and object sentences in Group 
1 (clockwise manual response) and Group 2 (counterclockwise manual response), when the implied language 
direction was congruent and incongruent with the manual response. The regions in bold type showed the 
significant differences between congruent and incongruent trails in the same condition of Sentence-type and 
Group. 
 
 
 
  Human sentences Object-related sentences 
  Congruence Incongruence Congruence Incongruence 
Experiment 1 Group 1 305 352 369 484 
 Group 2 387 373 482 422 
Experiment 2 Group 1 193 261 256 308 
 Group 2 294 262 355 268 
Experiment 3 Group 1 287 348 337 427 
 Group 2 355 330 385 332 
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Figure 2. Mean RTs (ms) for the processing of human sentences and object sentences in Group 1 (“cw”, 
clockwise manual response) and Group 2 (“ccw”, counterclockwise manual response), when the implied 
language direction was congruent and incongruent with the manual response. The pattern of performance 
observed in Experiment 1 (A) was replicated both in Experiment 2 (B) and Experiment 3 (C). Vertical bars 
denote the Standard Error of the mean.  
 
 
  
135 
5.2.3. Discussion 
We found that the congruence effect (faster response following a sentence implying 
congruent motion) took place when participants responded with CW rotation (Group 1), but 
not with CCW rotation (Group 2). However, the three-way interaction showed that these 
two factors interacted differently, depending on the Stimulus-type. For human-related 
sentences, physical responses congruent with implied-language direction were faster than 
incongruent responses when participants responded with CW rotation (Group 1), while no 
difference was found between congruent and incongruent trials when the motor response 
was CCW (Group 2). The performance difference in processing CW and CCW sentences in 
Group 1 reflects a congruence effect between the sentence content and the motor response, 
as the same sentences were processed equally fast in the Norming study, when participants 
responded with a keypress. Although the same sentences were presented, a congruence 
effect was not found in Group 2, suggesting a role of the type of involved motion (CW or 
CCW) in the interaction between stimulus and response.  
The relationship between mental simulation elicited by sentences and motor 
processes for response gave rise to different effects, depending on the kinematic features 
and familiarity of the involved movement. In particular, when the stimulus-response 
interaction involved a manual rotation conforming to postural bias and associated with 
comfortable kinaesthetic sensations (i.e., CW in Group 1), motor simulation elicited by 
human sentences matched the motor representation for the execution of a congruent 
movement, resulting in the congruence effect (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). In Group 
2, we found no congruence effect, but an overall qualitative increase of RTs, possibly 
reflecting the awkwardness effect, expected when the stimulus-response interaction involve 
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awkward movements (CCW rotations) that have weaker, less accurate representations, 
relative to more comfortable and familiar movements (Parsons, 1994).  
Using human-related sentences and a paradigm similar to the one employed by us, 
Zwaan and Taylor (2006) reported a congruence effect when participants responded with 
both CW and CCW manual rotation. In their study, however, the rotation required a 
precision grip that involved only finger movements, while we asked participants to respond 
by rotating their wrists. As aforementioned, the awkwardness effect has been demonstrated 
for hand rotations, but never for finger rotation. Hand/wrist and fingers clearly have 
different biomechanical constraints and discrete representations in the brain (Goldenberg, 
1999; Haggard, Kitadono, Press, & Taylor-Clarke, 2006); hence, phenomena observed with 
hand-related tasks do not necessarily apply to finger-related tasks. More crucially, in the 
domain of mental rotation studies, different patterns of participants’ performance have been 
reported in similar tasks, depending on the kind of movement involved in the task (see 
Sack, Lindner, & Linden, 2007). Thus, although most current explanations assume that the 
stimulus-response interaction takes place at a higher level of representation (Hommel, 
Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001), it has been suggested that motor and premotor 
representations of different muscle groups are differently susceptible to interaction with 
mental simulation (Sack et al., 2007).  
Our findings with human sentences do not contradict those of Zwaan and Taylor 
(2006), but the different responses employed in the two studies might have elicited the 
awkwardness effect in our but not in their study, or the congruence effect even with CCW 
rotation, in their but not in our study. This concern about the potential importance of 
specific muscle groups may pose a limit to the generalization of our findings. Overall, the 
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congruence effect in Group 1 and the awkwardness effect in Group 2 suggest that human 
sentences evoked motor representations.  
As for object-related sentences, participants in Group 1 were faster in responding to 
CW relative to CCW items. This pattern, however, did not reflect a congruence effect, as 
the same advantage was found in Group 2, even though, here, the response was congruent 
with CCW items. If the motor response interacted with representations elicited by object 
sentences, the CW bias should have been abolished or – at least - significantly diminished 
in Group 2, because the congruence between implied and actual CCW motion would have 
facilitated CCW responses. On the contrary, our findings suggest that participants’ 
processing of object sentences did not elicit (motor) representations that could affect the 
motor processes for response.  
The key result of Experiment 1 is that representations evoked by human sentences 
affected a subsequent motor response, while representations elicited by object sentences did 
not. In other words, only human sentences elicited representations owning kineasthetic 
motor components that trigger a motor modality of simulation. These findings mirror those 
observed in imagery studies, where stimulus-specific interactions between manual and 
mental rotation were reported, when mental rotation was applied to different visual stimuli. 
For instance, Sack, Lindner and Linden (2007) reported that the mental rotation of hands 
was facilitated by congruent and inhibited by incongruent manual rotation, whilst the 
mental rotation of cubes was unaffected by the congruence with manual rotation. Likewise, 
imaging studies reported motor and premotor activations only when participants mentally 
simulated movements associated with a kinesthetic feeling of the movement (Solodkin et 
al., 2004).  
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In the case of external-object motion, it is likely that our participants produced a 
visual representation of the moving object. Overall, a number of studies showed that this 
kind of stimuli activates visuospatial parieto-occipital regions (see Zacks, 2008 for a 
review). More crucially, the CW bias observed here, reminds of left-to-right directionality 
preference, ubiquitously found in visuospatial processes (Tversky, 1995). We will later 
return to this point of discussion.  
 
5.3. Experiment 2: the effect of the angle of rotation 
  Experiment 1, we observed a congruence effect in Group 1, when participants 
responded to human sentences with a CW manual rotation, but not in Group 2, when they 
responded with a CCW rotation. We proposed that this difference in participants’ 
performance resulted from CW and CCW movements involved in the stimulus-response 
interaction in Groups 1 and 2, respectively, having qualitatively different representations. In 
particular, CCW movements may be less accurately represented than the CW ones, because 
they are less frequently experienced. The reduced familiarity of CCW movements, relative 
to CW movements, is primarily due to the greater awkwardness for their execution, as they 
are opposite to the bodily postural bias. Thus, the difficulty of execution, in itself, might 
account for the lack of congruence effect, as this might have been precluded by generally 
slow reaction times. 
 The aim of Experiment 2 was to assess whether our results were due to the mere 
difficulty in executing CCW responses, or to the type and accuracy of mental 
representations that these motor responses rely on. Experimental design and procedure were 
the same as in Experiment 1, except that participants responded by rotating their wrist of 
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30° (rather than 60° as in Experiment 1) in either direction. This reduction of the angle of 
rotation was meant to facilitate the performance of CCW responses. 
 
5.3.1. Materials and methods 
 
5.3.1.1. Participants 
Participants were forty university graduates or undergraduate students (14 male; 18-
38 years), all healthy, right-handed (EHI, Oldfield, 1971), native Italian speakers. 
 
5.3.1.2. Procedure 
Stimuli and procedures were identical to those employed in Experiment 1, the only 
difference being that the knob was adjusted as to require a 30° rotation in either direction. 
 
5.3.1.3. Analyses 
Familiarization, state and nonsensical trials were discarded. All participants 
provided at least 85% of correct sensibility judgments (M=96%) on critical items. 
Incorrectly-judged trials (4.1%) and those with response latencies 2 SDs away from the 
individual condition mean (5% of correct responses) were discarded from the RT analysis. 
By-subjects and by-items analyses were performed as in Experiment 1. 
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5.3.2. Results  
The results of Experiment 2 were qualitatively identical to those of Experiment 1. 
The effect of Stimulus-type was significant, F(1,38)= 6.08, p = .02, p2=.14: motor 
responses were faster for human than for object sentences. There was a significant 
Congruence x Group interaction, F(1,38)= 28.06, p < .001, p2=42: in Group 1, RTs were 
faster for congruent than for incongruent trials, t(19)=-3.87, p = .001; whilst incongruent 
trials were faster than congruent trials in Group 2, t(19)=3.63, p = .001. The three-way 
interaction was not significant, F(1,38)<1, n.s. (Figure 2B). However, planned comparisons 
between critical conditions revealed that participants of Group 1 were faster in congruent 
than incongruent trials, when processing both human, t(19)=-2.96, p < .01, t(19)item=5.17, 
p < .0001, and object sentences, t(19)=-2.63, p = .01, t(19)item=2.36, p = .02. No difference 
was found in Group 2 between congruent and incongruent trials for human sentences, p > 
.1. For object sentences, incongruent trials were processed faster than congruent trials, 
t(19)=3.28, p < .01, t(19)item=3.66, p = .001; in other words, CW object sentences were 
always processed faster than CCW sentences. As in Experiment 1, the size of this bias (i.e., 
the difference in RTs between CCW and CW sentences), did not differ in Groups 1 and 2, 
t(19)=-.94, p =.3, suggesting that RTs to object sentences were not affected by the 
relationship between the implied and the actual rotation.  
Finally, that the 30° CCW rotation was equally difficult to perform, compared to the 
30° CW rotation, was confirmed by the 92.5% of participants (N=37) in the post-
experimental debriefing. 
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5.3.2. Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, here we found that processing human sentences interacted with 
concomitant motor processes for responding, as revealed by congruence effects in Group 1, 
and awkwardness effects in Group 2. Importantly, in the current experiment, the decrease 
of the knob rotation from 60° to 30° made the CCW response less difficult to perform than 
in Experiment 1. As a result, participants’ RTs decreased visibly in Experiment 2 (see 
Figure 2), even though the overall pattern of performance remained unchanged.  
We obtained different results when participants responded to human sentences with 
CW and CCW rotation, even though both movements were equally-demanding. This 
demonstrates that the difference in performance between Groups 1 and 2 cannot be 
explained in terms of mere physical difficulty in the execution of either movement. In 
contrast, it seems that, in the two conditions, the stimulus-response interaction involves 
qualitatively different motor representations (Cooper & Shepard, 1975; Funk et al., 2005; 
Parsons, 1994). The temporal advantage in processing CW object sentences over the CCW 
ones occurred when participants responded with both CW and CCW rotation, and its size 
was unaffected by the response direction.  
One might observe that the manual rotation of the knob mimicked better manual 
actions implied in human sentences, than the described trajectory of mechanical objects, to 
the extent that the stimulus-response interaction might have been promoted for human but 
not for the object items. Although the apparatus employed in the present study and the 
biomechanical constraints of human hand/wrist were not suitable to replicate some implied 
mechanical-object rotations (e.g., a continuous 360° rotation), consistent findings in 
Experiments 1-2 suggest that participants’ performance was not constrained to a specific 
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amplitude of the response. This issue has been further addressed in the following 
Experiment 3. 
 
5.4. Experiment 3: the effect of the plane of rotation 
 anguage can convey very detailed features of the described context, which are used 
to construct imaginal representations during comprehension (Bergen & Chang, 2005; 
Jackendoff, 2002). The plane along which motion takes place (e.g., vertical or horizontal) 
was found to be encoded in language-evoked representations (Bergen, Lindsay, Matlock, & 
Narayanan, 2007; Richardson, Spivey, McRae, & Barsalou, 2003; see Anderson, Chiu, 
Huette, & Spivey, 2010, for a review). For instance, Bergen and colleagues (2007) reported 
that the processing of sentences implying up- (e.g., “The patient rose”) or down-direction 
(“The glass fell”) selectively interfered with visual processing in the same part of the visual 
field.  
 In Experiments 1-2, the plane of rotation in the manual response was fixed, whereas 
that implied by sentences was variable. Indeed, some of our sentences (e.g., “The boy is 
turning up the volume of the hi-fi”) involved rotation on the same vertical plane as the 
manual rotation; other sentences, such as “the CD is turning in the CD-player”, described 
motion that took place on a horizontal plane. The variable relationship (congruence or 
incongruence) between implied and actual plane of rotation, which was not experimentally 
controlled, might have promoted the interaction between language and motor processes in 
some cases, but not in others. 
 Experiment 3 was carried out to investigate whether the effects observed in 
Experiments 1-2 were constrained by the specific plane of manual rotation, or could be 
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generalized to a condition differing for this dimension. The experimental paradigm was the 
same as in the previous experiments, except that the knob used for responding was adjusted 
as to require a manual rotation on a (almost) horizontal plane. 
 
5.4.1. Materials and methods 
5.4.1.1. Participants  
Forty-six university graduates or undergraduates (19 males; 18-35 years) 
volunteered for this study. They were all healthy, right-handed (EHI, Oldfield, 1971), 
native Italian speakers. 
 
5.4.1.2. Procedure 
Stimuli and procedures were the same as in Experiment 1 except that the panel, to 
which the knob was fixed, was placed at an angle of 30° to the table, obliging the 
participants to rotate their wrists CW or CCW on an almost-horizontal plane. 
  
5.4.1.3. Analysis 
Familiarization, state and nonsensical trials were discarded. All participants 
achieved at least 85% accuracy on sensibility judgments (M=96%) and were all included in 
the following analysis. Incorrectly-judged trials (3.8%) and those with RTs 2 SDs away 
from the individual condition mean (4.8% of correct responses) were discarded. RT data 
entered a repeated-measures ANOVA with the same factors as in Experiments 1-2. 
Planned-comparisons between critical conditions and the by-item analysis were performed 
as above.   
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5.4.2. Results  
The results of Experiment 3 were qualitatively similar to those of Experiments 1-2. 
The effect of Congruence was significant, F(1,44)=5.57, p = .02, p2=.11: RTs were faster 
when implied language and manual rotations were congruent. The effect of Stimulus-type 
was also significant, F(1,44)=14.13, p2=.24, p = .001, with responses to human sentences 
being faster than those to object sentences. The Stimulus-type x Group interaction was 
significant, F(1,44)=4.93, p = .03, p2=.11, suggesting that that the above advantage in 
judging human sentences occurred when participants responded with a CW (Group 1, p = 
.0001), but not with a CCW rotation (Group 2, p > .1). The Congruence x Group interaction 
was also significant, F(1,44)=58.9, p < .0001, p2=.57. Participants in Group 1 were faster 
in congruent trials, p < .0001; conversely, participants in Group 2 were significantly slower 
with congruent trials, p < .01. The Stimulus-type x Congruence x Group interaction was not 
significant, F(1,44)=1.30, n.s. However, planned comparisons between critical conditions 
revealed that, in Group 1, the congruence effect took place both for human and object 
sentences, as participants were faster in processing CW than CCW sentences (human 
sentences: t(22)=-2.74, p = .01, t(22)item=2.20, p = .03; object sentences: t(22)=-4.59, p= < 
.001, t(22)item=4.34, p < .001). In Group 2, this difference was no longer significant for 
human sentences, p >.1, whilst for object sentences, incongruent trials were faster than 
congruent trials, t(22)=2.51, p > .02, t(22)item=-5.58, p < .0001 (Fig. 2C). Once more, the 
size of the bias for CW object sentences over the CCW ones, was not significantly different 
in Group 1 and Group 2, t(22)=1.20, p = .2. This validated our argument that language did 
not affect participants’ motor responses when it concerned external-object motion. 
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5.4.3. Discussion 
While the interaction between the processing of human sentences and the 
subsequent response resulted in the congruence (Group 1) and awkwardness effects (Group 
2), for object sentences, the faster processing of CW items was not affected by the direction 
of the motor response. Thus, with the current experiment, we replicated the results of 
Experiments 1-2 and generalized them to a condition in which subjects’ response was 
performed on a different plane of rotation, relative to the previous experiments. These 
results ruled out the possibility that the variable relationship (congruence or incongruence) 
between the plane of motion implied by sentences and the plane of manual rotation brought 
a confounding factor in our participants’ performance. 
 
5.5. General discussion 
By comparing sentences implying human and external-object motion we have 
shown that motor simulation is a stimulus-specific mechanism in language comprehension, 
as it takes place when language content describes human bodily actions , but not when the 
implied motion refers to external, non-manipulable objects. The interaction between motor 
simulation evoked by human sentences and motor representations for responding was 
reflected in the congruence effect and its susceptibility to different types of motor 
representations involved in the response (i.e., awkwardness effect) (Experiment 1). 
Identical results were replicated when the angle and plane of rotation in the response were 
varied (Experiments 2-3). This suggests that the direction of rotation was the critical 
dimensional overlap between representations of stimulus and response, which, however, 
was effective only when the former referred to human motion. Our findings also add that 
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the experience (or familiarity) with a given movement plays a role in the interaction of 
basic (motor) systems with high-level cognitive processes (language). In particular, the 
congruence effect takes place when a simulated movement matches the representation 
underlying its physical performance. This match occurs most likely when the involved 
movement conforms to the postural bias and, as such, is frequently experienced, resulting in 
a more accurate or detailed representation, relative to awkward (less comfortable and less 
familiar) movements.   
The conditions that trigger motor processes (or simulation) in language 
comprehension mirror those that elicit the motor strategy, or kineasthetic motor imagery, in 
mental rotation of visual stimuli (Kosslyn et al., 2001; Solodkin et al., 2004; Tomasino, 
Borroni, Isaja, & Rumiati, 2005). This implies that motor simulation does not reflect the 
automatic and obligatory mapping of motor meanings into the comprehender’s motor 
system (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). If it were the case, both human- and object-related 
motion sentences should have affected the subsequent motor response, as they both include 
words (verbs) with motor meaning. Motor simulation rather appears as one strategy to 
support the retrieval of kineasthetic motor information associated with a language meaning, 
as cued by the context (Rumiati, Papeo, Corradi-Dell’Acqua, 2010). This strategy-based 
interpretation accommodates a number of studies reporting increased motor activity when 
people were induced (explicitly or implicitly) to access the motor attributes of words, but 
not when their attention was driven to other aspects of the same verbal materials (Papeo, 
Vallesi, Isaja, & Rumiati, 2009; Tomasino, Werner, Weiss, & Fink, 2007; Willems, 
Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2010). In the same vein, linguistic accounts that attempted to 
explain the connection of language to “the rest of cognition” (i.e., modality-specific sensory 
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or motor systems) pointed at imagery as the linkage between the two, but not the core 
attribute of comprehension (Jackendoff, 2007; Machery, 2007; Myachykov, Posner, 
Tomlinal, 2007).  
These findings also highlight the importance of the sentential context in the activation of 
motor representations during comprehension (see also Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 
2009). We showed that the association of a lexical unit with motion was not sufficient to 
elicit motor simulation, but it was the integration of all words’ meanings in a sentence that 
yielded motor imagery effects. Even though the verb typically brings motion within the 
linguistic focus and can be crucial to trigger simulation (Taylor & Zwaan, 2008), this 
appears limited to those cases when the sentence, as a whole, describes bodily actions, thus 
activating kineasthetic motor attributes of a verb meaning. The influence of the sentential 
context on the engagement of a motor modality of language processing requires a higher-
level cognitive mediation at that is not predicted by the proposal that a motor word is 
directly and automatically matched with the motor representation of the corresponding 
physical act (Rizzolatti et al., 2001). 
Differently from human-sentences, mechanical-object sentences showed a 
consistent advantage (faster RTs) for CW items over CCW items, which remained 
irrespective of the direction of the motor response (Norming study and Experiments 1-3). 
Sentences describing the rotation of mechanical objects that do not afford interactions with 
human body, were selected on purpose, as imagery studies showed that this type of content 
evokes visuospatial representations with no kinaesthetic components that affect the motor 
system (Solodkin et al., 2004). On the other hand, visuospatial processing is characterized 
by a preference for left-to-right directionality (Tversky, 1995) that is in keeping with the 
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advantage we observed for CW object sentences. This bias appears ubiquitously in the 
mental representation of visual scenes (Tversky, 1995), numbers (Dehaene et al., 1993) and 
time (Vallesi et al., 2008). Moreover, it influences the mental representation of sentential 
contexts: for instance, Italians spontaneously represent actions described in subject-verb-
object sentences, as evolving with a left-to-right trajectory (Maas & Russo, 2003). The left-
to-right bias seems modulated by cultural aspects, such as habits of writing and reading, as 
it is less strong or even reversed in Arabic and Hebrew speakers, relative to Western 
population (Maas & Russo, 2003). Thus, if our argument is correct, the pattern of 
performance we observed for object sentences may be abolished or reversed in participants 
belonging to a population with right-to-left writing and reading system.  
As in imagery, in language domain, motor or visuospatial processes can go along 
with word processing depending on the kind of (concrete) information that is the most 
salient in a linguistic message. For instance, sensory-motor representations might be 
activated for making judgments about detailed sensory properties of named objects (see 
also Caramazza & Mahon, 2003; Machery, 2007; Martin & Caramazza, 2003; Oliver & 
Thomson-Schill, 2003; Tyler, Moss, 2001). However, the claim that semantics can also 
encode the physical aspects of a concept (see Louwerse, 2008), or that conceptual processes 
can sometimes (e.g., when cued by the context) rely on modality-specific systems is quite 
different than claiming that motor simulation is a core attribute of the understanding of 
motion language. We believe that, given the available evidence, the notion of “strategy” 
accounts at the best for the relationship between motor simulation and language (Papeo et 
al., 2009; Rumiati et al., 2010). This notion implies that different mechanisms, beyond 
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motor simulation, can yield the same output or support the same task, depending on a given 
task context (Price & Friston, 2002).  
The parallel between the conditions that trigger motor imagery in mental rotation 
tasks, and motor simulation in language, leaves still open a possibility that the two differ to 
some extent. For instance, if we assume the view of imagery as the conscious counterpart 
of simulation (Jeannerod & Decety, 1995), it might be that motor representations evoked by 
motion-related sentences are less detailed than those consciously generated and transformed 
during imagery tasks. Suggestively, in this study, we found that the effects of interaction 
between human sentences and motor response were quite independent of the detailed 
features of the involved motion (i.e., angle and plane of rotation), as if a general description 
of the implied-language action was created, lacking the kind of specification that would be 
needed if one imagined that action explicitly. 
 
5.6. Conclusions  
The stimulus-specific interaction between language and motor processing suggests 
that motor simulation is constrained by the context in which motion-related words are 
presented. What does this finding add to our understanding of the relationship between 
motor simulation and language comprehension?  
Sentential contexts implying human (or biological) motion are most likely to evoke 
motor representations with kineasthetic components that affect the comprehender’s motor 
system. This suggests that motor simulation is a consequence of embodiment, reflecting the 
sense of agency, or ownership (“it is my body, it is me”; see Longo et al., 2008), and the 
influence of bodily experience (i.e., one’s own motor repertoire) in cognition, when one 
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applies a “personal perspective” (Buccino et al., 2004) in processing language contents. 
The role of kinematics and kineasthetic sensations people experience when performing 
different movements (e.g., CW versus CCW rotation) on their mental representation, as 
shown here, brings support to this interpretation (see also Chatterjee, 2010). On the other 
hand, the relevance of the sentential context in eliciting motor simulation immediately 
implies that the motor system does not respond automatically to motion words: the lack of 
motor imagery effects when motor words (verbs) were presented in object-related sentences 
reveals the inadequacy of motor simulation as a general and necessary mechanism for 
encoding motor meanings. Our motor experience may influence how we understand actions 
to the extent that, under certain conditions, embodied representations can go along with – or 
even supersede - more abstract representations of meanings. Nothing in the evidence 
supporting this claim motivates the inference that motor simulation is the core of the 
understanding of motion-related words.  
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Chapter 6.  
The implicit transfer of motor strategy in 
language processing: an fMRI study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Mental simulation is a form of implicit imagery, whereby images of things or events 
are “visualized” and transformed in a three-dimensional mental space, when the physical 
stimulus is out of view (e.g., Jeannerod & Decety 1995; Kosslyn et al., 1995). Activations 
of primary motor (M1) and premotor (PM) cortices during imagery are triggered when 
individuals imagine the movements of their own body parts or bodily interactions with 
objects (motor strategy), but not whet they imagine, for instance, an object rotating on its 
own, in an object-centered reference frame (i.e., visual strategy; Kosslyn et al., 1998; 
2001). Accordingly, several studies showed that the left M1 and PM are activated 
especially in tasks that drive participants’ attention toward the motor content of word-
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stimuli as opposed to their lexical-phonological features (e.g., Tomasino et al., 2007; 
Willems, Hagoort & Casasanto; 2010). In contrast with the simulationist view that motor 
simulation is automatically and necessarily involved in word processing (e.g., Rizzolatti et 
al., 2001; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Pulvermüller, 2005), it has recently been suggested  
that, just like in imagery, simulation in language is an opportunistic strategy to accomplish 
certain linguistic task (e.g., Rumiati et al., 2010).  
Yet, the specific conditions that are found to activate motor system leave open one 
possibility that simulation is at least necessary for deep semantic analysis of action-related 
language. In breaking out of this impasse, we used a novel paradigm in the action related 
verb processing domain, whereby we assessed the effect of the cognitive context (motor and 
nonmotor) on the subsequent language-related processing (and activation ), while keeping 
constant the stimuli (action and nonaction verbs) and the task requiring deep semantic 
analysis of those stimuli. We could thus investigate whether a highest-level factor could 
modulate the engagement of motor simulation, even under those stimulus- and task-
conditions that typically elicit it.  
 Wraga et al. (2003) showed that individuals solved a mental rotation task using a 
motor strategy, when they had previously performed a motor rotation task, but not when the 
preceding task involved visual rotation. The transfer of a motor-modality of processing 
from one task to another that does not necessarily require motor processes is based on 
motor learning (Grafton et al., 1995; Grafton et al., 1998; Pascual-Leone et al., 1994), 
which takes place in the absence of participants’ awareness and is tested indirectly via 
performance (Graf & Schacter, 1985). We exploited the mechanisms of motor learning and 
transfer to modulate the cognitive context in which participants processed language.  
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We asked participants to read action and nonaction verbs for delayed recognition, 
after either a motor task (motor context) or a visual task (nonmotor context). The 
instruction to read verbs for delayed recognition is thought to trigger deep levels of 
processing, whereby depth is intended in terms of the extent to which meaningfulness is 
extracted from the stimulus (Lockhart & Craik, 1990). Functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) was used to assess M1 and PM activation in the two conditions that were 
identical, meaning that similar linguistic items were presented for the same task, except for 
the cognitive context elicited by the preceding task. We reasoned that, if motor simulation 
is necessary for understanding action words, M1 and PM activity should burst whenever an 
action-word is being deeply processed; if, on the contrary, it is one (unnecessary) strategy 
for encoding action meanings, the highest-level contextual variable might modulate motor 
activation, top-down, irrespective of the stimulus-content and task demand. 
 
6.2. Materials and method 
 
6.2.1. Participants 
Since gender differences in handedness tasks have been reported in behavioral 
(Voyer et al., 1995) and neuroimaging (Jordan et al., 2002) studies, only healthy female 
university graduates or undergraduates (N = 18, right handed, aged 22-28 years) took part 
in the present experiment as paid participants. All of them were right-handed (on the 
Edinburgh Inventory test, Oldfield, 1971) native speakers of Italian, with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological illness, psychiatric disease, or 
drug abuse. They all gave written informed consent prior to the study. The study was 
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conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the local ethics 
committee.  
 
6.2.2. Stimuli 
 
Linguistic stimuli 
 In the linguistic task, 240 stimuli were presented, one at a time, on a white-
background computer screen. Legal words (N=160) presented in their infinitive form 
(Verdana: 40), included 80 verbs associated with hand actions (“mescolare”, to stir), and 
80 nonaction verbs (state/psychological verbs; “adorare”, to adore). In addition, a list of 
80 meaningless illegal letter strings (“csdawq”), matched for length with the above verb 
list, t(79) < 1, was presented. Verbs were chosen from a stimulus-set selected with a 
Norming study and used in previous studies (see Papeo et al., 2009, and Chapter 3). The 
selected stimuli were divided in two equivalent lists, matched for the percentage of 
agreement on the category (action vs. nonaction), length (number of graphemes) and 
written frequency (Laudanna et al., 1995).  
In the recognition task administered at the end of the fMRI scanning section, a 
subgroup of 40 verbs (20 action and 20 nonaction) was selected from the experimental list 
(“old” list), and presented, intermingled with 20 new action and 20 new nonaction verbs 
(“new” list). The old and new verb lists were matched for frequency and length.  
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Stimuli in the motor and nonmotor learning phase 
Two types of stimuli were used one for each mental rotation task (MR) constituting 
the learning phase. Color photographs of a hand or a geometrical figure, appeared, one at a 
time, on a white-background computer screen, in the motor and in the visual leaning phase, 
respectively. In both conditions, stimuli were shown in one of six possible orientations in 
the picture plane, namely, at 45°, 90°, 135°, 225°, 270°, or 315° from their upright 
canonical orientation. Each figure appeared at each of the six angles of orientation 20 times, 
the total set of stimuli, in each learning phase, resulting in 120 photographs (Figure 1a). For 
both sets of stimuli, the photographe were 560x560 pixels.  
In the motor task, the 120 photographs could depict either the right (50% of trials) 
or the left hand (50% of trials). In the visual condition, the 120 geometrical figures depicted 
three-dimensional armed cubes (Shepard & Metzler, 1971) created by using Blender 
(http://www.blender.it/). The figure, in its upright orientation, had approximately the shape 
of a “Z”. A red marker was placed on either shorter arm of the figure. A black arrow 
heading either leftward (50% of the trials) or rightward (50% of the trials), was placed at 
the center of the vertical arm cueing the direction for mental rotation.  
 
6.2.3. Experimental design and procedures 
We used a 2 x 2 block experimental design in which we manipulated the cognitive 
context (motor versus nonmotor) of word processing, as defined by the preceding MR, and 
the word-stimulus (i.e., action verbs versus nonaction verbs). In addition to action and 
nonaction verbs, meaningful letter strings were presented.   
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Eight-trials blocks of action verbs, nonaction verbs or strings were randomly 
presented (2 sec per stimulus), after each block of either motor or nonmotor task (2 sec per 
stimulus), for a total of 60 blocks (30 silent reading, 15 motor and 15 nonmotor task), This 
yielded six experimental conditions: (1) action verb (act), (2) nonaction verb (nact), (3) 
letter strings (string), after the motor task (post_H), and, (4) action verb, (5) nonaction verb, 
(6) letter strings, after the visual task (post_C). A fixation cross (150 ms) separated each 
stimulus in a block. Each block was introduced by instructions (5000 ms) informing the 
participants about the upcoming task (silent reading or either MR), and followed by a 
resting baseline of 10000 ms.  
The motor and the nomotor tasks corresponded to a hand-rotation (or handedness) 
task and a cube-figure rotation task, respectively. The former required participants to decide 
whether each presented photograph depicted a left or a right hand. Participants were 
explicitly instructed to perform the task using a motor strategy consisting in imaging to 
rotate their own hand until it reached the position of the hand-stimulus on the screen. These 
task instructions and stimuli have been reliably shown to elicit egocentric-perspective 
taking, motor cortical activations and processes (motor strategy) analogous to those for 
actual execution of hand movements (e.g., Kossyn et al., 1998; 2001; Parsons, 1998). In the 
cube-figure rotation task, participants were required to imagine the figure rotating leftward 
or rightward, according to the direction prompted by the central arrow, until it reached the 
canonical orientation with its longer arm aligned with the midsagittal line of the computer 
screen, and then decide whether, from that position, the red spot was at the left or at right of 
the screen. This type of stimuli and the instructions of imagining an external object rotating 
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in an object-centered visual space engage a visual strategy that recruits cortical regions and 
processes analogous to those for actual visuospatial perception (Kosslyn et al., 1998; 2001).  
Participants performed the three tasks (reading, motor and nonmotor task) in the 
MRI scanner. Before the scanning session, they were trained outside the scanner on the 
hand- and cube-rotation tasks. Training was protracted until participants felt confident that 
they understood the task and applied the correct strategy. During the scanning session, they 
laid supine with their head fixated by firm foam pads and their arms along the body with 
the palms parallel to the legs. They were asked to keep the head and the arms/hands 
motionless for the whole duration of the experiment. Stimuli were presented using 
Presentation 9.0 (Neurobehavioral Systems) and projected to a VisuaStim Goggles system 
(Resonance Technology). Behavioral responses in MR were provided by participants 
pressing the keys placed under the left toes, for “left” responses (left-hand or left-sided 
marker), or under the right toes, for “right” responses (right-hand or right-sided marker) of 
an MRI-compatible response device (Lumitouch, Lightwave Medical Industries, CST 
Coldswitch Technologies, Richmond, CA, USA) mounted on a custom-made feet support. 
Foot responses were chosen to minimize interference between response preparation and 
execution and the predicted task-related activity in M1 and PM hand areas. In the linguistic 
task (silent reading) no response was required.  
 
Hand-area localizer. To individually locate the hand representation within M1 of 
both hemispheres, a functional localizer task (Grefkes et al., 2008; Tomasino et al., 2010) 
was performed within the scanner, immediately after the main experiment. Participants 
were instructed to perform right or left hand clenching movements in synchrony with the 
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white-to-red color alternation (frequency: 55 Hz) of a circle appearing in the center of the 
white-background computer screen. Participants performed 9 blocks of active hand 
movements (15s each) alternated with 9 baseline resting periods (15s each), during which 
they performed no movement. Each “active” block was preceded by an instruction-screen 
(3 s) informing participants on whether they had to move the right or the left hand. The 
time between instruction and stimulation onset was jittered (1.5, 2.0, 2.5 ms).  
 
Recognition task. The recognition task was administered at the end of the fMRI 
session and outside the scanner. Participants sat on a chair at 1 meter from a LCD screen 
that displayed each verb (Verdana: 45) for 2000 ms, followed by a blank that remained on 
the screen up to 10000 ms, to allow the response. They were instructed to decide whether 
the verb had been presented during the fMRI session by pressing the K-key of a keyboard 
for yes-response and the L-key for no-responses. As soon as they provided the response, the 
new trail started. In this task, they were encouraged to favor response accuracy over speed. 
 
6.2.4. fMRI data acquisition 
A Philips Achieva 3-T whole-body scanner was used to acquire both T1-weighted 
anatomical and functional images using a SENSE-Head-8 channle head coil and a custom-
built head restrainer to minimize head movements. Each subject was scanned first for the 
main experiment and then again for the localizer task. Functional images were obtained 
using a single-shot gradient echo, echoplanar imaging (EPI) sequence. EPI volumes for the 
main experiment (N = 840) contained 30 axial slices (TR = 2500 ms, TE = 35 ms, FOV = 
200.000 90.000 230.000 mm, matrix: 128 x 128; slice thickness of 3 mm with no gaps, 90° 
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flip angle, voxel size: 1.79×1.79×3.3 mm) and were preceded by 7 dummy images that 
allowed the MR scanner to reach a steady state. EPI volumes for the functional localizer (N 
= 265 images) were acquired with the same sequence characteristics as in the main 
experiment except for a shorter TR of 1600 s, fewer (21) axial slices, and 5 dummy images. 
Both experiments were obtained in the same fMRI session. The main experiment lasted 
35.54 min and the localizer task 7.15 min. After functional neuroimaging, high-resolution 
anatomical images were acquired using a T1-weighted 3-D magnetization-prepared, rapid 
acquisition gradient fast filed echo (T1W 3D TFE SENSE) pulse sequence (TR = 8.227 ms, 
TE = 3.76 ms, FOV = 240.000 190.000 240.000 mm, 190 sagittal slices of 1 mm thickness, 
flip angle = 8°, voxel size: 1 x 1 x 1) lasting 8.8 min.  
 
6.2.5. Behavioral data processing 
Behavioral data were analyzed to ensure that participnats performed successfully on 
both MR tasks and on the recognition tasks. 
 
Mental rotation tasks. A general indication that participants have been actually 
performed the mental rotation is provided by a gradient in RTs, which increase linearly 
with the increase of the angle of rotation (Kosslyn et al., 1998; Shepard & Metzler, 1971). 
In addition, to ascertain that participants rotated the stimuli according to either (motor or 
visual) strategy, we checked whether RTs reflect arm-hand biological constraints (Parsons, 
1987; 1994). Performing the handedness task (motor-imagery based strategy), which 
involves a somatic or biomechanical space (Parsons, Gabrieli, Phelps & Gazzaniga, 1998), 
induces faster processing of stimuli oriented towards the body’s midsagittal plane (i.e., 
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medial) compared to those oriented away from it (i.e., lateral). This “lateral-medial” effect, 
which holds that imagined movements are affected by biomechanical limitations that apply 
to real movements, is not expected when participants mentally rotate the stimulus in the 
visual space (i.e., visual-imagery based strategy).  
Thus, consistently with previous experiments (Parsons, 1987; 1994), lateral 
orientations corresponded to 45°, 90° and 135° right-hand rotations, and to 225°, 270°, and 
315° left-hand rotations, from the upright canonical orientation. For cubes, lateral 
orientations corresponded to the figure rotated at 45°, 90° and 135° from its upright 
orientation. “Medial” orientations corresponded to right hands rotated at 225°, 270° and 
315°, left hands at 45°, 90° and 135°, to cube-figure at 225°, 270° and 315°, from the 
upright orientation. 
First, for each individual, we performed a binomial test on the performance (number 
of correct response) in both MR tasks, to check that it was significantly above the chance-
level (50%, p<0.05). Then, to assess the angle-gradient effect in both MR tasks, and the 
lateral-medial effect, which was expected for the handedness task but not for the cube-
rotation task, a repeated-measures ANOVA was run on RT data, with factors stimulus 
(hands versus cubes), orientation (lateral versus medial) and angle (short versus middle 
versus long). Notice that we collapsed the handedness of hand-stimuli (right or left); as a 
result, short, middle and long angles for later orientations corresponded, respectively, to 
right-hands rotated at 45°, 90° and 135°, and left hands rotated at 315°, 270° and 225°; for 
medial they corresponded, respectively, to right hands rotated at 315°, 270° and 225°, and 
left hands rotated at 45°, 90° and 135°. For cube figures, lateral short, middle and long 
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angles corresponded, respectively, to 45°, 90° and 135° ; medial short, middle, lateral 
orientations corresponded, respectively, to 315°, 270° and 225°.  
Trials in which participants provided an incorrect response (12% for the motor and 
18% for the nonmotor task) and those with RTs 2 SDs above or below the individual 
condition mean (6% of correct responses for the motor and 9% for the nonmotor task), were 
previously discarded from the analysis (Ratcliff, 1993). All post-doc comparisons were 
performed with the LSD Fisher’s test (α ≤0.05). 
 
Recognition task. A binomial test was performed on each individual performance 
(number of correct response), to check that it was significantly above the chance-level 
(50%). The successful performance on this task, as well as on both MR tasks, was the 
criterion for including a participant in the offline analysis of bahvioral and fMRI data. 
Moreover, mean accuracy rates of participants were submitted to a 2 x 2 repeated-measures 
ANOVA, with factors context (motor versus nonmotor) and word-stimulus (action versus 
nonaction). This ANOVA was performed in order to assess potential effects of the context 
(motor and nonmotor) on the delayed recognition of action and nonaction verbs. 
  
6.2.6. fMRI data processing 
Statistical analysis were performed on UNIX workstations (Ubuntu 8.04 LTS, 
i386, http://www.ubuntu.com/) using MATLAB r2007b (The Mathworks Inc., Natick, 
MA/USA) and SPM5 (Statistical Parametric Mapping software, SPM; Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). 
Dummy images were discharged prior to further image processing. Pre-processing 
 162 
included: spatial realignment of the images to the reference volume of the time-series; 
segmentation producing the parameter file used for normalization of EPI data to a standard 
EPI template of the Montreal Neurological Institute template provided by SPM5; re-
sampling to a voxel size of 2×2×2 mm; and spatial smoothing with a 8-mm FWHM 
Gaussian kernel to meet the statistical requirements of the General Linear Model and to 
compensate for residual macro-anatomical variations across subjects.   
We modeled the alternating epochs by a simple boxcar reference vector. A general 
linear model for blocked designs was applied to each voxel of the data by modeling the 
activation and the baseline conditions for each subject and their temporal derivatives by 
means of reference waveforms which correspond to boxcar functions convolved with a 
hemodynamic response function (Friston et al., 1995a; Friston et al., 1995b). To correct for 
motion artifacts, we included 6 additional regressors of no interest, which modeled head 
movement parameters obtained from the subject-specific realignment parameters.  
To delineate the network involved in the MR and in the silent reading tasks per se, 
we performed a whole brain random effects analysis. Low-frequency signal drifts were 
filtered using a cut-off period of 128 s. The presentation of MR blocks (hands and cubes) 
and of the silent reading blocks of each stimulus type (act, nact and strings) were modelled 
as the regressors of main interest (MR_hands, MR_cubes, act_ postH, act_ postH, 
string_postH, and act_postC, nact_postC, string_postC). All the regressors were convoluted 
with a canonical hemodynamic response function.  
At the single subject level, specific effects were assessed by applying appropriate 
linear contrasts to the parameter estimates of the experimental conditions resulting in t-
statistics for each voxel. First, we calculated the following contrast images for each subject: 
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the task-related network both for the mental rotation [MR(hands+cubes)–baseline], and for 
the silent reading collapsing the meaningful words [(act_postH + act_postC + nact_postH + 
nact_postC) – (string_postH + string_postC)] to check that participants were actually 
engaged in the mental rotation and the linguistic networks respectively. To ensure that the 
MR of hands (vs. MR of cubes) differentially activated the motor areas, we calculated the 
contrast images for the stimulus (hands – cubes and cubes -hands). We tested the following 
main effects: context (reading_postH > reading_postC) and (reading_postC > 
reading_postH), [(act_postH + act_postC) > (nact_postH + nact_postC)], and word-
stimulus [(nact_postH + nact_postC) > (act_postH + act_postC)]. Finally, we calculated the 
interactions: context × stimuli [(act_postH - nact_postH) > (act_postC - nact_postC)] and 
stimuli x contest [(act_postC - nact_postC) > (act_postH - nact_postH)].   
For the second-level random effects analyses, contrast images obtained from 
individual participants were entered into a one-sample t-test to create a SPM{T}, indicative 
of significant activations specific for this contrast at the group level. We used a threshold of 
p<0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level (using FWE), with a height 
threshold at the voxel level of p < 0.001, uncorrected. 
The localization of the functional activations with respect to cytoarchitectonic areas 
was analyzed based on probabilistic cytoarchitectonic maps derived from the analysis of 
cortical areas in a sample of 10 human postmortem brains, which were subsequently 
normalized to the MNI reference space. The significant results of the random effects 
analysis were compared with the cytoarchitectonic maps using the SPM Anatomy toolbox 
(Eickhoff et al., 2005).  
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In the hand localizer task identical pre-processing and first-level analysis procedures 
were used as in the main experiment. Accordingly, a design matrix, which comprised 
contrasts modeling alternating intervals of “activation” (hand clenching) and “baseline” (no 
movement), was defined. Specific effects were assessed by applying appropriate linear 
contrasts to the parameter estimates of the experimental condition and the baselines 
resulting in t-statistics for each voxel. The hand representations within the left and right 
hemispheres were defined for each subject as the set of all contiguous voxels that were 
significantly more active for performing clenching hand movements vs. baseline at a 
threshold of p < 0.05, family-wise error (FWE) corrected. Thereafter, we considered only 
these voxels that were located within the cytoarchitectonically defined maximum 
probability maps (MPMs) of the primary motor cortex (Brodmann Area 4) provided by the 
SPM Anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005). This combined anatomical and functional 
approach was necessary since the (anatomical) cytoarchitectonically defined probability 
maps do not specify the (functional) hand representations within the motor areas.  
 
6.3. Results 
 
6.3.1. Behavioral results  
 
Mental rotation tasks. Performance on both MR tasks was above the chance level 
(ps < 0.05) for all participants but three, of whom one failed the handedness task, another 
failed the cube-rotation task, and the last one failed both tasks (ps > 0.05). They were 
therefore discarded form the following analyses. The remaining 15 participants performed 
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successfully on the recognition task (ps < 0.05), and were all included in the following 
analyses. 
The ANOVA showed a significant effect of Stimulus, F(1,14)=14.97, p = 0.001, 
Orientation, F(1, 14)=20.16, p < 0.001, and Angle F(2,28)=78.95, p < 0.001. According to 
these main effects, hands were processed faster than cubes, medial orientations were 
processed faster than the lateral ones; and short angles were processed faster than middle 
angles (p < 0.001) and the latter, faster than long angles (p < 0.001). Importantly, the 
Stimulus x Orientation interaction was significant, F(1, 14)=12.32, p < 0.01 (Figure 1b): in 
rotating hands, participants were faster with medial than with lateral orientations (p < 
0.001), while in rotating cubes, they showed no difference between the two orientations (p 
= 0.6). The interaction between Orientation and Angle was also significant, F(2,28)=25.60, 
p<0.0001 (Figure 1b). Accordingly, RTs were faster for short angle than for middle and 
long angles for both stimulus orientations, although this gradient was more pronounced for 
lateral than for medial orientation. In particular, for medial orientations, there was no 
difference between short and middle angles of rotation (p > 0.05), while RTs increased 
significantly from middle to long angles (p < 0.001). For lateral orientations, short angles 
were processed faster than the middle ones, and these were processed faster than the long 
ones (ps < 0.001). Lateral orientations were processed overall slower than the medial ones, 
but this difference was significant for middle and long angles (p < 0.001) but not for short 
angles (p > 01).  
Thus, the main effect of angle (and the lack of interaction between angle and 
stimulus) revealed that the typical angle-gradient effect applied to both hand- and cube-
rotation. Moreover, as predicted, participants’ performance on the handedness task was 
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characterized by the lateral-medial effect, providing a crucial indication that they have 
actually been rotating the hand according to the motor strategy1. This effect was not found, 
when participants rotated the cube-figures. Following these results, we could be confident 
that the two learning phases elicited a motor and nonmotor (visual) processing. 
 
Recognition task. The ANOVA revealed no significant effect or interaction (all ps > 
0.05). This suggests that action and nonaction verbs were processed and recognized equally 
well, regardless of the context in which they appeared during the fMRI session. 
 
6.3.2. Neural activations 
 
Network for mental rotation tasks 
The neural network sustaining MR (i.e., all experimental trials including hand- and 
cube-rotation versus baseline) was assessed by a whole brain random effects analysis (p < 
0.05, FWE corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level, with a height threshold 
at the voxel level of p < 0.001). This network included activation clusters bilaterally in the: 
i) precentral gyrus (Area 6); ii) superior frontal gyrus; iii) middle frontal gyrus; iv) superior 
parietal lobe; v) insula; vi) thalamus, and vii) occipital gyrus. Furthermore, the putamen 
was activated in the left hemisphere (see Table 1 and Figure 1c). These activations 
                                                 
1
 With a one-way ANOVA, we checked the lateral-medial effect, at individual level, defined as the temporal 
advantage in processing medial, over later orientations. It was significant in 10 out of 15 participants 
(p<0.05). The remaining 5 participants, qualitatively, showed a temporal advantage for medial orientations, 
although it did not approach significance (p>0.05). 
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encompass the classic network for MR (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 1998; 2001; Vingerhoets, de 
Lange, Vandemaele, Deblaere et al., 2002; Wraga, Shephard, Churcha, et al., 2005).  
The motor task (MR of hands versus MR of cubes, Figure 1d) activated clusters in 
the: i) right superior frontal gyrus extending to the middle frontal gyrus; ii) left inferior 
frontal gyrus (pars Orbitalis); iii) left superior occipital gyrus extending to cuneus. 
Additionally, a small volume correction was employed to allow for a hypothesis-driven 
region-of-interest (ROI)-based approach (Friston, 1997). The small volume correction was 
performed on the M1 hand representation, to assess whether this region was activated 
during hand rotation. The x-, y- and z-coordinates for the position of M1 hand area were 
derived from the localizer task, averaging across participants, and were used to center the 
ROI for the current analysis. The resulting coordinates were: x= − 38, y = −24 and z= 60 
(left hand area of M1). The extent of the spherical ROI was set to 8 mm (corresponding to 
the smoothing kernel used in single subject analysis). Individual and group-mean 
coordinates (in MNI space) of the maximally activated voxel within the anatomically-
constrained functional ROIs comprising the hand representation in the left and right 
primary motor (M1) cortices, obtained by the functional localizer task and the maximum 
probability maps (MPMs) are presented in the Appendix E (Table S1) and in Figure 2a. 
Using a threshold of p<0.05, FWE corrected for the ROI, we found a significant activation 
at x = -38, y = -26 and z = 66 in the left postcentral gyrus (Area 4a and Area 1). 
The visual task (MR of cubes versus MR of hands, Figure 1e) activated clusters in 
the: i) middle frontal gyrus bilaterally; ii) right superior parietal lobule; iii) left inferior 
parietal lobule; and iv) thalamus bilaterally. 
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Table 1: Whole brain analysis: brain regions showing significant relative increases of 
BOLD response associated with Mental Rotation tasks. 
 
MNI Z Cluster size 
 
 
Region 
 
Side x y z  Voxel 
MR task (Hands + Cubes) >Baseline 
 
Precentral gyrus (Area 6) 
 
L 
 
-30 
 
-4 
 
62 
 
5.87 
 
4811 
Superior Frontal gyrus L -22 -4 50 5.70  
Middle Frontal gyrus R 28 2 48 5.62  
Inferior Frontal gyrus (P.Opercularis) R 54 8 28 5.18 979 
Precentral gyrus R 44 4 32 4.97  
Middle Frontal gyrus R 38 48 28 4.46  
Middle Frontal gyrus L -42 36 34 3.77 70 
Inferior Frontal gyrus (P.Triangularis) L -40 28 26 3.62  
Insula R 30 20 4 5.19 540 
Insula L -34 16 4 5.15 290 
Thalamus L -18 -24 10 5.95 3381 
Thalamus R 18 -24 10 5.52  
Putamen L -24 10 4 3.98 70 
Middle Occipital gyrus L -32 -92 6 6.98 15495 
Cuneus R 18 -98 14 6.27  
Parietal lobule L -24 -64 -52 6,07  
Parietal lobule R 12 -70 -50 6,07  
MR_Hands > MR_cubes 
 
Superior Frontal gyrus 
 
R 
 
18 
 
60 
 
18 
 
4,51 
 
82 
Middle Frontal gyrus R 24 54 22 3,87  
Inferior Frontal gyrus (P.Orbitalis) L -42 36 -6 4,06 99 
Primary motor cortex, hand area L -38 -30 66 3,58** 15 
Superior Occipital gyrus L -14 -96 20 4,43 761 
Cuneus R 4 -92 14 4,26  
MR_cubes > MR_Hands 
 
Middle Frontal gyrus 
 
R 
 
30 
 
4 
 
56 
 
4,56 
 
531 
Middle Frontal gyrus L -20 2 44 3,95 135 
Superior Parietal lobule R 18 -60 56 5,92 8273 
Inferior Parieltal lobule L -52 -42 46 4,25 221 
Thalamus R 18 -30 14 6,04 150 
Thalamus L -20 -34 14 4,30 70 
 
For each region of activation, the coordinates in MNI space are given in reference to the maximally activated 
voxel within an area of activation, as indicated by the highest Z-value (p<0.05, corrected for multiple 
comparisons at the cluster level, height threshold p<0.001, uncorrected). L/R = left/right hemisphere. 
**Psvc<0.05, [corrected for region of interest, ROI, i.e. left hand motor area of the M1 cortex, coordinates 
derived from the localizer task (x=−38, y=−26, and z=60)]. 
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Figure 1. A) Experimental Design: in each block of silent reading (SR), 8 trails of action verbs (SR_M), 
nonaction verbs (SR_nM) or strings were presented. Each SR block was followed by one block of either 
hand- (MR_motor) or cube-rotation (MR_visual). B) Behavioral data: RTs increased linearly with the angle 
of rotation (short, middle, long) in both MR of hands and cubes; only in the former case Rts were consistently 
faster for medial vs. lateral orientations. Vertical bars denote the standard error of the mean. C) Common 
network underlying the mental rotation tasks as revealed by the whole brain analysis. Relative increases in 
neural activity associated with the hands and cubes mental rotation tasks (p<0.05, FWE corrected at the 
cluster level; see Table 1) are displayed on a rendered template brain provided by spm5. MR=Mental 
Rotation. D) Differential activation of M1 revealed by the main effect of task (MR_Hands > MR_Cubes). The 
activation cluster in left M1, centered in the central sulcus during MR_hands (vs. MR_cubes) is shown. E) 
Differential activation of M1 revealed by the main effect of task (MR_Cubes > MR_Hands). 
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Network for silent reading  
The neural network underlying the silent reading task of all meaningful verbs (i.e., 
action and nonaction verbs following either MR task versus strings) included activation 
clusters in the left: i) inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis); ii) supplementary motor area; 
iii) precentral gyrus (Area 4p extending to Areas 4a and 6). The postcentral gyrus (Area 4p 
extending to Areas 1 and 3b) was activated in the right hemisphere. Finally, significant 
activation was found, bilaterally, in the middle temporal gyrus (see Figure 2a and Table 2).  
This pattern of activity corresponds to the classic network involved in visual word 
processing and semantic analysis (e.g., Chee, O’Craven, Bergida et al., 1999; Fiez & 
Petersen, 1998; Friederici, Optiz & von Cramon, 2000).  
 
Main effect of context 
Figure 2b and Table 2 shows that the areas differentially recruited by reading action 
and nonaction verbs following the motor task (versus silent reading following the nonmotor 
task) involved clusters of activity in the: i) left precentral gyrus (Area 6, 4a) extending to 
Poscentral gyrus (Areas 3b, 2), and in the ii) right precentral gyrus (Area 6).   
No differential activation was found for silent reading following the visual task, as 
compared with silent reading following the motor task. 
 
Main effect of stimuli 
Irrespective of the context (motor and nonmotor), action verbs relative to nonaction 
verbs activated the: i) right middle frontal gyrus; ii) left postcentral and precentral gyrus 
bilaterally (Area 6 and Area 1); iii) right anterior cingulate cortex; iv) superior medial gyrus 
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bilaterally; v) middle orbital gyrus extending to the inferior frontal gyrus, bilaterally; vi) 
middle temporal gyrus bilaterally; vii) middle occipital gyrus bilaterally; viii) right 
paracentral lobule; ix) angular gyrus; and x) left superior parietal lobule (see Table 1). The 
reverse contrast (nonaction versus action verbs) included a cluster of activation in the left 
middle frontal gyrus. 
 
Context x Stimuli interaction 
The Context x Stimulus interaction [(act-nact)_postH > (act-nact)_postC] revealed 
no significant activation at the predefined statistical threshold. The reverse contrast [(act-
nact)_postC > (act-nact)_postH] differentially activated regions within the left precentral 
gyrus (Areas 6) and within the right postcentral gyrus (Areas 3a). Precentral activity was 
modulated, as follows: while the activation was greater for action than for nonaction verbs, 
when reading in the nonmotor context, t(14)=2,671, p =0.01, comparable PM activation 
was found for both verb categories, when read in the motor context t(14)=-1,470, p = 0,1. 
The modulation of activity in the right postcentral gyrus was modulated as follows: 
activation was greater when reading action versus nonaction verbs, in the nonmotor 
context, t(14)=3,68, p<0.01, and when reading nonaction versus action verbs, in the motor 
context, t(14)=-3,24, p < 0.01.   
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Table 2. Whole brain analysis: brain regions showing significant relative increases of 
BOLD response associated with Silent Reading task. 
 
MNI Z Cluster size 
 
 
Region 
 
Side x y z  Vox 
Silent Reading: (action+nonaction)  > string 
Inferior Frontal gyrus (P.Triangularis) L -48 14 26 4.97 1842 
Supplementary Motor Area L -4 8 58 4.65 427 
Precentral gyrus (Area 4p) L -34 -24 54 5.24 248 
Precentral gyrus (Area 4a) L -36 -30 62 4.30  
Precentral gyrus (Area 6) L -30 -20 68 3.52  
Postcentral gyrus (Area 4p) R 32 -22 44 3.92 72 
Precentral gyrus (Area 1) R 44 -24 56 3.64  
Precentral gyrus (Area 3b) R 42 -24 44 3.60  
Middle Temporal gyrus L -66 -44 2 5.16 833 
Middle Temporal gyrus R 52 -30 -2 4.53 115 
CONTEXT: (action+nonaction) post_ Hands  > (action+nonaction) post_ cubes 
Precentral gyrus (Areas 6, 4a) L -30 -24 62 4,65 88 
Poscentral gyrus (Area 6) L -30 -34 62 4,07  
Precentral gyrus (Areas 6) R 26 -16 66 4,02 52 
CONTEXT: (action+nonaction) post_ cubes  > (action+nonaction) post_ Hand 
-    - - - - 
STIMULI: action  ( post_ Hands + post_ cubes) > nonaction (post_ Hands + post _cubes) 
 
Middle Frontal gyrus 
 
R 44 12 52 5,44 175 
Postcentral gyrus (Area 1) L -52 -16 48 5,05 1594 
Precentral gyrus (Area 6) L -46 0 44 5,05  
Precentral gyrus (Area 6) L -32 -24 64 4,91  
Postcentral gyrus (Area 1) R 50 -22 52 4,57 569 
Precentral gyrus (Area 6) R 36 -16 64 4,23  
Postcentral gyrus (Area 1) R 62 -8 36 4,06  
Anterior cingulate cortex R 10 48 18 4,97 613 
Superior Medial gyrus R 12 58 18 4,69  
Superior Medial gyrus L -6 40 36 4,84 1189 
Middle Orbital gyrus L -36 52 -10 4,12 180 
Inferior Frontal gyrus (P.Orbitalis) L -42 42 -14 3,95  
Middle Orbital gyrus R 38 44 -10 4,11 168 
Inferior Frontal gyrus (P.Orbitalis) R 50 40 -8 4,09  
Middle Temporal gyrus R 50 -34 -2 4,79 75 
Middle Occipital gyrus L -32 -94 4 4,65 201 
Middle Temporal gyrus L -46 -54 -2 4,47 166 
Middle Occipital gyrus L -46 -74 0 3,97  
Middle Occipital gyrus R 40 -64 -2 4,43 100 
Middle Temporal gyrus R 48 -60 4 3,45  
Middle Temporal gyrus L -64 -30 -4 4,13 66 
Middle Occipital gyrus R 24 -98 4 3,75 125 
Paracentral lobule R 6 -24 66 4,29 108 
Angular gyrus R 58 -56 30 3,66 64 
Superior Parietal lobule L -28 -58 50 3,48 60 
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Table 2 continued 
STIMULI: nonaction (post_Hands + post_cubes) > action (post_Hands + post_cubes) 
 
Middle Frontal gyrus 
 
L -30 -8 54 4,24 64 
CONTEXT x STIMULI (action>nonaction)_post_Hands >  (action>nonaction) post_cubes 
- - - - - - - 
CONTEXT x STIMULI (action>nonaction) post_cubes >  (action>nonaction) post_hands 
 
Postcentral gyrus (Area 3a) 
 
R 40 -20 38 4,28 212 
Precentral gyrus (Area 6) L -52 4 34 3,93 52 
 
For each region of activation, the coordinates in MNI space are given in reference to the maximally activated 
voxel within an area of activation, as indicated by the highest Z-value (p<0.05, corrected for multiple 
comparisons at the cluster level, height threshold p<0.001, uncorrected). L/R = left/right hemisphere 
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Figure 1. (Caption on the next page) 
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Figure 1. A) Group mean coordinates (x= − 38, y = −24 and z= 60 in MNI space) of the maximally activated 
voxel within the (anatomically-constrained functional) ROIs comprising the hand representation of the left 
and the right primary motor cortices obtained by the functional localizer task and the maximum probability 
maps (MPMs). B) Common network underlying the silent reading task as revealed by the whole brain 
analysis. Relative increases in neural activity associated with the silent reading (action + nonaction verbs vs. 
strings; p<0.05, FWE corrected at the cluster level; see Table 2) are displayed on a rendered template brain 
provided by spm5. C) Main effect of context (post_H = motor; post_C = nonmotor) on silent reading (SR), 
irrespective of the verb category (action and nonaction). d) Main effect of Stimuli (Act = action verbs; nAct = 
nonaction verbs) independent of the context. D) Context x Stimulus interaction and the plots of relative 
BOLD signal changes in the left precentral and right postcentral gyri. 
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6.4. Discussion 
 
6.4.1. Implicit transfer of motor strategy to the processing action and nonaction verbs 
We have combined the paradigm for implicit transfer of motor strategies and fMRI 
technique to manipulate the cognitive context (motor versus nonmotor) in which 
participants processed action and nonaction verbs, and investigate the nature of motor 
activation in word understanding.  
Behavioral performance together with M1 and somatosensory activations 
specifically associated with the hand rotation (versus cube rotation) confirmed that 
participants carried out this task according to the motor strategy. The main effect of context 
showed that the same modality of processing was implicitly transferred from the motor 
(hand) rotation to the encoding of the subsequent words, despite the fact that participants 
were given no instruction to relate hand rotation to word-stimuli. Indeed, silent reading 
after the motor task (versus the nonmotor task) specifically activated M1 and primary 
somatosensory cortex, which are expected correlates of motor imagery (Decety et al., 1990; 
Kosslyn et al., 2001; Parsons et al., 1995; Porro et al., 1996; Sirigu et al., 1995; Tomasino 
et al., 2005). The cluster of activation in the left M1 included the hand-area activated in 
both hand rotation and hand-localizer tasks. Importantly, the motor strategy was extended 
to both action and nonaction verbs. A similar effect was not found when the linguistic task 
was preceded by the nonmotor (cube rotation) task. The present results provide novel 
demonstration that motor activations reflect the strategy of relating the word content to an 
embodied meaning, which can, or cannot, be engaged depending of implicit learning and 
regardless of the word category.  
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Why did the nonmotor (visual) context not have a clear effect on word-related 
activation? In motor simulation, people also produce a visual representation of their moving 
limb or the simulated scene; thus, while the motor processes (and the associated kinesthetic 
feelings) are specific for the motor strategy, visual processes are likely to apply to both the 
visual and the motor strategy (Solodkin et al., 2004). The observed activationof body-
related sensory areas (precentral gyrus), together with M1 and PM, during reading in motor 
context, supports this argument. 
 
6.4.2. Action verbs and sensorimotor representations  
Relative to nonaction verbs, action verbs specifically activated a widespread neural 
network, distributed across the two hemispheres. Differential activation for action and 
nonaction verbs is in keeping with previous evidence that concrete and abstract concepts 
rely on partly distinct neural systems (Fiebach & Friederici, 2003; Jessen et al., 2000; 
Noppeney & Price, 2004). In particular, the former are characterized by a more extensive 
and complex, bilaterally distributed, cortical representation, while the latter are strongly 
left-lateralized (e.g., Laws et al., 1995; Binder et al., 2005). In the following discussion, I 
focus on sensorimotor activations associated with word processing. Other activations will 
not be dealt with here, as our a priori hypothesis focused on potential changes of brain 
activity in sensorimotor areas.  
Relative to nonaction verbs, action-verb processing activated sensorimotor regions 
centred in the bilateral ventral premotor (vPM) and precentral gyrus. Our findings are 
consistent with a wealth of studies reporting the involvement of extrasylvian frontal and 
temporal regions in word processing (Damasio, Grabowski, Tranel, et al., 1996; Tranel, 
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Damasio & Damasio, 1997). Among these ‘‘nonclassical’’ language areas, vPM and, 
sometimes, parietal regions (including the precentral gyrus) are activated during reading 
action words (Hauk et al., 2004; Rueschemeyer, van Rooij, Lindemann et al., 2009), verb 
generation (Grabowsky, Damasio, Frank et al., 1995; Petersen, Fox, Posner et al., 1988) 
and tool naming (Grabowsky, Damasio & Damasio, 1998; Grafton, Fadiga, Arbib & 
Rizzolatti, 1997; Martin et al., 1995; 1996). While these activations are typically left-
lateralized, clinical studies suggested that sensorimotor regions in the right hemisphere may 
contribute to action-word processing, particularly for attention-demanding tasks (Cappa, 
Binetti, Pezzini et al., 1998; Neininger & Pulvermüller, 2001; 2003).  
Premotor activity is especially triggered in tasks requiring the retrieval of action 
knowledge related to stimuli (Grabowsky, Damasio & Damasio, 1998; Martin et al., 1996). 
Thus, this region has been suggested to mediate the conscious processing of action 
concepts, by promoting the explicit and efficient retrieval of sensorimotor representations 
associated with a word or concept (Mahon & Caramazza, 2009; Martin & Chao, 2001; 
Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1997). On the other, it is unlikely that PM regions host the 
representations of action concepts or the lexical definition of those categories. Clinical 
studies have indeed shown that the retrieval of action concepts, although defective, is not 
entirely precluded by damage to sensorimotor areas, suggesting that other mechanisms can 
sustain it (Tranel et al., 1997). Likewise, patients with impaired action performance can 
preserve the ability to recognize objects and actions (Negri et al., 2007; see Mahon & 
Caramazza, 2005, for a review) and comprehend action words (refer to Chapter 1).  
 
 
 179 
6.4.3. Verbs and sensorimotor representations  
The interaction between context and word-stimulus showed two clusters of 
activation centered in left vPM and right postcentral gyrus. The modulation of vPM activity 
revealed that in a context that did not cue a motor-modality of processing, this region was 
more activated for action than for nonaction verbs. This is as expected, according to the 
above discussed findings (e.g., Grabowski et al., 1998; Martin et al., 1996). When a motor-
modality of processing was cued, vPM was equally activated for action and nonaction 
verbs, suggesting that the cognitive context elicited the retrieval of sensorimotor 
representations, irrespective of the word category. This finding further support the 
abovementioned view that sensorimotor areas are not essential components of the lexical-
semantic network; instead, their involvement is strongly constrained by the task-context 
eliciting the conscious, explicit processing of concrete, embodied information associated 
with a stimulus (e.g., Tranel et al., 1997). Importantly, a similar modulation was not 
observed for M1 activity. Activity in this region was only modulated by the context, in that 
it was triggered when participants processed verbs in the motor context, irrespective of their 
category. 
 Right postecentral activity resulted greater for action verbs in the nonmotor context, 
and for nonaction verbs in the motor context. Postcentral activity have been repeatedly 
observed in motor imagery (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2009; Hodge et al., 1996; Porro et 
al., 1996; Ruby & Decety, 2001; 2003). In particular, right-lateralized activation has been 
related to visuospatial processing of body-related stimuli (Goldenberg, 1999; Goldenberg & 
Hagmann, 1997; Tanaka & Inui, 2002). Thus, it is possible that the nonmotor (visual) 
context highlighted the visuospatial component of concrete sensorimotor representations, 
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which were activated for action, but not for nonaction verbs. The increased postcentral 
activity for nonaction verbs confirmed that, in the motor context, concrete representations 
were elicited and simulated for these items. It is not clear why, in the same context, 
postcentral activation was lower for action than for nonaction verbs. As a tentative 
explanation, this may reflect the phenomenon of suppression of the somatosensory activity, 
ipsilateral to the (right-hand) task-relevant sensorimotor information (Staines, Graham, 
Black & McIlroy, 2002). In fact, in the motor task, the simulation associated with action 
verbs (all denoting hand-actions) might be strongly centered on right-hand movements, all 
participants being right handed (see Willems et al., 2010).  
   
6.4.4. Motor simulation is one strategy for language comprehension  
These results support a twofold role of the motor system in word processing and 
help clarify the nature of motor simulation in word understanding. We suggest that the 
activity in the vPM can be reliably linked to its representational function for concrete 
concepts; M1 activity reflects the motor-based strategy of referring a given stimulus to 
one’s own bodily movement, via simulation. The activation of sensorimotor representations 
and the motor simulation of their implied content do necessarily not co-occur.  
As discussed above, when the task, or the cognitive context, require relating stimuli 
to action knowledge, the distributed semantic system can recruit PM regions, which 
promote the explicit sensorimotor representation of that knowledge. This recruitment can 
be preferential and possibly automatic in normal retrieval, when stimuli saliently refer to 
actions, because the modality in which individuals typically interact with entities may 
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constrain conceptual organization (Pulvermüller, 2002; Tranel et al., 1997; Warrington & 
McCarthy, 1987; Warrington & Shallice, 1984).  
There is reason to believe that, under certain task conditions, sensorimotor 
representations can be elicited also for nonaction verbs. Overall, the class of “verbs” owns 
in se the idea of action (Bates & MacWhinney, 1982; Langacker, 1987). Moreover, the 
polysemy, i.e., the capacity to covey multiple meanings and subsume novel usage, 
depending on the context, applies to concrete as well as to abstract words (Lee, 1990). 
Extensive behavioral priming studies documented the effects of context on the activation of 
specific meaning attributes of a word (Tabossi, 1988; Tabossi, Colombo & Job, 1987), and 
tasks involving explicit motor skills (specific movements for responding), such as the one 
presented in Chapter 4, may cue motor processes also when processing of abstract 
utterances (see Glenberg & Kashak, 2002; see Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008 for a 
discussion). Finally, imaging studies found that other dimensions, such as the imageability, 
can activate premotor areas in processing nonaction word (D’Esposito et al., 1997; Mellet 
et al., 1998; Postle et al., 2008; Pulvermüller & Hauk, 2006). These and our findigs 
strongly support the view of human brain as a distributed flexible architecture (Friston, 
1998; McIntosh, 2000), whereby learning can immediately promote a cognitive or neural 
context that affects structure and operations.  
Our results also contribute to depict motor simulation as a strategy or a procedure, 
which is defined by the reliance on the context, rather than stimulus-driven, to the extent 
that it can be applied to the processing of action verbs in a given (motor) context but not in 
another (nonmotor), and can be “learnt” and immediately extended to the processing of 
nonaction verbs. This explains why M1 activity is so inconsistently found in imaging study 
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on action-word processing (see Hickok et al., 2009; Turella et al., 2009). By this, it is not 
meant that motor simulation cannot be engaged spontaneously in action-word 
understanding. It may provide one (the most) efficient strategy that individuals acquire 
early and adopt in performing task with critical sensorimotor components. Yet, it is not the 
sole strategy to encode action meanings. In fact, when another (nonmotor) modality of 
processing was cued, identical task instructions for action-verb processing were not 
accompanied by M1 activity. Despite so, participants’ performance was as successful as in 
the motor context (see Recognition results).  
The proposal that different networks can support the same cognitive operation is 
framed within the same aforementioned conception of brain as a flexible, distributed 
architecture (Price & Friston, 2002). The ability of structurally different mechanisms to 
yield the same output is well acknowledged in cognitive neuroscience, whereby multiple 
routes, associated with segregated brain networks, have been described for action imitation 
(Cubelli et al., 2000; Tessari & Rumiati, 2004), object recognition (Hmphreys & Riddoch, 
1984), or word reading (Marshall & Newcomb, 1973). Particularly, a cognitive counterpart 
of our results can be found in the different kinds of representations (propositional/symbolic 
or situational/analogue) of the same linguistic materials (texts), which can be activated for 
comprehension (Kaup & Zwaan, 2003; Perring & Kintsch, 1985). 
 We have so far assumed a virtual identity between motor simulation and M1 
activity, claiming that the latter implicates the former. One might argue that vPM can also 
reflect simulation, so that this operation applies to the processing of action verbs also in the 
nonmotor context. We find this explanation implausible. First, imaging studies have shown 
that mental simulation engages more often the dorsal, than the ventral aspect of PM region 
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(Kosslyn et al., 1998; Solodkin et al., 2004; Vingerhoets, de Lange, Vandemaele et al., 
2002), which is massively connected to M1 (Baumer et al., 2006; Koch et al., 2006; 
Kosslyn et al., 1998; Xiong, Parsons, Gao, and Fox, 1999). Moreover, high-resolution 
fMRI and a number of other techniques have demonstrated that M1, particularly in the left 
hemisphere, is an essential correlate of motor simulation, to the extent that this cognitive 
ability is defined as a true motor behavior sharing important features (including brain 
network, kineasthetic sensations and autonomic activation) with overt motor execution 
(Decety, Jeannerod, Durozard & Baverel; 1993; Jackson et al., 2006; Jeannerod, 2001; 
Kosslyn et al., 1998; Porro et al., 1996; Solodkin et al., 2004; Tomasino et al., 2005).  
The idea underlying this study was challenging in that the experimental paradigm, 
which has been typically implemented across tasks of the same domain (e.g., sequence 
learning or mental rotation in both learning and testing phases; Fletcher et al., 2004; Wraga 
et al., 2003), here, was used to transfer strategies across domains (motor/visual rotation and 
language). Our results, therefore, provide insight to the long-lasting issue concerning the 
degree of specificity of implicit transfer. In contrast with the proposal that implicit transfer 
is strictly limited to tasks that are based on the same underlying structure and tap in the 
same domain (Dienes & Berry, 1997), we have shown that it is a flexible mechanism, not 
bounded to a specific type of learning material or domain (Willingham, 1999).  
This study provides strong evidence that simulation in language is one strategy or 
procedure that can be prevented by top-down context-dependent factors, even for tasks and 
stimuli with salient sensorimotor components. And it is so truly a strategy that it can be 
imposed top-down to the processing of stimuli (nonmotor verbs) that do not normally elicit 
it.  
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Chapter 7.  
General Discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1. The tie between action and language is in our imagination 
In this thesis I described a number of conditions, at stimulus- and task-level, that make 
the cross/talk between language and motor system possible. These conditions are 
compatible with the kind of circumstances that strategically elicit a motor modality of 
processing, based on imagery ability. On the other hand, the definition of conditions that 
do not elicit simulation implies, per se, that motor simulation is not the general 
mechanism for understanding action language.  
In chapter 2, I have reproted neuropsychological double dissociations between 
language and praxis, even when the two abilities were tested under conditions (i.e., 
equally early-acquired verbal and motor tasks involving perceptually and conceptually 
identical stimuli) that may increase the degree of overlap between the two systems (e.g., 
Bates & Dick, 2002). In the same study, there was no indication that the deficit in action-
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word understanding could specifically relate to lesions in frontocentral (motor and 
premotor) regions that are held to encode action meanings. These findings brought 
support to the hypothesis that motor areas are not essential for action-word understanding 
(see also Hickok, 2010). Starting from here, I attempted to define the nature of motor 
simulation in normal language processing. 
In chapter 3, using TMS, I found that motor simulation, as reflected in primary 
motor (M1) activity, mediates language processing only when the task required the 
explicit retrieval of action knowledge associated with a word (versus other tasks). 
Importantly, M1 activity enhanced beyond the time interval for lexical-semantic 
encoding (before 400 ms; e.g., Sereno et al., 1998), and within that for imagery (after 400 
ms; e.g., Iwaki et al., 1999). Moreover, in chapter 5, I provided evidence that language 
affected a subsequent motor response when the sentential context described human action 
versus not non-biological mechanical motion. Not only is the motor system capable of 
distinguishing humans from non-humans actions, but it can also differentiate the self 
from others. Indeed, in a second TMS study (Chapter 4), I found that motor activity 
increased selectively for actions attributed to the self versus a third subject/agent. The 
fMRI study reported in Chapter 6 provides, in my view, the ultimate evidence that 
simulation in language is one strategy that can be prevented by context-dependent 
factors, even for tasks and stimuli with salient sensorimotor components, and readily 
learnt and imposed top-down to the processing of (nonmotor) words that do not normally 
elicit it.  
This set of results suggests that the exposure to action-related words, on its own, 
is not sufficient to elicit simulation. In other words, motor simulation, in language 
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understanding, is not completely stimulus-driven, but is defined by the reliance on top-
down higher-level factors, such as the individuals’ attention to some aspects of the 
stimuli, the representation of self as distinct from others, the sentential and the cognitive 
(neural) context. The engagement of this modality of processing requires a cognitive 
mediation that is not predicted by the direct matching between a perceived stimulus and 
the corresponding motor representation, as the embodied hypothesis suggests.  
Motor imagery provides the interface between language and action, by mediating 
the information transfer of across the two domains. Adding a third component to the 
relationship between action and language, immediately implies that action understanding 
and motor simulation are not identical processes and language and action are 
independent, although highly interactive, domains. The view of strategic, rather than 
obligatory, motor simulation (or imagery) can explain why motor activation is so 
inconsistently found in imaging studies on language and action understanding (Hickok et 
al., 2009; Turella et al., 2009).  
It is conceivable that motor simulation is the preferential, most effective modality 
to achieve comprehension, for normally-able individuals who are typically tested in 
studies involving daily actions that can be easily “visualized” or simulated. The 
familiarity with an action has been already shown to affect motor activation during action 
observation (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005; see also Chatterjee, 2010). No theory denies 
“(…) that images exist or images play an important role in many cognitive processes” 
(Fodor, 1975, p. 184), or that “all higher mental capacities including language make use 
of some sort of basic machinery” (Jackendoff, 2007, p. 389). However, the claim that our 
complex ability to comprehend can take advantage of sensorimotor experience and 
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modality-specific systems, which are the link to senses and environment, is quite 
different from the claim that motor simulation is the “core attribute” of our understanding 
of actions. 
 
7.2. Brain functioning and flexibility 
The interpretation, proposed here, of a strategic interplay between action and 
language relates to a vision of the brain as a flexible distributed architecture, owning the 
faculty to cross the boundaries of traditionally distinct cognitive domains when needed by 
the task (see Rumiati, Papeo, & Corradi-Dell’Acqua, 2010; Willems & Hagoort, 2007). 
In this view, every cognitive task can, in principle, be mediated by context-dependent 
interactivity of different neural elements, so that every brain area can be part of different 
networks depending on a given task (McIntosh, 2000), and different networks can 
support the same function (Friston & Price, 2003).  
The cross-talk between action-related language and motor processes may 
represent one paradigmatic example of the brain flexibility for making sense of task-
relevant sensorimotor information in a verbal message, without implying an exclusive 
relationship between action and language. Instead, language comprehension can rely on 
different networks that can or cannot involve simulation. In chapter 5, for instance, I have 
suggested that visuospatial, rather than motor processes can be involved in linguistic 
tasks, when the sentential context cues perceptual/spatial, rather than motor 
representations (see also Bergen et al., 2007; Landau & Jackendoff, 1993; Talmy, 2000). 
The notion of strategic (context-dependent) brain functioning is well acknowledged in 
cognitive science, where multiple-route models have been conceived to account for 
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empirical results in different domains of cognition. For instance, dual-route models have 
been proposed for word reading (Marshall & Newcombe, 1973), action imitation (Cubelli 
et al., 2000; Rothi et al., 1991; Tessari & Rumiati, 2004), and object recognition 
(Humphreys & Riddoch, 1984). Likewise, psycholiguistic research have suggested that 
comprehenders can construct either propositional (i.e., a symbolic description of the 
event) or situational representation (i.e., an analogue description to mimic structural 
relations between entities in the described scene) of the same text (e.g., Kaup & Zwaan, 
2003; Perring & Kintsch, 1985).  
In the case of language comprehension, we have so far assumed that simulation 
serves for conveying concrete information to conceptual representations. In the following 
section I will sketch alternative answers to the question why motor simulation should be 
engaged, if comprehension can be achieved without it. 
 
7.3. The role(s) of motor simulation in language: a question for future research 
In discussing the involvement of motor simulation in language, we have been 
emphasizing the relevance of rehearsing previous sensorimotor experience, through 
imagery, to access the concrete attributes of a word meanings (see also Rumiati et al., 
2010). This idea has been well articulated in Machery’s reasoning about the role of visual 
imagery in cognition: “to decide whether something is a part of something else, a reliable 
strategy is to visualize it. Relying on imagery is a reliable strategy to solve the part-whole 
property verification task because in visual imagery, we access some information about 
the physical structure of objects” (Machery, 2007, p. 35). Likewise, to decide whether a 
word is related to an action (e.g., Chapter 3), or whether an implied action is carried out 
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outdoor or indoor (Tomasino et al., 2007), motor simulation appears as an effective way 
to infer the response.  
Compatibly with this view, it has been suggested that the information flow from 
the motor to the conceptual domain is functional to language understanding in itself, by 
providing concepts with a physical instantiation that enriches comprehension (Mahon & 
Caramazza, 2008; Tranel et al., 1997). On this view, language exploits the motor system 
as a device providing abstract representations with concrete, contextual information to 
sustain semantic encoding. Thus, the role of motor system in conceptual processing may 
provide a measure of individual difference in conceptual processes, depending of 
individual motor experience (Chatterjee, 2010). In the same vein, it may be expected that, 
patients with impaired motor function, while they can comprehend the core meaning of 
an action-concept, actually lose some aspects of that concept. Moreover, the phenomena 
of language-induced motor activity are typically observed in normal participants during 
the processing of words implying actions, which every able-bodied person can perform 
and frequently experience. The investigation of individuals with congenital deprivation of 
sensorimotor experience, due, for instance, to the congenital absence of upper-limbs, can 
represent a test-bed to establish the extent to which motor simulation actually reflects 
sensorimotor experience, and what, if anything, sensorimotor experience adds to 
conceptual knowledge.  
 It is equally possible that motor activity does not serve language (conceptual) 
processing or categorization per se, but underlies functions that are triggered by, but are 
different from, the encoding of action meanings. In Chapter 3, I provided evidence that 
motor activity results from (i.e., comes after), rather than contributing to action 
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understanding. This observation is consistent with the idea that motor simulation in 
action understanding, serves action anticipation (Csibra; 2004; 2008). “The motor 
activation in the observer may not mirror but anticipate, may not shadow but 
foreshadow, what the other is doing. The perception of dynamic events, whether or not 
they involve social stimuli, is always predictive in nature” (Csibra, 2008, p.451). 
According to this view, action stimuli may elicit motor planning to anticipate the further 
course of an action. This hypothesis is particularly appealing because it does not deny 
“mirror” activity of the brain, but reverses its function from replication of a perceived 
action, as originally argued (Rizzolatti et al., 2001), to anticipation. The existence of the 
so-called “logically-related mirror neurons” in humans may constitute the neural 
foundation of this hypothesis. Imaging studies have showed that premotor “mirror” areas 
activates in response to an observed action, but discharge during the execution of another 
one that is the obvious consequence of the former (Iacoboni et al., 2005). Analogously, 
the activity in the frontoparietal “mirror” circuitry was found to increases massively to 
prepare an action complementary to the observed one (Newman-Norlund et al., 2007).  
These observations raised in the domain of action observation, where the benefits 
of being able to anticipate the immediate future of another’s action appear obvious 
(Csibra, 2008). In language comprehension, the comprehender’s motor system may 
subserve a similar anticipatory function by implementing the commands implied in the 
sender’s linguistic message. This may help coordinate behaviour for social 
communication and interaction, which is accomplished only when the comprehender 
understands the intentions underlying speech and reacts properly to them (Clark & Bly, 
1995; Levinson, 1983; see also Scott et al., 2009). The associated enhancement of motor 
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activity can have the adaptive value of bringing the system close to threshold for actual 
execution, when the sensorimotor meaning is the focus of a message, or words are 
intended as motor commands (see also Postle et al., 2008).  
The involvement of motor system in language may imply a mechanism of word-
response association that is not extraneous to some embodied accounts of language (e.g., 
Pulvermüller, 2002) or can be the result of evolutionary constraints to the functional 
connectivity within the brain (see Mahon & Caramazza, 2009; Riesenhuber, 2007; see 
Mahon et al., 2009 for related questions in visual domain). In this latter view, the motor 
system can be part of the brain network, innately disposed to handle motor information. 
Then, how much of motor activation depends on previous sensorimotor experience and, 
as such, is learned, and how much of it depends on a priori principles of cortical 
organization? Another question for future research! 
To recap, we have discussed two alternative, though not mutually exclusive, 
functions of motor simulation in language and conceptual processing. Simulation may 
serve language understanding by enriching a word representation with details concerning 
concrete aspects of its meaning. Alternatively, it can reflect action anticipation to 
coordinate behavior for social communication and interaction. Either function 
(categorization or anticipation) would be compatible with our account based on strategic 
motor imagery. In fact, while imagery allows the rehearsal of motor images or acts, 
which may help comprehension of perceptual stimuli, its ultimate function is to 
continuously update mental representations in order to predict the consequences of our 
own and others’ actions and prepare the appropriate response (e.g., Jeannerod, 2001).  
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What function is actually reflected in motor activation, how much of it depends on 
previous individual experience, and how much on our evolutionary history, what 
sensorimotor information adds to our conceptual abilities and how much flexible our 
innate conceptual structure is, are all questions for future research. Beneficiating of the 
apparent anatomical and functional transparency of the motor system, this investigation 
can reveal the neural mechanisms of brain flexibility, by explaining how information 
from any modality-specific system can be transferred and integrated in higher-level 
cognition.  
 
7.4. Concluding remarks 
It is hard to “imagine” how extreme versions of embodied (but also disembodied) 
cognition could account for the complex relationship between language and motor 
system. While the recruitment of motor simulation in language poses a challenge to 
traditional, strictly modular views of cognition, it cannot be explained by collapsing 
conceptual, language and sensorimotor systems in a unique substrate, ruled by a unique 
mechanism (i.e., the mirror matching). This proposal has been under examination here 
(and elsewhere), but have failed dramatically on empirical investigation. On the one 
hand, neuropsychological investigation does not allow to assume an identity between 
conceptual and sensorimotor representations and processes; on the other hand, 
behavioral, imaging and TMS studies, presented here, have significantly restricted, from 
all to certain, the conditions for action-language interaction. The combination of these 
imaging and neuropsychological findings defines the role of motor system as 
(sometimes) sufficient, but not necessary for language comprehension.  
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Strategic motor imagery seems to provide the most parsimonious explanation and 
the most plausible interface between basic (motor) and specific (linguistic) processing. 
This very powerful mental operation, in language comprehension, can mediate the 
information flow across domains, in order to enrich symbolic representations with 
embodied meaning, and/or extract crucial information for planning actions. In my view, 
there is nothing special about the relationship between action and language. Whole 
cognition may take advantage of information represented in distinct systems, which can 
be creatively connected to subsume novel usage. However, in any situation requiring 
arbitrary combinations of information from diverse sources, is there any combinatorial 
system as good as language? 
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APPENDIX A.  
List of the 15 action-verbs and 15 tool-nouns (in alphabetical order) used as experimental 
stimuli  for the linguistic tasks in the neuropsychological study reported in Chapter 1. 
 Actions (verbs) Tools (nouns) 
1 Accendere (to light up) Accendino (cigarette lighter) 
2 Bere (to drink) Bicchiere (glass) 
3 Cancellare (to rub out) Gomma (eraser) 
4 Chiudere (to lock) Chiave (key) 
5 Cucire (to sew) Ago (needle) 
6 Fumare (to smoke) Sigaretta (cigarette) 
7 Lavare (to brush the teeth) Spazzolino (toothbrush) 
8 Mangiare (to eat) Cucchiaio (spoon) 
9 Pettinare (to comb) Pettine (comb) 
10 Scopare (to sweep) Scopa (broom) 
11 Scrivere (to write) Penna (pen) 
12 Suonare (to play the flute) Flauto (flute) 
13 Telefonare (to phone) Telefono a rotella (telephone) 
14 Timbrare (to stamp) Timbro (stamp) 
15 Versare (to pour) Bottiglia (bottle) 
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Appendix B 
Action-related and non-action related lexical items used in Experiments 1-3. 
Hand-action verbs    Non-hand action verbs   
abbottono, I button up maneggio, I handle accavallo, I cross nuoto, I swim 
abbraccio, I embrace manipolo, I manipulate accelero, I accelerate  oltrepasso, I outstrip 
accarezzo, I caress manometto, I tamper addento, I bite ondeggio, I stagger 
acchiappo, I catch martello, I hammer ammicco, I wink palleggio, I bounce 
acconcio, I comb mescolo, I steer annuisco, I nod passeggio, I stroll 
afferro, I grasp mitraglio, I shoot annuso, I sniff pedalo, I pedal 
agguanto, I grab mungo, I milk arretro, I move back percorro, I walk 
allaccio, I fasten palpeggio, I feel avanzo, I move forward peregrinare, I stroll 
amalgamo, I mix perquisisco, I frisk ballo, I dance pesto, I stamp on 
ammanetto, I arrest poto, I prune bevo, I drink piantono, I guard 
annodo, I tie prendo, I take bighellono, I stroll about piroetto, I twist 
applaudo, I clap pugnalo, I stab calpesto, I stomp proferisco, I utter 
arrostisco, I roast remo, I row cammino, I walk retrocedo, I demote 
autografo, I sign rimescolo, I reshuffle cavalco, I ride ridacchio, I chortle 
avvito, I screw riparo, I fix circondo, I encircle rido, I laugh  
bastono, I thrash saluto, I salute corro, I run rincorro, I run after 
cesello, I carve sbottono, I unbutton danzo, I dance salgo, I rise 
clicco, I click scaravento, I hurl decelero, I slow down saltello, I jig 
coloro, I color scavo, I dig deglutisco, I swallow salto, I jump 
condisco, I dress scrivo, I write dondolo, I swing sbuffo, I fume 
cucio, I sew sfoglio, I leaf through espiro, I breathe out scappo, I rush off 
decoro, I decorate sminuzzo, I chop gareggio, I race scavalco, I leap over 
digito, I press smonto, I dismantle gattono, I crawl scivolo, I slip 
dipingo, I paint  soffriggo, I fry gironzolo, I loiter sgambetto, I trot 
firmo, I sign solletico, I tickle girovago, I bum around sgranocchio, I crunch 
imbottisco, I pad sparo, I shoot imprigiono, I imprison soffio, I blow 
impugno, I clasp spremo, I squeeze inchino, I bow sogghigno, I sneer 
incateno, I chain stappo, I uncork indietreggio, I back off striscio, I crawl 
indico, I point stiro, I iron inseguo, I pursue vagabondo, I rove 
inscatolo, I pack in tins stringo, I hold marcio, I march veleggio, I sail 
intarsio, I sculpt strofino, I rub mastico, I chew volteggio, I vault 
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Non-action Verbs 
      
addoloro, I distress elimino, I eliminate manco, I miss rinnego, I disown 
adoro, I adore eredito, I inherit medito, I wonder rinuncio, I give up 
ambisco, I hanker esagero, I exaggerate memorizzo, I memorize riprovo, I retry 
analizzo, I analyze esamino, I examine miglioro, I improve rispetto, I respect 
angoscio, I am worried esigo, I demand moltiplico, I multiply sbaglio, I mistake 
annoio, I bore esordisco, I debut nego, I deny sboccio, I blossom 
annullo, I nullify evito, I avoid obbedisco, I obey 
scado, I decrease in 
value 
apprezzo, I appreciate evolvo, I evolve odio, I hate scelgo, I choose 
assumo, I assume fallisco, I fail offendo, I offend scoccio, I annoy 
attendo, I wait favorisco, I promote omologo, I approve scommetto, I bet 
auspico, I wish formulo, I formulate ostento, I boast sconto, I discount 
autorizzo, I authorize fuorvio, I mislead perdo, I lose sconvolgo, I distress 
bado, I take care of garantisco, I guarantee placo, I calm soffro, I suffer 
boccio, I flunk gioisco, I rejoice plagio, I crib sogno, I dream 
brillo, I shine gradisco, I enjoy poltrisco, I lounge somiglio, I resemble 
decido, I decide gravo, I bear upon possiedo, I own sopporto, I tolerate 
comincio, I begin idolatro, I idolize preferisco, I  prefer sospendo, I suspend 
condivido, I share ignoro, I ignore preoccupo, I worry stanzio, I allocate 
condiziono, I influence illudo, I deceive prevedo, I predict stimo, I estimate 
conosco, I know imparo, I learn proibisco, I prohibit stupisco, I astonish 
consisto, I consist influenzo, I influence  promuovo, I promote sublimo, I subliminate 
deludo, I disappoint interesso, I interest provo, I feel subordino, I subdue 
deplore, I deplore interpreto, I interpret provoco, I provoke sudo, I sweat 
deprimo, I depress intristisco, I get sad ragiono, I reason sussisto, I subsist 
desidero, I desire invecchio, I grow old rallegro, I am happy taccio, I shut up 
detesto, I detest invidio, I envy rappresento, I represent tasso, I tax 
dimentico, I forget ipotizzo, I hypothesize  rendo, I convey temo, I fear 
distinguo, I distinguish istruisco, I teach resisto, I resist tollero, I tolerate 
divento, I become lamento, I complain ricevo, I receive trascuro, I abandon 
doto, I provide legalizzo, I legalize 
riconosco, I 
acknowledge turbo, I trouble 
dubito, I doubt limito, I limit rifletto, I think overt vario, I change 
elaboro, I elaborate lucro, I earn rimpiango, I regret vinco, I win 
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Appendix C. 
Sentences used as experimental stimuli in Experiments 1-3 reported in Chapter 5. 
Clockwise human-related sentences 
Il bambino sta temperando la matita colorata (The child is sharpening the colored pencil). 
L’operaio sta avvitando la lampadina al lampadario (The worker is screwing the light bulb 
into the lamp). 
L’autista sta sterzando velocemente a destra (The driver is rapidly veering to the right). 
La signora sta componendo il numero sul telefono a rotella (The lady is composing the 
phone number on the dial phone). 
Il ragazzo sta alzando il volume dello stereo con la manopola (The boy is turning up the 
volume of the hi-fi with the knob). 
Il falegname sta stringendo la vite del tavolo (The carpenter is tightening the screw of the 
table). 
Il ragazzo sta azionando il motore della macchina (The boy is turning on the car engine). 
 
Counterclockwise human-related sentences 
L’autista sta sterzando velocemente a sinistra (The driver is rapidly veering to the left). 
La signora sta abbassando la fiamma del fornello (The lady is turning down the gas on the 
hob) 
Il ragazzo sta abbassando il volume dello stereo con la manopola (The boy is turning down 
the volume of the hi-fi with the knob). 
Il farmacista sta svitando il barattolo di vetro (The pharmacist is opening the glass-jar). 
L’operaio sta svitando la lampadina dal lampadario (The worker is removing the light bulb 
from the lamp). 
Il falegname sta estraendo la vite dal muro (The carpenter is removing the screw from the 
wall) 
Il ragazzo sta spegnendo il motore della macchina (The boy is turning off the car engine). 
 
Clockwise object-related sentences 
Il CD sta girando nel lettore (The CD is turning in the CD-player). 
Il disco sta girando sul grammofono (The record is turning on the gramophone). 
La lavatrice sta centrifugando il bucato colorato (The washing machine is spinning the 
colored laundry).  
La lancetta sta segnando lo scorrere dei secondi (The second-hand is turning). 
La trottola colorata sta girando sul pavimento (The spinning top is turning on the floor). 
La lancetta della bilancia sta segnando l’aumento di peso (The scales are indicating the 
increase in weight). 
Il tachimetro sta avvertendo l’aumento di velocita’ (The speedometer is indicating the 
speed increase). 
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Counterclockwise object-related sentences 
Il mangianastri sta riavvolgendo la cassetta (The cassette-player is rewinding). 
La videocassetta sta tornando indietro (The video-tape is rewinding). 
La lancetta sta segnando un abbassamento di pressione (The barometer is signalling a drop 
in pressure). 
La punta del trapano sta estraendo la vite dal muro (The point of the screwdriver is 
removing the screw from the wall). 
Il carillon si sta muovendo in senso antiorario (The mobile is moving counterclockwise). 
La lancetta della bilancia sta tornando sullo zero (The scales are returning to zero). 
La lancetta del tachimetro sta registrando la riduzione di velocita’ (The speedometer is 
signalling a decrease in speed). 
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Appendix D 
Norming study for the assessment of sentences used as experimental stimuli in 
Experiments 1-3 reported in Chapter 5. 
A Norming study was carried out with the objective to collect basic information 
about the selected stimulus-sentences. Thirty-one participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire to evaluate those motor dimensions implied by language that might influence 
the relationship between language and motor processes. Particularly, the familiarity tightly 
correlates with the time for item processing (e.g. Connine et al. 1990), and the imageability 
of an utterance determines the ability to mentally represent its content. Moreover, language 
can convey very detailed features of the described context that are used to construct 
situation models during comprehension (see Jackendoff 1987). Therefore, features like 
amplitude and continuity might render the motion implied in some items, more perceptually 
salient or suitable to interact with motor processes, than others. On the other hand, the time 
for mentally representing rotation is typically proportional to the degrees of rotation 
(Shepard and Cooper 1982). Thus, participants rated: 1) familiarity (how familiar they were 
with the scene described in the sentence); 2) imageability (how difficult/easy it was to elicit 
a mental image of the described scene); 3) amplitude of the implied motion; and 4) whether 
it was part-way or continuous. The first three dimensions were rated on 1-7 Likert-type 
scales, whereas a binary score (0-1) was required to judge whether the implied motion was 
part-way (0) or continuous (1). 
We also collected simple RTs for each sentence, with the objective to test whether 
and to what extent any of the assessed dimensions influenced sentences comprehension. In 
other words, we wanted to ensure that implied motor dimensions, other than type (manual 
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or mechanical) and direction, were balanced across sentences or, at least, did not crucially 
affected or biased sentence processing. In this manner, should any difference occur in the 
following experiments between CW and CCW human and objects sentences, it could be 
attributed to the interaction between type and direction of implied motion and motor 
process for responding. Therefore, before filling in the questionnaire, participants 
performed a semantic-judgment task, where they judged the sensibility of the selected 
sensible and nonsensical sentences by pressing a key, a response that did not elicit any 
congruence effect with the implied-language motion.  
 
Materials and methods  
Participants 
 Thirty-one healthy, right-handed native Italian speakers (11 males, 18-31 years), all 
university graduates or undergraduate students, participated in this preliminary study. 
 
Materials and procedure  
Participants were presented with the above 56 motion and state sentences and 56 
nonsensical sentences for a semantic-judgment task. All items had been previously read 
aloud and recorded (http://audacity.sourceforge.net/) by a female Italian speaker. They 
were transmitted to participants through headphones, their length ranging from 2.066 to 
3.995 ms. Participants were instructed to press the spacebar on a keyboard when the 
sentence made sense, while no response was required for nonsensical sentences. They were 
told to respond as quickly as possible, but not before they had listened to the whole 
sentence, as many nonsensical sentences could not be recognized as such until the last word 
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was heard. Each sentence was randomly presented twice for a total of 224 trials. All factors 
were manipulated within-subjects; this yielded a 2 Stimulus-type (human-related and 
object-related sentences) X 2 implied-language rotation (clockwise and counterclockwise) 
experimental design. At the end of the experiment, the ratings for the several dimensions of 
the motion implied by the sentences were collected with a questionnaire. 
 
Analyses 
 Familiarization, state and nonsensical trials were discarded. All participants 
achieved at least 85% accuracy in judging critical trials (M=97%), except two, who failed 
in 19% and 22% of trials respectively and were therefore excluded from subsequent 
analyses. Incorrectly-judged trials (2.6%) and those with response latencies 2 SDs away 
from the individual condition mean (7.5% of correct responses) were discarded. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA with factors Stimulus-type and Implied-language rotation was 
run on RTs. All planned comparisons between critical conditions were performed using 
two-tailed t-tests (α≤.05) and the by-item analysis was performed with regressions of 
repeated measured data (Lorch and Myers 1990).  
 
Results 
All participants achieved at least 85% accuracy in judging critical trials (M=97%), 
except for two, who failed in 19% and 22% of trials respectively and were therefore 
excluded from the analyses. RTs to state and nonsensical sentences, incorrectly-judged 
trials (2.6%) and those with response latencies 2 SDs away from the individual condition 
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mean (7.5% of correct responses) were discarded (Ratcliff 1993). Responses to human-
related sentences resulted overall faster than responses to object-related sentences 
F(1,28)=10.47, p<.01, ηp2=.27, and  CW sentences were overall faster than the CCW ones, 
F(1,28)=5.70, p=.02, ηp2=.17. The interaction between the two factors was not significant , 
F(1,28)=1.97, n.s. No significant difference was found between CW and CCW human 
sentences, p>.1, while judgments on CW object sentences were faster than those on CCW 
sentences, t(28)=2.17, p=.03, t(28)item=2.62, p=.01 (Fig. 1). That is, participants processed 
CW and CCW human sentences equally fast, whilst they showed a temporal advantage in 
processing CW over CCW object sentences. These comparisons provided us with 
information on participants’ performance in a response condition (i.e. keypress) that did not 
elicit any congruence effect. In the following experiment, we investigated whether and how 
the congruence between implied and actual motion (i.e. manual rotation) altered such 
pattern of performance on human and object sentences. 
 
Post-experimental questionnaire 
The results of the questionnaire revealed no difference in familiarity and 
imageability between CW and CCW human- and object-sentences (ps>.1). The amplitude 
of motion was judged to be overall greater for object than human motion, t(13)=4.73, 
p<.001, but CW and CCW sentences within each type resulted matched for this dimension, 
ps>.1. Likewise, object motion was judged as having higher continuity than human motion, 
t(13)=3.98, p=.001, although this dimension was matched between CW and CCW human-
related sentences and between CW and CCW object-related sentences, ps>.1. Then, a 
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regression model was created using the participants' ratings of familiarity, imageability, 
amplitude and continuity, entered in a stepwise fashion, as predictors of the mean RT for 
each sentence1. This resulted in an effect size with R2(23)=.34, and significant beta weight 
obtained for the familiarity factor only (β=-.96; t(23)=-3.22, p=.003). Thus, the only 
predictor of RTs was the familiarity that, however, could not constitute a bias in sentence 
comprehension because it was matched for all the critical types of sentences. Human and 
object sentences differed for amplitude and continuity of implied motion, both being higher 
for the latter type of stimuli. This is not surprising, because manual rotations described in 
human sentences involved the wrist (e.g. to open a glass jar) which has limited degrees of 
rotation, compared with many mechanical objects (e.g. a record rotating on a gramophone). 
Likewise, motion implied in object sentences was often a continuous rotation, whereas 
biomechanical joint-constraints of the wrist only allow part-way rotation. However, neither 
dimension predicted RTs, thus ensuring that these differences could not weight on 
participants’ performance. More importantly, the Norming study showed that CW and 
CCW sentences within each stimulus-type (which were the critical conditions for 
comparisons), besides length, structure and complexity, were fully comparable for 
familiarity, imageability, amplitude and continuity of implied motion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Mean RTs for each sentence were computed taking into account the response latencies of the first 
presentation of each sentence. The correlation between RTs for the first presentation of the item and the 
mean RTs of both presentations was highly significant (r(27)=.94, p<.0001) 
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Appendix E 
Table S1. (Relative to Chapter 6) List of the individual and group mean coordinates (in 
MNI space) of the maximally activated voxel within the (anatomically-constrained 
functional) ROIs comprising the hand representation of the left and the right primary 
motor (M1) cortices obtained by the functional localizer task and the maximum 
probability maps (MPMs). 
 
Left M1 Right M1 
x y z x y z 
-42 -24 60 38 -28 52 
-38 -24 62 36 -24 58 
-38 -24 56 36 -24 58 
-42 -24 60 42 -22 50 
-38 -26 62 42 -20 56 
-32 -24 56 36 -22 58 
-34 -24 58 38 -24 52 
-38 -28 60 38 -24 50 
-34 -28 60 40 -22 60 
-42 -28 58 42 -20 56 
-38 -28 60 36 -22 58 
-38 -24 60 40 -26 62 
-38 -22 62 42 -22 52 
-38 -28 62 36 -24 60 
-42 -22 56 42 -18 54 
 
-38 -26 60 39 -23 56 
3,07 2,1 2,2 2,6 2.5 3,8 
 
The group mean coordinates are indicated in bold and the respective standard deviations in italics. 
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